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ABSTRACT 
 
 In September 1945, after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the 
United States possessed only one nuclear weapon. Thirteen years later, in September 
1958, the nation possessed a significant stockpile of nuclear weapons, including the very 
powerful hydrogen bomb. The United States was able to build its stockpile of nuclear 
weapons because the Los Alamos Laboratory, once a secret wartime facility, was able to 
convert the forces of nature – fission and fusion – into weapons of war. The United States 
also was successful because of the sacrifice made by a tiny Pacific Ocean nation, The 
Marshall Islands, and the people of Bikini, Enewetak, and Rongelap Atolls. Between 
1946 and 1958, the United States tested sixty-six nuclear weapons in the Marshall 
Islands. Nuclear testing contaminated these three atolls and, in one instance, injured the 
people of Rongelap. As a result of this testing many of these people cannot return to their 
ancestral homes. This dissertation examines the many conditions that led to the creation 
of the Los Alamos Laboratory, its testing of nuclear weapons in the Marshall Islands, and 
the long term, perhaps, permanent, displacement of the people of Bikini, Enewetak, and 
Rongelap. 
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CHAPTER 1 
WHAT ATOMIC BOMB? 
The indescribable destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by just two atomic 
bombs created a New World in which the foreign and military policy of the United States 
was determined largely by the possession of nuclear weapons.
1
 This New World, 
however, was a chimera because at the very instant the atomic bomb known as Fat Man 
exploded in a blinding flash over the Urakami Valley of Nagasaki on August 9, 1945, the 
United States had only one nuclear weapon or, more correctly, the components for one, 
separated by nearly seven thousand miles. The non-nuclear parts - the mechanical, 
electrical, and high explosive components for a second Fat Man - were at the assembly 
facility on the Marianas Island of Tinian. The nuclear components, only recently 
fabricated, remained in the United States.
2
 By 1958, just thirteen years later, the United 
States had a very large and sophisticated nuclear stockpile, including thermonuclear (aka 
hydrogen) bombs. 
How did the United States overcome this period atomic scarcity and produce the 
nuclear arsenal that was the keystone of national defense? The answer, and my thesis, is 
that a small group of relatively little-known scientists, who continued working at a secret 
nuclear laboratory after the war ended, kept the nation’s nuclear capability alive, even as 
a war weary nation demobilized and the political fate of the nation’s nuclear weapons 
program fell into limbo. These little-known scientists understood that nuclear weapons, 
                                                 
1
 Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, The New World, 1939-1946 (University Park, Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania University Press, 1962). 
 
2
 W.S. Parsons to J.R. Oppenheimer, LANL Archives, 17 August 1945.   
 
  2 
by virtue of their existence and use against Japan, had become the defining feature of the 
nation’s military power. Believing that their work provided a singular service to the 
country, these scientists remained at their posts despite the postwar leadership vacuum. 
Working without substantial technical or political direction, the scientists of this secret 
laboratory, known during the war by its codename Project Y, created the nation’s postwar 
nuclear weapons research and development program. This program was simple, design 
and build better bombs. When the veil of secrecy was lifted after the war, Project Y 
became known as Los Alamos. 
 
  
Figure 1.  Fat Man: Final Touch - a note to Hirohito. LANL Archives. 
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Figure 2. Nagasaki: Remains of the Mitsubishi Steel Works. LANL Archives. 
 
Little Boy and Fat Man came as a surprise to all but a very few political and 
military leaders. The United States Army and its Manhattan Engineer District (MED) 
built these first bombs in secret, spending nearly two billion dollars in the process.
3
 The 
success of the MED, however, created a new problem – developing the nation’s nuclear 
future. Outside the confines of a secret War Department organization known as the 
Interim Committee, no thought had been given about the future of the atomic bomb. As 
the nation demobilized, war-related work, including that of the MED and Los Alamos, 
                                                 
3
 For discussions of the cost of the wartime atomic bomb project, see: Stephen I. Schwartz, Atomic Audit: 
The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940 (Washington, D.C., Brookings 
Institution, 1998). 
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ground to a virtual standstill. The one unassembled Fat Man bomb left over from the war 
constituted the nation’s nuclear stockpile. 
A clear definition of the nation’s nuclear future did not come easily. Throughout 
the last months of 1945 and into 1946, Congress debated the issue extensively before 
finally creating a new executive agency, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), to 
replace the War Department’s Manhattan Project. This political debate was devoid of any 
discussion of a most important issue – could the United States even build another atomic 
bomb. When the newly appointed AEC commissioners took office, they discovered that 
the entire nuclear infrastructure created by the MED gutted by postwar demobilization. 
Key facilities, such as Los Alamos, were understaffed and literally falling down. 
Consequently, it took the AEC nearly three years to create an effective executive agency 
and give the New World substance. 
The New Los Alamos Mission 
Believing that Los Alamos and its work were vitally important to the future of the 
country, Los Alamos, under its interim director, Norris Bradbury, created a new mission 
for the Laboratory – building newer and better atomic bombs. Bradbury and his closest 
advisors knew, instinctively, that the atomic bomb could not be un-invented. The 
destructive energy of this new weapon was simply too enormous to be ignored. They also 
knew that other nations, starting with the Soviet Union, would eventually develop nuclear 
weapons. Hence, they believed the United States should always have atomic superiority. 
The mission of continually building newer and better bombs, which became the 
foundation of the nation’s entire nuclear weapons program, remained unchanged until 
  5 
September 1992, when the United States ceased testing in anticipation of a 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). 
The mission of building newer and better bombs, while simple in construct, was a 
highly sophisticated concept. The wartime bombs were little more than laboratory 
experiments rather than weapons of war. Both Little Boy and Fat Man were difficult to 
build and highly wasteful of their nuclear fuel. Most significantly, they were built with 
relatively little understanding of their nuclear, chemical, and metallurgical processes. The 
scientists of Los Alamos understood that only by increasing the scientific and technical 
understanding of nuclear weapons, could the nation have a viable nuclear future. Thus, 
while political leaders were deciding on the nation’s nuclear future, Los Alamos was 
working on providing the foundation on which that future could be built. 
Testing and the Marshall Islands 
Only full-scale detonations in the atmosphere could advance the knowledge about 
the complex nuclear, chemical, and metallurgical processes of nuclear detonations. As 
such, testing was, in the words of one Los Alamos weaponeer, “A continuous learning 
experience” that proved the science and technology of each nuclear device. 4 Nuclear 
testing by this definition is laboratory experimentation writ large. 
Full-scale testing of nuclear devices required an outdoor laboratory capable of 
absorbing the very large energy yields of each detonation and mitigating the worst of the 
ever present radioactive fallout. In early 1945, a portion of the southern New Mexican 
desert known as the Jornada del Muerto, the Journey of Death, was selected for the first 
                                                 
4
 Robert R. Brownlee, private communication to author, June 8, 2013. A nuclear device is a mechanical 
configuration that, when detonated, gives a nuclear yield. A nuclear bomb is a device that has been 
weaponized, that is engineered and standardized for production and military use. 
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ever test of a nuclear device, codenamed Trinity. The Jornada del Muerto absorbed 
Trinity’s twenty kiloton5 energy release and seemingly absorbed much of the attendant 
radioactive fallout. However, and somewhat unexpectedly, prevailing winds carried 
radioactive debris across the United States, where it fell in detectable quantities on 
American farmlands and cities. Some of this debris continued on, circling the entire 
planet. Concern about far reaching fallout instantly rendered the Jornada del Muerto 
unsuitable as a nuclear test site. In 1946, when looking for a suitable anchorage for its 
Operation Crossroads tests, the United States Navy selected Bikini Atoll, part of the 
remote Marshall Islands. Bikini seemed nearly ideal for nuclear testing because the vast 
emptiness of the surrounding Pacific would absorb, it was believed, most of the fallout 
from the Crossroads tests. Bikini, like the Trinity site, had one drawback. It was 
inhabited. The problem was solved in much the same manner as Trinity. The resident 
population was simply relocated. 
The use of Bikini Atoll for nuclear testing has had two significant long-term 
consequences. First, it set the precedent of using the Marshall Islands as a nuclear test 
site. In 1948, the United States began using a second atoll, Enewetak,
 6
 and was on the 
verge of using a third, Taongi, when nuclear testing ceased in 1958. The second long-
term consequence was the impact on the people of Bikini, Enewetak, and Rongelap 
Atolls. The Bikini Islanders were relocated in 1946, the Enewetak Islanders in 1947. As a 
result of radioactive fallout, the people of Rongelap Atoll had to be evacuated in 1954. 
                                                 
5
 Hereafter abbreviated as ‘kt.” 
 
6
 Enewetak” is the official spelling used the Republic of the Marshall Islands and will be used throughout 
this manuscript. Other variants, such as “Eniwetok”, appear only if contained in a quote. 
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All of these people, with the exception of a portion of the Enewetak people, remain 
strangers to their ancestral homes. 
While mitigating radioactive fallout was the contemporary reason for choosing 
Bikini and Enewetak as nuclear test sites, the larger question is how and why this very 
remote archipelago, with very little land mass, became the center of the early United 
States nuclear test program. The answer lies in its accidental discovery by Spain followed 
by subjugation to Germany, Japan, and the United States. These collisions with superior 
powers robbed the Marshallese of self rule, marginalized their importance in world 
affairs, and permitted the use of Bikini and Enewetak as ground zero for sixty-six nuclear 
tests. And so, my thesis uses the collisions between the Marshall Islands and the western 
world to frame the work of Los Alamos and its nuclear weapons development from late 
1945 through 1958. 
The MED, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, and Hanford
7
 
 The discovery of fission in 1939 made atomic bombs possible. Fission, the 
splitting of an atom, converts a portion of a split atom into energy. When the discovery of 
fission was announced to the scientific community, physicists including J. Robert 
Oppenheimer, instantly understood that if enough atoms could be split very quickly, the 
result would be an enormous explosion. Although the construct of fission was easy to 
understand, building an atomic bomb was another matter. The problem was how to build 
a bomb that could split a billion atoms in a microsecond. The task of building such a 
                                                 
7
 The MED also went by the name Manhattan Project. The Los Alamos Laboratory had many names 
beginning with its wartime designations: Site Y and Project Y. In 1946, the laboratory became the Los 
Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) and in 1980 the Los Alamos National Laboratory. For simplicity, the 
terms Los Alamos or the Laboratory will be used throughout this manuscript. Oak Ridge was known as Site 
W and Hanford as Site X. 
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bomb was assigned to the War Department by President Franklin Roosevelt in 1942. The 
War Department, in turn, created the Manhattan Engineer District.
8
 Under the command 
of Major General Leslie Groves, the MED built one of the largest industrial enterprises in 
the United States that employed more than 100,000 people working at facilities in 
Tennessee, Washington, and New Mexico. 
 The MED had two challenges. First, it had to acquire significant amounts of the 
only two elements that could be used in an atomic bomb: uranium (U) and plutonium 
(Pu). Acquiring uranium ore was relatively easy. It exits in nature and had, by 1942, been 
mined extensively. However, only one specific isotope of uranium, 
235
U, could be used in 
an atomic bomb.
235
U is rare, comprising only seven percent of all uranium found in 
nature (
238
U). The problem was to find a method that could separate the 
235
U from 
existing ore stocks. Because 
238
U and 
235
U are chemically identical, an industrial-scale 
method capable of discriminating between the very slight differences in their atomic 
weights had to be created. Uranium ore was converted to a gas and passed through a 
series of barriers until sufficient 
235
U atoms had been collected. These atoms were then 
sent to Los Alamos for fabrication into weapon parts. Groves and the MED contracted 
with the DuPont Company to build and operate a uranium isotope separation plant at Oak 
Ridge, Tennessee. 
Unlike uranium, plutonium is entirely manmade by a modern day form of 
alchemy that uses nuclear reactors to transform uranium into plutonium. Since the 
production reactors were very large and gave off an enormous amount of heat, they had 
to be sited near a source of cold water that could be used for cooling. Hanford, 
                                                 
8
 The name Manhattan Engineer District was chosen because the first headquarters of the district was in 
New York City. 
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Washington, was chosen because of its proximity to the Columbia River. The plutonium 
production process was laborious. During the first month of fulltime operations, Hanford 
produced only 500 milligrams of 
239
Pu. Once enough 
239
Pu atoms had been produced, 
they too were shipped to Los Alamos for fabrication into weapon parts. 
The second problem faced by the MED was the development of an atomic bomb. 
This job was assigned to yet a third laboratory built by the MED, Los Alamos. Located 
high in the mountains of Northern New Mexico, Los Alamos was chosen strictly for its 
remoteness. Secrecy was of paramount importance and the mountains and canyons 
surrounding Los Alamos provided natural security barriers. Los Alamos fashioned the 
235
U into Little Boy and the 
239
Pu into Fat Man. Uncertainty about the use of 
239
Pu led to 
a proof test of Fat Man in July 1945 that certified the device for use in combat.
9
 
The MED’s one and only mission was accomplished with the detonations of Little 
Boy and Fat Man. Having no other mission, the MED and its laboratories seemingly 
vanished in the first months after the war, largely forgotten as the President and Congress 
debated the future of the New World. The lack of a clear institutional future was only one 
of the problems facing Los Alamos at war’s end. The entire facility, itself, also was 
literally falling apart. Never meant to be permanent, the Laboratory’s technical buildings 
and living quarters were ramshackle and substandard at best. By the end of the war, the 
wear and tear on buildings had become acute. Los Alamos also was falling apart 
intellectually as key scientific personnel, including Oppenheimer, returned to their prewar 
                                                 
9
 Vincent Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military 
History, United States Army, 1985); Leslie R. Groves, Now it can be Told; the Story of the Manhattan 
Project (New York: Harper, 1962); David Hawkins, Project Y: The Los Alamos Story (Los Angeles: 
Tomash 1983); Lillian Hoddeson, Paul Henriksen, Roger Meade, and Catherine Westfall, Critical 
Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos during the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945 (Cambridge 
England ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, 
The New World, 1939-1946 (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 1962). 
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lives. As the national debate about the efficacy, morality, and national security 
ramifications of the atomic bomb intensified, no one seemed to notice that the very 
existence of the atomic bomb rested solely in the hands of Los Alamos and was not 
assured. Hence, the continued existence of Los Alamos, and by extension the atomic 
bomb, lay not with policy makers in Washington, but with a few Los Alamos scientists, 
technicians, and the laboratory’s new director Norris Bradbury. Working unseen and 
mostly under its own initiative, Los Alamos kept the nation’s nuclear capability alive 
throughout the last half of 1945 and through a very troubling 1946. By doing so, Los 
Alamos established the foundation for nuclear weapons research and development in the 
immediate post war years and which, by extension, became the foundation of the nation’s 
nuclear policy. 
This same institutional initiative also provided the basis for the first 
thermonuclear (aka hydrogen) bomb. The literature related to the development of the 
hydrogen bomb focuses on the bitter political infighting that erupted among politicians, 
scientists, and the Air Force over the question of whether or not to build a hydrogen 
bomb – an intense argument about the morality and national security issues of a weapon 
one thousand times more energetic than the two atomic bombs used to end World War II. 
Absent from this debate was any recognition of the monumental technical challenges of 
building such a bomb.
10
 Los Alamos successfully tested the first American hydrogen 
bomb two years after President Truman authorized an acceleration of it’s development. 
However, this success was due less to Truman’s directive than to the hydrogen bomb 
                                                 
10
 David E. Lilienthal, E., The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Vol.2: The Atomic Energy Years, 1945-1950 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1964); and Herbert York, The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller & The 
Superbomb (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1976). 
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research that Los Alamos had been conducting since 1943. As Los Alamos Director 
Norris Bradbury told the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1969, “It 
would have been truly impossible to have stopped Los Alamos from studying, working 
on, and exploring the problem with all of the facilities available to us. One cannot tell 
scientists not to think!”11 Bradbury’s statement captured the essence of Los Alamos’ 
work of converting the forces of nature into weapons of war. 
The Marshall Islands 
Lost and often forgotten in the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean are the twenty-
nine atolls and five islands that constitute the Marshall Islands. Having a total land mass 
of only seventy square miles, these atolls and islands are spread over 750,000 square 
miles of ocean between 4
0
 and 14
0
 North Latitude and 160
0
 and 173
0
 East Longitude in 
two parallel chains – the Ratak, or sunrise, to the east and the Railik, or sunset, to the 
west.
12
 Bikini and Enewetak are located at the northern end of the Railik Chain. 
 
                                                 
11
 N. E. Bradbury to the Honorable Chet Holifield, LANL Archives, October 15, 1969. 
 
12
 http://www.rmiembassyus.org. 
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Figure 3.  The Marshall Islands - outlined in red. (www.janeresture.com). 
 
   
 
Figure 4. Marshall Islands: The Railik and Ratak Chains. (Wikipedia). 
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 The proximate reason nuclear testing came to the Marshall Islands was World 
War II and the capture of the islands by the armed forces of the United States in a series 
of costly and bloody island battles. These battles made the Pacific, in the words of 
political scientist Hal Friedman, an “American lake” governed exclusively by the United 
States Navy.
13
 Although the United States initially governed the Marshall Islands as the 
spoils of war, it could not do so indefinitely. The islands belonged to United Nations, the 
successor to the League of Nations. The United States was able to retain control of the 
Marshall Islands by way of a United Nations strategic trusteeship. As the trust 
administrator, the United States continued governing the Marshall Islands as it had been 
doing since their capture early in the war, and allowing the use of Bikini and Enewetak 
for sixty-four nuclear tests between 1948 and 1958. 
 Nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands ended in 1958. Reacting to “the advent of 
the hydrogen bomb and the attendant possibility of global destruction,” what historian 
Robert Divine called “the gravest problem of the 1950s,” the United States and the 
Soviet Union agreed to a moratorium on testing that took effect late in 1958.
14
 For a short 
time, the United States maintained Enewetak in readiness for use once testing resumed. 
However, a number of circumstances kept the United Sates from returning to the 
Marshall Islands after the moratorium ended. The first of these circumstances was the 
greatly increased energy yields of individual tests that threatened the very existence of 
both Bikini and Enewetak. Beginning with the fission devices tested in Operation 
                                                 
13
 Hal M. Friedman, Creating an American Lake: United States Imperialism and Strategic Security in the 
Pacific Basin, 1945-1947 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2001). 
 
14
 Robert Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1978), xiii. 
 
  14 
Crossroads, through the detonation of the thermonuclear devices in Operation Castle, 
energy yields increased from thousands to millions of tons of TNT equivalence.
15
 The 
very small land masses of both Bikini and Enewetak could not continue absorbing these 
increased yields. Even when megaton-range tests were moved to barges anchored in each 
atoll’s lagoon, the sheer size of these detonations still had deleterious effects on nearby 
islands and even created tsunami waves that reached Hawaii.
16
 Second, beginning in the 
early 1950s, military requirements for nuclear warheads necessitated the testing of 
megaton-yield devices at very high altitudes.  The intense light from such tests could 
cause eye burns in a significant portion of the Marshallese population. No good way 
existed to prevent such injuries. Third, the Marshallese people, beginning in 1954, had 
begun to exercise a political voice on the international stage. In a somewhat ironic twist, 
the United Nations trusteeship status, which gave the United States almost unlimited 
authority in the islands, also provided the Marshallese with a legal mechanism to protest 
nuclear testing on their islands and atolls. The United States faced increasing political 
pressure from both the Marshallese and the United Nations to relinquish control of the 
islands at a time when other World War II trusteeships were ending. Thus, the last test 
conducted in the Marshall Islands occurred on August 18, 1958, with the firing of the Fig 
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device at Enewetak. Having a yield of only 0.020 kilotons, Fig was an anticlimactic 
ending to testing in the Marshall Islands.
17
 
Nuclear Testing – An Overview 
Most nuclear tests conducted by the United States were laboratory experiments 
known formally as proof-of-principle tests. Such tests provided the basic scientific and 
technical understanding of nuclear devices. The July 16, 1945, Trinity test proved that the 
process of fission could be engineered into a bomb of almost unimaginable energy and 
destructive power. Fission is the fundamental process that drives all atomic bombs. The 
October 31, 1952, Mike test proved the principle of fusion, the combining of two light 
elements, again with an enormous release of energy. Fusion is the process that drives 
thermonuclear bombs. Because proof-of-principle tests were laboratory experiments, 
ideas given a temporary physical reality, each new device was tested repeatedly to correct 
design issues and improve performance. Only after a design had been fully investigated 
was it engineered into a true combat weapon. 
A small number of tests analyzed the effects of nuclear detonations on military 
equipment, animals, and civilian structures. The first of these effects tests, Operation 
Crossroads, subjected a fleet of naval ships, along with pigs, goats, and mice to the blast 
effects and the ionizing radiation of two Nagasaki-type bombs. A third set of tests, 
stockpile confidence tests, assessed the effects of age on weapons taken from the national 
stockpile. The question, of course, was whether or not a weapon sitting in the stockpile 
for years would work and work well. Finally, in a somewhat ironic sense, a number of 
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tests were devoted to safety issues such as developing features to prevent a nuclear 
weapon from detonating either by accident or sabotage. Shot Fig, the last test conducted 
in the Marshall Islands, was one of these safety tests. The sixty-six tests conducted in the 
Marshall Islands encompassed this entire learning regime, allowing the United States to 
prove and stockpile highly energetic fission weapons and fusion weapons.  
From a technical perspective, nuclear testing was an enormously successful 
learning experience. In just ten years Little Boy and Fat Man were replaced by more 
advanced weapons including the hydrogen bomb. However, these advances came at the 
cost of injecting enormous amounts of radioactive debris into the earth’s atmosphere. 
When the natives of Rongelap Atoll and the crew of the Japanese fishing trawler the 
Lucky Dragon
18
 were injured by radioactive fallout in 1954, the entire world took notice 
that it too faced exposure to radioactive fallout. Concern about worldwide radioactive 
fallout created an international debate about the health consequences of atmospheric 
testing, leading, ultimately, to the cessation of all atmospheric testing. 
  Conducting nuclear tests in the Marshall Islands was an enormously complex 
process with logistics not unlike those of combat operations carried out in the Pacific 
Theater during World War II. When President Harry Truman authorized the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (JCS) to carry out Operation Crossroads, the JCS used a World War II invention, 
the joint task force system (JTF), to transport 42,000 people, hundreds of naval vessels, 
and nearly a thousand aircraft to Bikini Atoll. The JTF system co-located the logistics, 
which were a military responsibility, and the scientific work, which was the responsibility 
of the AEC, in one organization under one commander. For each of the seven test 
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operations carried out at Bikini and Enewetak, the JCS appointed an executive agent for 
the operation, rotating the responsibility between the Chief of Naval Operations and the 
Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force. Each service chief appointed a flag officer to 
command the task force. The task force commander, who was responsible for all test 
activities, gave the order to fire a test device. The decision to fire, however, was not made 
unilaterally. Since task force commanders had little knowledge of nuclear devices, they 
could not give the order without the consent of the resident senior scientist. 
 
Table 1 
Joint Task Force Designations 
Operation Date Executive Agent JTF Designation 
Crossroads 1946 Navy 1 
Sandstone 1948 Army 7 
Greenhouse 1951 Army 132 
Ivy 1952 Army 132 
Castle 1954 Army 7 
Redwing 1956 Navy 7 
Hardtack I 1958 Air Force 7 
 
Tests conducted at Bikini and Enewetak took place in one of five environments:  
as airdrops, atop towers, submerged underwater, on the surface of an island, and on 
barges. The test environment was primarily dictated by the purpose of a test. Tests 
conducted on towers, barges, and on the surface provided a static point in space that 
  18 
could be extensively instrumented with mile long line-of-sight pipes that carried data 
through a vacuum. Airdrops and underwater bursts were effects tests that did not require 
extensive diagnostics. Visual observation provided ample evidence of success. While 
preferred, surface and tower tests were inherently dirty, sucking large amounts of soil, 
sand, and coral into the mushroom clouds, where the debris became irradiated before 
falling back to the surface. Barges were a compromise of sorts.
 19
 Although they provided 
a fixed point in space, they could not be hardwired. Both the firing signal and data 
collection had to be done by way of electronic signals, which could be problematic in a 
marine environment. 
 
Table 2 
Test Environment 
TYPE # OF TESTS 
Airdrops 4 
Underwater 3 
Surface 10 
Tower 13 
Barge 36 
 
The 1958 Test Moratorium  
World sentiment against nuclear testing intensified after radioactive fallout from 
the Castle Bravo test of March 1954 injured the people of Rongelap Atoll and the crew of 
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The Lucky Dragon. After these exposures, the Marshallese and Japanese governments 
petitioned the United Nations to end nuclear testing in the Pacific. A loose coalition of 
non-aligned countries, including India, took up the cause linking testing to colonialism. 
Their collective voice stoked world opinion, providing a powerful and effective argument 
against atmospheric nuclear testing. 
Bravo also thrust radioactive debris into the stratosphere, where it dispersed over 
the entire planet and began falling back to earth in an indiscriminate fashion. One of the 
constituents of this debris, 
90
Strontium, accumulated in food supplies such as milk and 
was a particular hazard to children. The health risk of being exposed to radioactive fallout 
was a primary reason the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to a test moratorium 
in 1958. The moratorium, little more than a gentleman’s agreement between President 
Eisenhower and Premier Nikita Khrushchev, began in November 1958 and lasted until 
September 1961. 
Historiography and the Atomic Bomb 
 
 A wide variety of literature discusses and debates the origins, development, and 
the use the atomic bomb. This debate began with the publication of John Hersey’s 
Hiroshima and Henry Stimson’s On Active Duty in Peace and War.20 Shortly after the 
end of the war, journalist John Hersey depicted the immense and terrible human suffering 
caused by a single atomic bomb. The atom presented a new way to kill in war, a way that 
seemed particularly inhuman. Although World War II claimed upwards of seventy 
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million lives, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki seemed particularly 
horrific. Not only did the destructive power of an invisible force, the splitting of an atom, 
frighten people, so too did the sickness and death caused by nuclear radiation. The 
radioactivity released by Little Boy and Fat Man caused horrible suffering that no amount 
of medical attention could alleviate. The specter of nuclear annihilation was born as were 
the moral and ethical issues related to nuclear weapons in general. In contrast, Secretary 
of War Henry Stimson argued that the atomic bomb was both necessary and appropriate, 
a weapon of war that was justifiably used. For Stimson, the atomic bomb ended World 
War II and becoming what historian Greg Herken termed “the winning weapon.”21 
 Historians working inside the Atomic Energy Commission and its successor, the 
Department of Energy, also have written much about the atomic bomb and have made 
significant contributions to the literature on the general subject. Richard Hewlett, one of 
the pioneers of public history, along with his colleagues Oscar Anderson, Francis 
Duncan, and Jack Holl produced a comprehensive three-volume history of the Atomic 
Energy Commission covering the wartime work of the Manhattan Project, the postwar 
creation of the AEC, and the agency’s evolution through the 1950s. Hewlett and 
Anderson, in The New World, argue that the development and use of the atomic bomb by 
the United States during World War II fundamentally changed the nature of warfare as 
well as the manner in which postwar international relations was conducted. In Atomic 
Shield, Hewlett and Duncan chart the trajectory of the New World from the wartime 
Manhattan Project through the development and testing of the first hydrogen bomb. In 
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Atoms for Peace and War, Hewlett and Holl analyze the work of the AEC through the 
Eisenhower administration.
22
 Other institutional historians, working at the Los Alamos, 
Lawrence Berkeley, Oak Ridge, Hanford, Argonne, and Sandia nuclear laboratories have 
contributed extensive writings.
 
Los Alamos has received the most attention beginning 
with a self-published 1946 manuscript, Project Y, followed by the publication of Critical 
Assembly in 1993. Critical Assembly placed the work of Los Alamos within the frame of 
big science, the growth of American science by way of large government-university 
projects.
23
 
Although much of what is known about the Manhattan Project, the Atomic 
Energy Commission, and the nuclear weapons laboratories comes from the work of 
institutional historians, their work is often suspect within the academy. But, as Sharon 
Gibbs Thibodeau points out, although public historians working within government 
agencies are sometimes viewed as court historians, “they have provided scholarly works 
that should not be summarily dismissed as academically substandard.” 24 
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Various historians within the academy have also written about these topics. Some 
scholars, such as Barton Bernstein, Robert J. Lifton, Linus Pauling, and Gar Alperovitz 
have challenged the interpretation of Secretary of War Stimson about the necessity and 
propriety of using the atomic bomb against Japan. In 1995, fifty years after the bombings 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Bernstein directly countered Stimson’s assertion about the 
necessity and appropriateness of using the atomic bomb in a Foreign Affairs article, “The 
Atomic Bombings Reconsidered,” saying the United States could have pursued 
“alternative tactics” and thereby still “obviated the dreaded invasion and ended the war 
by November.”25 Lifton, Pauling, and Alperovitz tackle the psychological, 
environmental, and foreign policy implications of the first atomic bombs and their 
influence on public thinking since 1945.
26
 Some historians have begun analyzing nuclear 
weapons from a post Cold War perspective. One such historian, John Lewis Gaddis, 
views nuclear weapons as having created a mood that had “a remarkably theatrical effect 
on the course of the high Cold War,” meaning that success or failure in the conduct of 
foreign affairs was based “not on what one was really doing, but on what one appeared to 
be doing.” 27 
Four doctoral dissertations have focused on topics related to the atomic bomb 
beginning with Marjorie Bell Chamber’s 1974 Technically Sweet Los Alamos: The 
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Development of a Federally Sponsored Scientific Community. Chambers was the first 
historian to be given access to the AEC files on Los Alamos. The subtitle of her 
dissertation, The Development of a Federally Sponsored Scientific Community, is 
indicative of her intent to write “an administrative history” of how the community of Los 
Alamos changed from a collection of people governed by the United States Army to a 
democratic entity.
 28
 Jon Hunner’s 1996 Family Secrets charts the community of Los 
Alamos from its formation in 1943 through the literal opening of the community to the 
wider world in 1957. Two of Hunner’s key themes are the “role of secrecy” in family 
affairs and protection of the community from the “toxic materials” used in the adjacent 
laboratory.
29
 Patrick Moore’s 1997 dissertation, Federal Enclaves: the Community 
Culture of Department of Energy Cities: Livermore, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, is a 
comparative study of the atomic communities of Los Alamos, Oak Ridge (Tennessee), 
and Livermore (California) and how the federal government “created distinctive patterns 
of behavior within the residents of each city.”30 The remaining two dissertations provide 
a very different view of nuclear weapons and Los Alamos. Sybil Francis’ Warhead 
Politics: Livermore and the Competitive System of Nuclear Weapons Design, a 1997 
political science dissertation, looks at the competition between Livermore and Los 
Alamos and analyzes how that competition defined the technical thrust of each 
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laboratory.
31
 Scott Hughes’s The Unclosed Circle: Los Alamos and the Human and 
Environmental Legacy of the Atom, 1943-1963 analyzes Los Alamos and the “myriad 
legacy of human and environmental effects,” particularly the radioactive wastes of the 
laboratory’s work. In writing of the environmental effects legacy of the Los Alamos 
Laboratory, Hughes discusses some of the testing conducted in the Marshall Islands as 
well at the Nevada Test Site.
32
 Taken together, these works offer a wide ranging look at 
the institutions involved in atomic matters, but provide little detail about the inner 
workings of weapons design and testing. 
Historians working in the National Park Service and the Smithsonian also have 
contributed to the historiography of the atomic bomb in their respective programming 
efforts. In 2012, sixty-seven years after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
the National Park Service proposed a three-state Manhattan Project Site National Park. 
The three states; New Mexico, Tennessee, and Washington, were (and still are) home to 
the Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, and Hanford laboratories. Each laboratory, as part of the 
World War II Manhattan Engineer District, contributed to the making of Little Boy and 
Fat Man. Oak Ridge provided the uranium for Little Boy, Hanford the plutonium for Fat 
Man, and Los Alamos the designed and assembly of the bombs. Supporters of the 
proposed park believe it is an opportunity to venerate one of the largest and most 
successful scientific and engineering projects undertaken by the United States. Jonathan 
B. Jarvis, the director of the National Park Service, stated that the park will “unlock” the 
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stories of the Manhattan Project and tell “the narrative of the bomb’s creation” to a wide 
audience. Critics, including United States Congressman Dennis Kucinich, view the park 
as a form of advocacy “celebrating a weapon of mass destruction.” The park is becoming 
more and more certain having finally cleared the arcane committee processes of 
Congress.
33 
 
 A little over two decades before the NPS park proposal, the Smithsonian sought to 
craft an exhibit depicting in part the breadth and depth of human suffering caused by the 
bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The center piece of the exhibit was to be the 
Enola Gay, the massive Army Air Corps’ B-29 bomber that carried Little Boy to 
Hiroshima.
34
 The Smithsonian’s critical interpretation of the war in the Pacific and its 
planned use of the Enola Gay ran head long into the collective national narrative that 
America fought a just and honorable war against a dishonorable enemy. Facing strident 
criticism, the Smithsonian sought to share authority for reframing the interpretive story 
with its stakeholders, including the influential Air Force Association. A compromise 
exhibit, essentially a portion of the giant Enola Gay, was mounted, but stood largely mute 
about the consequences of the only two atomic bombs used in combat.
35
 No one was 
especially pleased with the exhibit. Shared authority, a tool employed by public historians 
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to include stakeholders, failed the Smithsonian - perhaps because it came too late in the 
planning process.
36
 
A final set of literature deals more directly with nuclear testing. Historian Barton 
Hacker’s The Dragon’s Tale is an account of the work by the Manhattan Project during 
World War II and Operation Crossroads to create a program that would protect scientists 
and workers from undue risk. His follow-on work, Elements of Controversy, continues 
this exploration through the Cold War Years.
 37
 A much earlier work, No Place to Hide, 
written in 1948 by physician David Bradley, a participant in Operation Crossroads, 
captured the dangers of nuclear testing of which Hacker analyzed. The spectacle of the 
damage from the explosions of the two Crossroads bombs, along with the lingering 
radiation on the surviving ships – radiation that could not be removed - caused Bradley to 
write, “if life as we know it is to continue, men must understand and deal with the 
menacing aspects of atomic energy.”38 
Information about the Marshallese people comes primarily from the work of 
anthropologists, who began working in the islands during World War II. Well before the 
U.S. Navy and its Marine Corps invaded and occupied the Marshall Islands in 1944, the 
Navy had established a university-based program to train administrators for its soon to be 
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conquered territory. Among the participants in this program was a cadre of university-
based anthropologists, who served as mediators between the Navy and the native 
islanders. Dating from this entrée into the Marshallese archipelago, anthropologists and 
their literature have made the single largest contribution to our understanding of the 
Marshall Islands and its people. Some portions of their work, especially on the 
relocations of the Bikini and Enewetak people, touch on the consequences of nuclear 
testing. This literature, much of it written in the 1950s and 1960s, suggests that the 
Marshallese were responsible for their own happiness and wellbeing, despite being 
forcibly relocated.
39
 One anthropologist, Holly Barker, examines the consequences of the 
largest ever United States test, codenamed Bravo, on the Marshallese.
40
 Bravo, which 
also injected radioactive debris into the stratosphere, potentially exposing the entire world 
to radioactive fallout, led the Marshallese to protest the use of their homeland as a nuclear 
test site. Bravo also led to the 1958 test moratorium and the ultimate ending of 
atmospheric testing. A somewhat related work by psychotherapist Jane Dibblin, Day of 
Two Suns, makes a highly polemical argument that birth defects increased throughout the 
Marshall Islands because of radioactive fallout.
41
 
Writings by political scientists Harold Nufer and Hal M. Friedman analyze the 
bureaucratic politics of the United States’ management of its Pacific interests. Nufer 
examines the creation and administration of the trusteeship of Micronesia under the 
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auspices of the United Nations and evaluates the performance of the United States’ rule 
against the UN mandate of promoting political, economic, social, and educational 
advancement, as stipulated by Article 6 of the 1947 Trusteeship Agreement. Nufer 
“consciously constructed” his analysis of the United States’ performance from the bias of 
a professor, assigning an overall grade of “C+”, which was a passing grade, but not good 
enough for admission into graduate school. Friedman analyzes the United States role in 
the Pacific from the viewpoint of the bureaucratic politics within the Executive Branch, 
particularly the Navy, the State Department, Department of Defense, and the Department 
of the Interior. Having fought and won a bitter war, the Navy laid claim to both the 
psychological and physical ownership of Micronesia. The Navy, and later the Defense 
Department, saw Micronesia as a defensive bastion in the Pacific from which to counter 
any Soviet threat in the Far East. All efforts to reduce the military’s control of the region 
were resisted. Friedman, then, views the entire postwar period in the Pacific as one long 
bureaucratic struggle by the United States government to maintain absolute control over 
Micronesia without appearing overtly colonial. The primary battle between civilian and 
military agencies was about who would govern and not about if Micronesia should be 
governed.
 42
 The issue of nuclear testing is subsumed and often overlooked in the 
discussion of postwar colonialism, super power politics, and the quest of the Pacific 
Islanders for political independence. 
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 Policy makers such David Lilienthal, the first chairman of the Atomic Energy 
Commission; Truman advisor Clark Clifford; State Department Analyst Paul Nitze; and 
Atomic Energy Commissioner Lewis Strauss deal with the larger issue of nuclear 
policymaking as opposed to scientific and technical issues of nuclear weapons.
43
 In his 
multivolume diary, Lilienthal describes the birth of the Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC), the successor to the wartime Manhattan Project, and how the AEC struggled to 
establish its credentials as the country’s first postwar nuclear agency. Lilienthal depicts 
the AEC as a stepchild trying to gain equality with the State and Defense Departments 
within the executive branch of government, particularly the newly formed National 
Security Council. Both Clark Clifford and Paul Nitze provide detailed accounts of how 
the national security apparatus came to be and how that apparatus relied on nuclear 
weapons to give the United States a very big club in the foreign policy arena. Clifford, 
the principal author of national security papers in the Truman White House, almost 
singlehandedly charted United States policy toward the Soviet Union. Nitze, a State 
Department analyst, had a major role in shaping and developing the post World War II 
national security structure and its codification as NSC-68. Nitze believed that it was the 
task of the United States to “create a tolerable structure of political and economic 
freedom, but also to help defend it while under construction from those who still believed 
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that a better world for them could only be obtained through further widespread tearing 
down.”44 Nuclear weapons, for Nitze, were a tool demanded by the Cold War. 
The many authors and their interpretations of or about the atomic bomb have 
three elements in common. First, atomic bombs are not discussed in much detail. 
Although many of the technical design details are classified, and will remain so, there is 
still much that can be said about them.  Knowing more about the technical makeup of 
both fission and fusion bombs and how those bombs came to be tested can enlarge our 
knowledge of the work of Los Alamos and of nuclear testing. Second, the overall nuclear 
test program in the Marshall Islands has not been used as a frame to understand the 
interactions between the United States and the Marshallese. Third, the atomic bomb, 
beginning with Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is often depicted as a mystical instrument of 
unprecedented power, often described in apocalyptic terms, a weapon that could be 
conjured up and used at will. Reality at the end of World War II, however, was very 
much different. For a period of about a year, the unassembled parts of a Nagasaki-type 
bomb were the New World. To be sure, more atomic bombs could be built, but not at a 
rate sufficient to become an apocalyptic weapon. Also, at war’s end, production of 
plutonium and uranium slowed considerably, as did the work at Los Alamos. The nation 
was demobilizing. The frenzy of the war effort quickly gave way to a sort of national 
malaise. Finally, as mentioned earlier, there were no concrete plans within the MED, the 
Congress, or the Presidency for dealing with the atomic bomb at war’s end. While there 
was a proposal put forward by the Interim Committee to replace the MED with a civilian 
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agency, the political process for enacting any kind of atomic energy legislation was slow 
in coming. Throughout the remainder of 1945 and all of 1946, Los Alamos was virtually 
ignored giving the Laboratory’s staff a growing conviction that it “is headed for 
dissolution.”45 
Sources 
A rich archival record exists at Los Alamos that provides an in-depth look at the 
goals, planning, and execution of the sixty-six Marshallese tests, the potential and real 
health issues for the Marshallese, the larger issue of exposure to radioactive fallout to the 
general population, and the historical legacy of testing itself. These records also include 
information related to interactions between the Laboratory and the national political 
establishment. The Los Alamos archives also houses records related to the cleanup of the 
test islands, the work of health physicists in evaluating the effects of testing on the native 
populations, and the papers of many individuals who participated in the testing. 
The specific types of primary sources are the correspondence, reports, and 
memoranda created by Laboratory staff, the armed forces joint task forces, as well as the 
files of those individuals who conducted health physics surveys of both the Marshallese 
people and their islands. As such, these records are detailed, official accounts of test 
activities and can be expected to reflect a position favorable to the testing of nuclear 
weapons. However, much of this source material has had to withstand the scrutiny of 
technical peer reviews in both the classified and unclassified scientific literature. As such, 
the science has been evaluated and can be used with assurance of its accuracy. The 
secondary literature used will introduce themes and interpretations and also will serve as 
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a counterpoint to the official record. A major concern about using classified sources is the 
seeming inability of other historians to independently verify the veracity of individual 
documents and the accuracy with which the information is presented. Under current rules, 
all classified sources can be reviewed for declassification way of the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA). 
 The National Archives (NARA) houses the records of the Atomic Energy 
Commission. Other record collections housed at NARA include those of the United 
States Navy and the Department of the Interior. Both of these organizations administered 
the Micronesian Trust Territory and participated in one fashion or another in the selection 
and use of the islands as nuclear test sites. The Nevada Operation Office of the National 
Nuclear Security Agency in Las Vegas, Nevada, has another extensive archive containing 
valuable information. The Harry Ransom Center at the University of Texas houses one of 
the most complete set of records related to the Southwest Pacific, including the papers of 
C. Harley Grattan. Grattan wrote extensively about the islands of the Southwest Pacific.  
His papers give additional details on the effects of colonization by Europe of the Pacific 
region. 
Chapter Synopses 
 Including this introductory chapter, my dissertation has a total of ten chapters. 
Chapter Two, “Discovery: Fission and the First Atomic Bombs,” explores the discovery 
of fission, which set the stage for the most important of collisions between the Marshall 
Islands and the western world; the creation of Los Alamos; and the bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Chapter Three, “Discovery and Collisions,” is an overview of 
the discovery of the Marshall Islands by Spain and subjugation by Germany, Japan, and 
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the United States as well as intellectual subjugation to Christian missionaries. Chapter 
Four, “Exile: Bikini and Operation Crossroads,” explores the push for the testing of a 
pair of nuclear weapons against naval vessels. In the course of planning Crossroads, the 
use of Bikini established the precedent for future testing in this remote area of the Pacific 
Ocean. Crossroads created the first Marshallese Diaspora when the Bikinians were 
relocated to Rongerik Atoll. This Diaspora continues today. 
 Chapter Five, “The New World, National Security, and New Tests,” explores the 
use of a second Marshallese Atoll, Enewetak, as a nuclear test site. The selection of 
Enewetak created a second Diaspora when the Enewetak people were relocated to 
Ujelang Atoll. Operation Sandstone was a technical milestone for Los Alamos. The three 
tests of Sandstone verified major improvement to the Nagasaki bomb and opened the way 
for further improvements in fission weapons. Chapter Six, “Fission to Fusion:  An Island 
Goes Missing,” examines the push to create the first thermonuclear, aka super, or 
hydrogen bomb. When tested, the first hydrogen bomb vaporized one entire island as 
well as portions of two others. While an enormous technical success, this first hydrogen 
bomb ultimately had negative consequences for the Bikinians, all but insuring that the 
atoll might never be inhabited again. Chapter Seven, “Why Buy a Cow when powdered 
Milk is so Cheap?,” examines the most significant test series conducted in the Marshall 
Islands, Operation Castle. Castle made true hydrogen bombs possible. Chapter Eight, 
“The World We Think She Start Over Again,” examines the radiological impact of 
Bravo on both the Marshallese and the world. Radioactive fallout from Castle fell on the 
inhabitants of Rongelap and Utirik Atolls, forcing the emergency evacuation of these 
people. Radioactive debris from the Castle detonations also entered the stratosphere, 
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where it circled the entire globe potentially exposing most of mankind. Castle was the 
beginning of a struggle to end atmospheric testing. Chapter Nine, “The End of Testing:  
Redwing, Hardtack I, and Silence, looks at the last two test operations carried out at 
Bikini and Enewetak. These tests of these two operations put the final touches on the U.S. 
stockpile of nuclear weapons. Redwing and Hardtack I were significant also for the 
number of tests in each operation, seventeen and thirty-two respectively, constituting 
almost seventy-five percent of all tests conducted in the Marshall Islands. Even as these 
test series were being carried out, the United States and the Soviet Union were 
negotiating a test moratorium. One of the consequences of these negotiations was a rush 
to test as many nuclear devices as possible before the moratorium took effect. In addition 
to the thirty-two detonations in the Marshall Islands, an additional thirty-seven tests were 
carried out at the Nevada Test Site. Chapter 10, “Epilog,” reviews the legacy of testing 
and its long-term effect on the Marshallese people. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DISCOVERY: FISSION AND THE FIRST ATOMIC BOMBS 
At 8:15 a.m. local time, flying 30,000 feet over the city of Hiroshima, Japan, 
Colonel Paul Tibbets relinquished control of the B-29 bomber, Enola Gay,
46
 to his 
bombardier, Major Thomas Ferebee. Ferebee identified his aiming point and entered the 
coordinates in the automatic bombing computer. When the bombing coordinates were 
reached, the computer released the atomic bomb known as Little Boy. Ninety seconds 
later, Little Boy exploded 1,800 feet over Hiroshima killing approximately 40,000 people 
and destroying much of the city. Three days later, on August 9
th
, the bombing computer 
of a second B-29, Bock’s Car,47 released the atomic bomb known as Fat Man, over the 
city of Nagasaki.
48
 Although Fat Man missed its aiming point, the bomb’s twenty kiloton 
explosion produced the same results as Little Boy. The atomic bombings forced Emperor 
Hirohito into taking the unprecedented imperial action of personally interfering with the 
war effort. Against the advice of his military leaders, he ordered a cessation of hostilities. 
Taking yet another unprecedented action, Emperor Hirohito spoke directly to the people 
of Japan for the very first time. In a prerecorded radio broadcast that a rogue army unit 
tried to destroy, Hirohito said, “a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do 
damage is indeed incalculable” is “the reason why we have ordered the acceptance of the 
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provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Allied Powers.”49 World War II came to an end. 
On September 2, 1945, Japan signed the instrument of surrender aboard the United States 
Battleship Missouri, which was riding at anchor in Tokyo Bay.
50
 “The atomic bombs 
exploded over the Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” historian Richard Rhodes has written, 
“didn’t win the war, but without question they ended the war.”51 Historians Richard 
Hewlett and Oscar Anderson said the bombings created a “New World.”52 
 
Figure 5. Destruction caused by Little Boy at Hiroshima. LANL Archives. 
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Almost swept aside, for the moment, in Americans’ joy at the end of this conflict 
was the utter surprise at the appearance of this new, devastating weapon. What exactly 
was this new type of bomb that suddenly rendered all other forms of explosives 
seemingly irrelevant? And, where did it come from? The answers were as difficult to 
comprehend as was the scale of devastation at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This new bomb 
was atomic, its extraordinary explosive power the result of splitting an invisible entity, 
the atom, or, more accurately the splitting of a billion or more atoms in a microsecond. 
They were conceived, designed, and produced by yet another invisible entity, a scientific 
laboratory hidden in the mountains of northern New Mexico and known only by its 
wartime code name, Site Y. Only after wartime secrecy restrictions were lifted, would the 
nation learn that Site Y was Los Alamos. 
Those persons closest to the development and use of the atomic bomb had varying 
thoughts. Secretary of War Henry Stimson stated throughout a three-part Harpers 
Magazine series that science and technology had simply been adapted to the immediate 
goal of winning the war. The United States, Stimson believed, had acted in good 
conscience in time of war. Atomic weapons were “as legitimate as any other of the other 
deadly explosive weapons of modern war.”53 Paul Nitze, a member of the postwar 
Strategic Bombing Survey and later a key nuclear diplomat maker under five presidents, 
believed the atomic bomb created “a tolerable structure of political and economic 
freedom” and “defended it while under construction from those who still believed that a 
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better world for them could only be obtained through further widespread tearing down.”54 
Others considered this new weapon an ominous development. Said J. Robert 
Oppenheimer, the wartime director of the Los Alamos Laboratory, “It did not take atomic 
weapons to make war terrible It did not take weapons to make man want peace, a peace 
that would last. But the atomic bomb was the turn of screw. It has made the prospect of 
future war unendurable. It has led us up those last steps to the mountain pass; and beyond 
there to a different country.”55  
In his poignant account of the survivors of Hiroshima, journalist John Hersey 
focused not on war strategy, but on the terrible human suffering caused by this new and 
awesome weapon.
56
 Ionizing radiation, in the form of beta particles and gamma rays, 
severely injured and killed thousands who otherwise had survived the blast of the two 
atomic bombs.
57
 The effects of radiation rekindled fears, as historian of science Spencer 
Weart wrote, that were embedded in the “themes of millenarian hope, apocalyptic fear, 
and anxiety.”58 The path to Hiroshima and Nagasaki was one that started many years 
earlier and involved a combination of scientific, political, and military decisions. The 
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postwar development of nuclear weapons would rest on this earlier experience, but would 
occur in a much different environment and take a very different path. 
Discovery – Fission 
The scientific and technical road that led to Los Alamos, the atomic bomb, the 
destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the creation of the New World originated 
with changes in the science of physics as it moved from the study of visible phenomena, 
such as thermodynamics, to the study of the invisible world of radiation and the atom. 
The discovery in the 1880s of radiation, energy that originates in the atom, by Antoine 
Becquerel, and the discovery of X-rays by Wilhelm Roentgen initiated this change in 
focus. Marie and Pierre Curie built on the discoveries of Becquerel and Roentgen and 
discovered the radioactive elements radium and polonium.
59
 Marie Curie received the 
first of her two Nobel Prizes for this work and also died from complications caused by 
exposure to radiation.
60
 In 1905, Albert Einstein published the first of his three seminal 
papers on relativity, including his famous equation, E=mc
2. Einstein’s work of relating 
mass to energy provided the theoretical basis for understanding the atomic world. In 
1911, Ernest Rutherford, working at the University of Manchester, developed his 
planetary model of the atom likening an atom to a miniature universe where electrons 
(planets) orbit the nucleus (sun), and in 1917 discovered protons. Danish physicist Niels 
Bohr expanded on Rutherford’s work, publishing articles on the structure of the atom and 
his theory that electrons were the major determinate of an element’s chemical properties. 
Bohr’s research became the basis for quantum theory (aka quantum mechanics), the dual 
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particle-like and wave-like behavior of matter and energy. In 1930, Wolfgang Pauli 
predicted the existence of neutrinos, subatomic particles that would not be physically 
confirmed until the 1960s. In 1931, Harold Urey discovered deuterium, an isotope of 
hydrogen that would become the primary material of thermonuclear bombs in the 1950s. 
 As the body of knowledge about the atom grew, however, there remained a 
disturbing fact. An atom weighed more than the combined weights of its two known 
particles, electrons and protons. What and where was this unidentified missing mass? 
British physicist James Chadwick postulated and then in 1932 proved the existence of a 
third subatomic particle having no electrical charge - the neutron. This particle, part of an 
atom’s nucleus, solved the puzzle of atomic weight. The discovery of the neutron 
completed the structure of the atom - a nucleus of positively charged protons in 
combination with neutrons having no electrical charge, surrounded by a negatively 
charged shell, or cloud, of electrons. 
 The discovery of the neutron was vitally important to physics for yet another 
reason. The neutron was an ideal experimental tool for exploring the atomic world 
because its neutral charge allowed it to easily penetrate an atom’s negatively-charged 
electron shell and its positively-charged nucleus. Using a stream of neutrons, physicists 
bombarded elements with neutrons and then analyzed the chemical and physical 
properties of the resulting debris. Physicists, however, did not have all the requisite 
chemistry skills to correctly analyze the debris. Working at his laboratory in Rome in 
1934, Enrico Fermi, a future Nobel Laureate, bombarded a number of elements, including 
uranium, with neutrons. When Fermi and his team bombarded uranium, the resulting 
debris consisted of two particles of nearly equal mass that they could not identify. 
  41 
Unknowingly, Fermi and his team became the first scientists to achieve fission.
61
 In 1938, 
at Berlin’s Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman also bombarded 
uranium with neutrons. Like Fermi, they also split uranium atoms into two almost equal 
pieces, which to them appeared to be krypton and barium. Hahn and Strassman, like 
Fermi, could not explain why the new particles appeared to be two distinct elements, or 
why the combined mass of these new particles was slightly less than that of the original 
atom. Perplexed by their findings, Hahn wrote to a former colleague, Lise Meitner,
62
 
describing the experimental findings. Meitner, a chemist, discussed the results with her 
nephew, Otto Frisch. Together, they deduced what had happened – a uranium atom had 
been split into two nearly equal pieces, which were indeed krypton and barium. The 
“missing mass” had been converted into energy. Fission, the splitting of the atom, had 
been discovered.
63
 
 A short time later Frisch shared this revelation with Niels Bohr, who was on his 
way to Washington, D.C. to attend the Fifth International Theoretical Physics 
Conference. Bohr announced the discovery of fission at the conference, creating great 
excitement throughout the physics community. Very quickly other physicists replicated 
the Hahn and Strassman experiment, achieving the same results. Just as quickly, it 
became obvious that if a billion or so atoms could be split in a microsecond, the 
cumulative energy release would create an explosion of extraordinary power. J. Robert 
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Oppenheimer, a young theoretical physicist at the University of California at Berkeley, 
was among those physicists who came to this realization. A few months after the 1939 
conference, Robert Serber entered Oppenheimer’s university office only to find a crude 
sketch of an atomic bomb on the office blackboard.
64
 Six years later, under the leadership 
of Oppenheimer, Los Alamos scientists would engineer fission into the atomic bombs 
used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
Fission, Self Sustaining Chain Reactions, and Atomic Bombs 
Once discovered, fission was a disarmingly simple construct. However, this 
simple construct was very difficult to fashion into a nuclear weapon, both politically and 
technically. The political problem was a lack of awareness by the President about the 
possibility of an atomic bomb. Three Hungarian physicists, all refugees from Nazi 
controlled Europe, Leo Szilard, Edward Teller, and Eugene Wigner, sought to alert 
President Franklin Roosevelt about the possibility. Although prominent within the 
physics community, none had any political standing and could not hope to attract 
Roosevelt’s attention. Knowing this, Szilard drafted a letter that he hoped yet another 
European refugee, the very famous Albert Einstein, would sign and forward to the 
president. Einstein did so with the result that Roosevelt authorized the creation of the 
Advisory Committee on Uranium to investigate existing research on atomic matters. 
When the committee found that this research strongly suggested that an atomic bomb was 
possible, Roosevelt assigned responsibility for the bomb’s development to the War 
Department, which created the Manhattan Engineer District (aka Manhattan Project) to 
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organized and manage laboratories and production plants that produced the first atomic 
bombs. 
Designing and building the first atomic bombs required the solving of three 
technical problems. First, large quantities of uranium and plutonium had to be amassed. 
Only these two metals, specifically their isotopes 
235
U and 
239
Pu, could be made to 
fission.
65
 Amassing 
235
U was very difficult because it is chemically identical to natural 
uranium, 
238
U, and also very scarce, constituting only seven percent of all uranium in 
nature. Only by exploiting the very minute weight differences between 
235
U and natural 
uranium (
238
U) could enough bomb material be accumulated. The separation process, 
known as gaseous diffusion, required a massive plant, which was built at Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee. The separation process was difficult and not terribly efficient. Just enough 
235
U for Little Boy was accumulated by July 1945.
66
 To produce 
239
Pu, a modern form of 
alchemy had to be employed. Massive reactors built at Hanford, Washington, bombarded 
uranium with neutrons, transforming it into plutonium. This process, too, was laborious 
and not terribly efficient. Not until early 1944, had enough 
239
Pu been produced that it 
could be seen by the naked eye.
67
 
The second problem in turning fission into a weapon was proving that a self-
sustaining chain reaction was possible. A self-sustaining chain reaction occurs when an 
atom is split, releasing one or more neutrons that split other atoms. This process 
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continues in an exponential fashion until the reaction runs out of atoms, or as in the case 
of a bomb, blows itself apart. Initiating a chain reaction is dependent on the critical state, 
or criticality, of each metal. Criticality is defined as the mass of material that is just 
sufficient to sustain a nuclear fission chain reaction and is represented by the equation 
k=1. A subcritical mass, denoted k<1, cannot sustain a chain reaction. A supercritical 
mass, k>1, yields a self-sustaining chain reaction. In December 1942 Nobel Laureate 
Enrico Fermi, who had fled Europe with his Jewish wife and was now working at the 
University of Chicago, successfully proved that a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction 
was possible. His experiment was a rudimentary reactor into which a number of slugs of 
uranium were placed until enough material was accumulated to reach criticality. Fermi 
then manipulated the reactor to produce the world’s first self-staining chain reaction. 
Before the experiment could blow itself apart, Fermi engaged his safety mechanism and 
shut the reactor down. Although Fermi was confident he could control his experiment, he 
nonetheless stationed three graduate students, known as the suicide squad, on top of the 
reactor to pour buckets of a cadmium solution over the experiment if the safety 
mechanism failed. The cadmium solution would soak up neutrons and quash the fission 
process. 
  45 
 
Figure 6. The Fission Process. LANL Archives. 
 
 
Figure 7. Fermi and his Pile. Note the suicide squad on top of the pile. LANL Archives. 
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The third problem was to design and build an actual nuclear weapon. The trick 
was to amass, in a compact form, a slightly subcritical amount of nuclear material. Then, 
by some manipulation, turn the subcritical piece of material into a supercritical mass. If 
too little metal was used, the bomb would not yield a nuclear explosion. If too much 
metal was amassed, the assembly would self destruct. This task became the job of the Los 
Alamos Laboratory. 
The Manhattan Project and its Laboratories 
 
 When it was created in early 1942, the Manhattan Engineer District inherited a 
number of university-based research projects, like Fermi’s, that were researching nuclear 
matters. None of these projects had the capability or legal authority to amass the amount 
of nuclear material needed to build an atomic bomb. 
68
 A bomb project required the 
resources and authority of the United States. Under the command of Brigadier General 
Leslie Groves, the MED built a massive nationwide complex consisting of three major 
nuclear laboratories built at Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Hanford, Washington; and Los 
Alamos, New Mexico. Oak Ridge was chosen for the 
235
U production plant because of its 
proximity to the electrical power produced by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). 
Hanford was selected because the nearby Columbia River guaranteed a supply of cold 
water to keep its reactors from overheating. Los Alamos was chosen because its remote 
location high in the Jemez Mountains of Northern New Mexico protected its secret work, 
even from the possibility of bombing by enemy aircraft. The site of a boarding school, 
Los Alamos was originally ignored by the Manhattan Project in favor of the tiny 
mountain village of Jemez Springs, New Mexico. J. Robert Oppenheimer, the newly 
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selected head of the bomb laboratory, objected, believing the valley in which Jemez 
Springs sat was too narrow and confining for a scientific laboratory. Oppenheimer, who 
had a ranch in Northern New Mexico and knew the surrounding country well, suggested 
an alternative location, Los Alamos. Los Alamos had several large buildings, an open 
landscape that could easily be graded for construction, and its location also offered the 
shortest land route to the railheads in Santa Fe and Albuquerque. Groves agreed, and had 
the War Department purchase the Los Alamos Ranch School.
69
 
Los Alamos was a small collection of log structures used by Ashley Pond’s Ranch 
School. While these buildings could be used for housing, they were completely 
unsuitable for the technical work. Groves had to very quickly build the laboratory from 
the ground up to meet the demands of war. A contractor, the Sundt Company, working 
through the Army Corps of Engineers Albuquerque Office, began work in late 1942 and 
which continued into the first half of 1943. During the first classified technical meeting 
of the Laboratory, held in April 1943, a Sundt worker nearly fell through the ceiling of 
the building where the meeting was being held. New housing was built just as quickly 
and cheaply and was universally detested by the scientists and their families. Emilio 
Segre, one of many European scientists working at Los Alamos, and later a Nobel 
laureate, complained to housing officials about the overheating of his apartment saying 
on more than one occasion that “the temperature of the walls in the apartment reached 
such a point that there was an obviously immediate danger of a fire.” On one such 
occasion, Segre had to run to one of the few emergency telephones to place a call for 
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help,
70
 but the phone didn’t work. As Segre later complained, “The repetition of such 
occurrences and the precarious state of the alarm system on the Post makes me 
exceedingly uncomfortable, especially because having two small children at home I don’t 
feel safe leaving them alone even for a very short time.” The response was a desultory “It 
is entirely possible that the telephone was out of order at the time you tried to call.”71 
Laboratory buildings were somewhat better constructed, but only because the heavy 
machinery they housed required stouter structures. Office space was limited and very 
spartan. Shortly after moving into his Los Alamos office, Oppenheimer had to request a 
nail to hang his coat and hat on.
72
   
                                                 
70
 There were no personal telephones in Los Alamos. 
 
71
 Lillian Hoddeson, Paul W. Henriksen, Roger A. Meade, and Catherine Westfall, Critical Assembly: A 
Technical History of Los Alamos during the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993); and  Segre to Hawkins, Oppenheimer and Col. Tyler, December 12, 1944; and 
Captain C. U. Forrest, Post Engineer to Segre, December 16, 1944, LANL Archives. 
 
72
 Los Alamos Science, Number 7 (Los Alamos: Los Alamos National Laboratory, Winter/Spring 1983). 
 
  49 
 
Figure 8.  Typical housing and living conditions at Los Alamos. LANL Archives. 
 
Los Alamos was unique. It was an Army base that existed only to build an atomic 
bomb. Since its unique mission required a scientific and technical staff, rather than 
military troops, the Los Alamos Base was the only Army facility in the country populated 
by more civilian than military personnel. Although the Army controlled the Los Alamos 
reservation, the scientific work was managed by the University of California. Groves 
chose the University to operate the Laboratory because of the university’s pioneering 
work in nuclear physics and the prestige of its physics department and its two leading 
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physicists, E. O. Lawrence and J. Robert Oppenheimer. The university managed Los 
Alamos as a government-owned, contractor operated facility (GOCO), one of the first in 
the nation. The university, however, did not interfere in the scientific work, but rather 
provided the financial, legal, and personnel services. The university also provided Los 
Alamos with the trappings of an academic institution that greatly aided in personnel 
recruitment both during and after the war. Although Groves greatly admired the 
university, he initially overlooked its ranking theoretical physicist, Oppenheimer, when 
searching for a director of Los Alamos. Groves wanted to hire an American Nobel 
Laureate in physics, but there was only three, Lawrence, I. I. Rabi, and Arthur Compton. 
Since they were already leading major war-related efforts, Groves chose Oppenheimer, 
but only after being favorably impressed by the physicist during a meeting on fission 
research.
73
  
The Laboratory’s initial research and development plan outlined three possible 
methods of achieving a self-sustaining chain reaction in an atomic bomb. The first 
method proposed using a military cannon to shoot a subcritical piece of nuclear material 
at a second piece of the same material. The resulting collision would create a supercritical 
mass. This “gun method” became known as Little Boy. The second method proposed 
imploding, or crushing, a subcritical piece of nuclear material into supercritical mass. 
This implosion method of assembly became known as Fat Man. The third method, an 
awkward autocatalytic assembly, received scant attention and was summarily dismissed. 
Gun assembly appeared to be the surest method of assembly. Accordingly, Oppenheimer 
focused most of the Laboratory’s first year of work on this method. 
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Figure 9. Cabin where the isotopic impurity in Plutonium was discovered. LANL Archives. 
 
 In May 1944, however, a small group of graduate students working in a long-
abandoned Pajarito Club cabin discovered a contaminating isotope that prevented the use 
of plutonium in a gun-assembled weapon. The contaminating isotope, 
240
Pu, would cause 
a premature explosion in the gun barrel. Compounding this contamination issue was a 
production shortage of uranium. Scientists at Oak Ridge were having great difficulty 
separating the rare isotope 
235
U from its abundant natural form. If plutonium could not be 
used, and if 
235
U production continued to falter, the entire atomic bomb program could 
fail. Oppenheimer, fortunately, had hedged his bets in 1943 and allowed a small amount 
of research on the implosion design. Implosion, the use of supersonic shock waves to 
crush a ball of subcritical metal into a supercritical state, could, in theory, overwhelm the 
isotopic contamination. In August 1944 Oppenheimer refocused the technical work of the 
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Laboratory centering it’s efforts on developing the implosion method. To make sure the 
implosion method was developed quickly, Oppenheimer created the Cowpuncher 
Committee “to ride herd on implosion.”74 The Committee did its job well. A design for 
an implosion bomb, dubbed Fat Man, was complete by early spring 1945. Believing that 
the 
235
U production problems would be solved, Oppenheimer, again hedging his bets, had 
allowed work on the gun assembly to continue, but at a much reduced level of effort. 
Trinity: The First Nuclear Test 
 The implosion design approved by the Cowpuncher Committee proposed 
focusing the supersonic shock waves produced by almost three tons of high explosives to 
crush a small ball of plutonium into a supercritical mass. The complexity of this process, 
coupled with the precision required of the converging shock waves, dictated a proof of 
principle test. Fortunately, Hanford was producing plutonium at a rate sufficient for both 
a test and a combat weapon. A successful proof test of the implosion design also would 
show that a self-sustaining fission chain reaction in a bomb configuration worked, 
making a proof test of Little Boy unnecessary. This was an extraordinarily significant 
development since uranium production continued to lag.
 75
 With Cowpuncher approval, a 
proof test, codenamed Trinity, was planned for the summer of 1945. 
Planning a full scale nuclear test was complicated. If successful, Trinity’s blast 
would destroy much of its immediate surroundings and inject radioactive debris into the 
atmosphere. The contaminated debris would be carried away from the point of detonation 
by prevailing winds, with the heavier and radioactively hotter debris falling out close to 
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ground zero. The lighter and cooler particles would disperse into insignificance. Hence, a 
remote area was required to contain the blast and capture the hottest fallout. A remote 
location also guaranteed the test could be carried out in secrecy. 
 
Figure 10.  Early implosion experiment where pipe was crushed by high explosives. LANL Archives. 
 
If Trinity failed, the force of the high explosives would scatter the scarce 
plutonium over the surrounding terrain. If a failure seemed likely, some method had to be 
devised to recover the plutonium. That solution was a giant 216 ton containment vessel 
code named Jumbo. Jumbo was designed to contain a failed experiment and, more 
importantly, the plutonium. Built in Barberton, Ohio, Jumbo’s size and mass required that 
it travel over a rail route three times longer than the normal journey to southern New 
Mexico because many of the existing rail bridges could not hold its weight.
76
 Once 
Jumbo arrived at its destination, it was suspended from a derrick a quarter of a mile from 
ground zero. Shortly before the planned test, Hans Bethe assured Oppenheimer that 
Trinity would be successful. Jumbo was not needed and became a bystander and survivor 
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of Trinity’s blast, what Trinity Test Director Kenneth Bainbridge called “a silent 
partner.”77 
 
Figure 11.  Jumbo being prepared just prior to the Trinity test. LANL Archives. 
 
Oppenheimer and Bainbridge identified and evaluated eight potential sites for the 
Trinity test. Four of these sites were in New Mexico, two in California, and one each in 
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Colorado and Texas. The ultimate selection of the Jornada del Muerto
78
region of 
southern New Mexico was based on what Bainbridge described as practical, scientific 
considerations. First, the site was expansive and flat. The blast wave from the test would 
spread quickly thus minimizing its effects on the surrounding terrain. Second, the 
weather, on average, was benign with only small amounts of haze and dust thereby 
permitting the collection of optical data (i.e., photographs). The final consideration was 
the site’s relative proximity to Los Alamos that minimized travel time to and from the 
site.
79
 
In the early morning hours of July 16, 1945, Oppenheimer stood in the darkness 
of the Jornada del Muerto anticipating the detonation of the world’s first atomic bomb. 
The stress of leading Los Alamos had taken its toll. When he arrived in New Mexico, 
Oppenheimer weighed 130 pounds. By the time of Trinity his weight had dropped below 
100 pounds. Now, in the darkness, Oppenheimer and hundreds of other scientists waited 
anxiously to see if their labors had been in vain or if the “gadget” would work.80 
Oppenheimer’s concern was justified. While high explosives in the form of small shaped 
charges had been used before, most notably in the sculpting of Mount Rushmore, their 
use as the trigger for an atomic bomb was novel and worrisome. In the penultimate entry 
of the Trinity timetable, Norris Bradbury wrote: 
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“Sunday, 15 July, all day. Look for rabbit’s feet and four leafed 
clovers. Should we have the chaplain down there? Period for 
inspection available from 0900-1000.”81 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.  Norris Bradbury standing beside the Trinity device. LANL Archives. 
 
At 5:45 am Mountain War Time
82
, just moments before the first rays of daylight 
appeared, the Trinity device exploded with the force of approximately 20 kilotons, 
lighting up the southern New Mexico sky. 
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Figure 13. Trinity at sixteen seconds after detonation. LANL Archives. 
 
Figure 14. One of only six color photographs of Trinity. Color film was scarce and very hard to acquire. LANL 
Archives. 
Reactions to the Trinity test varied among the scientists who witnessed the detonation. 
Oppenheimer recalled a line from the Sanskrit poem, the Bhagavad Vita, “I am become 
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death, the destroyer of worlds.”83 Test director Kenneth Bainbridge said simply, “Now 
we are all sons of bitches.”84 Ever the experimentalist, Nobel laureate Enrico Fermi, took 
out a piece of paper and tore it into small pieces. As the blast wave passed by him, Fermi 
dropped the pieces of paper as a way of calculating Trinity’s yield.  As Fermi later wrote,  
About 40 seconds after the explosion, the air blast reached me. I 
tried to estimate its strength by dropping from about six feet small 
pieces of paper before, during and after the passage of the blast 
wave. Since, at the time, there was no wind I could observe very 
distinctly and actually measure the displacement of the pieces of 
paper that were in the process of falling while the blast was passing. 
The shift was about 2½ meters, which, at the time, I estimated to 
correspond to the blast that would be produced by ten thousand tons 
of T.N.T.
85
 
 
Fermi underestimated the force of the blast by ten kilotons. Edward Teller prepared for 
the anticipated intensity of the blast’s heat and light by liberally applying sun tan lotion. 
Richard Feynman, a future Nobel laureate, took off his protective goggles to witness the 
blast with his unshielded eyes only to be temporarily blinded by the extreme brilliance of 
the explosion’s fireball. Harvard chemist and Russian émigré, George Kistiakowsky, 
wrote, “the flash lit the countryside like a hundred suns and the reflection from the far 
away mountains nearly blinded me for a few seconds.”86 Yet another Nobel laureate, I. I. 
Rabi, won the betting pool on how large the yield would be. His choice, 18 kilotons, was 
the only remaining number in the betting pool. Anticipating that the explosion would be 
heard and perhaps seen at great distances, and seeking to protect nuclear secrecy, Groves 
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hired New York Times Reporter William Laurence to prepare a press release announcing 
that an ammunition dump had accidentally exploded. This press release said, in part, 
“Several inquiries have been received concerning a heavy explosion which occurred on 
the Alamogordo Air Base reservation this morning. A remotely located ammunition 
magazine containing a considerable amount of high explosives and pyrotechnics 
exploded. There was no loss of life or injury to anyone, and the property damage outside 
the explosives magazine itself was negligible.”87 Trinity worked, and worked well. The 
bombings Hiroshima and Nagasaki soon followed.
88
 
 Trinity had a number of significant implications beginning with the fact that the 
bomb worked and, at the same time, proving that a self-sustaining chain reaction could be 
successfully fashioned into a bomb. Before Trinity, a fission chain reaction had only been 
demonstrated experimentally by Enrico Fermi in a small reactor under the University of 
Chicago's Stagg athletic stands. While Fermi’s experiment demonstrated that a fission 
chain reaction was possible, it did not prove that a chain reaction could be fashioned into 
an atomic bomb. Trinity did so. Second, Trinity proved that the implosion assembly 
worked better than expected, becoming the basis for most postwar nuclear weapons. 
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Figure 15. J. Robert Oppenheimer and General Leslie Groves at Trinity ground zero in October 
1945. LANL Archives. 
 
Trinity also had significant implications for future testing. First, it established the 
precedent of selecting nuclear tests sites based solely on technical considerations. People 
could be moved. Just as the ranchers of the Jornada were moved for Trinity, so too would 
the people of Bikini and Enewetak. Second, Trinity proved the techniques of testing in 
the atmosphere. These techniques, such as the use of tall shot towers along and with 
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instrumentation to measure light, heat, and yield, did not change fundamentally until 
testing was moved underground in the 1960s.
89
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly 
Trinity’s radioactive fallout forced the first postwar nuclear tests to be conducted outside 
the continental United States. Anticipating local fallout from Trinity, monitoring stations 
were placed in the surrounding towns and villages. When none of these communities 
received measureable fallout, Oppenheimer and others believed that Trinity’s fallout was 
localized near ground zero. But, other surprising data forced a different conclusion. When 
unusually large amounts of defective photographic film were returned to the Kodak plant 
in Schenectady, New York, an investigation revealed that wheat straw harvested in 
Indiana and used in the construction of packing boxes sold to Kodak had been 
contaminated by fallout from Trinity.
90
 While Los Alamos scientists knew that wind 
currents would carry fallout for some distance, they were quite surprised that it traveled 
so far. This discovery influenced planning for the first postwar nuclear test series, 
Operation Crossroads, carried out in early 1946. The use of Bikini Atoll for Operation 
Crossroads would eventually haunt the United States, both for the depravation of the atoll 
and for the dislocation of its people. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DISCOVERIES AND COLLISIONS 
 As the test site for sixty-six nuclear detonations, the Marshall Islands played a 
central role in the development of America’s nuclear weapons from the crude fission 
bombs of World War II to the very sophisticated hydrogen bombs of the 1950s. This role 
was a consequence of the islands’ history, beginning with their accidental discovery by a 
lone Spanish navigator and followed by nearly four hundred years of subjugation by a 
succession of world powers, including the United States. The role as a test site also was a 
consequence of the islands’ geography. Located in a particularly empty expanse of the 
Pacific Ocean, two of the Marshall Islands’ twenty-nine atolls, Bikini and Enewetak, 
seemingly offered nuclear test sites that could be used with minimal impact on the 
peoples of the world. The few people evicted from their very small island homes were 
considered too few to be of any consequence. 
The Spanish crown, seeking to control the lucrative European spice trade, 
commissioned a succession of navigators to find a sailing route to the Spice Islands of the 
Indonesian Archipelago. One of these navigators, Alvaro de Saavedra Ceron, happened 
on a Marshallese atoll while searching for a sailing route from the Spice Islands to 
Mexico. For three hundred years following their discovery, Spain ignored the Islands, not 
even bothering to name them. With a total land mass of barely seventy square miles and 
no natural resources, the twenty-nine atolls and five islands drew virtually no attention 
until American missionaries arrived in the in the 1850s to convert and educate the 
population. Although the intent of the missionaries was to convert souls, their influence 
shaped the islanders’ cultural expectations of foreigners, making them deferential to 
  63 
foreigners, particularly to their German, Japanese, and American overseers. Germany, 
largely by subterfuge, wrested control of the islands from Spain in 1885 and governed the 
archipelago until the outbreak of World War I. When Germany abandoned its Pacific 
holdings, Japan quickly took control of the islands and governed them by right of 
occupation until granted a League of Nations mandate. Japan retained control of the 
archipelago until United States armed forces took the Marshall Islands by combat early in 
World War II. America then governed the Marshall Islands until 1990, first by right of 
combat and then by a United Nations trusteeship. The trusteeship was formally abolished 
in 1990. 
The sheer remoteness of the Marshall Islands kept the archipelago and its people 
in relative obscurity, even after the battles of World War II, until the 1946 Crossroad tests 
made Bikini a household word, albeit more for the swimsuit designed in the aftermath of 
the tests. In the summer of 1946, the entire world was able to listen to the Crossroads 
tests on radio and later watch them on movie screens. Little mention or thought was given 
to the native islanders, who had been forced to leave their homeland. Throughout the next 
twelve years, nuclear testing continued in the Marshall Islands ending only when 
worldwide fear of radioactive fallout led to the 1958 moratorium. When testing ended, 
two atolls, Bikini and Rongelap, were uninhabitable along with half of Enewetak. 
Questions remain about the levels of contamination that may still reside on other atolls, 
such as Utirik. Despite the visible role played by the Marshall Islands in the development 
of nuclear weapons, and the consequences testing had on the archipelago and its people, 
this country remains hidden in the Pacific, little known by most people. 
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Discovery – The Marshall Islands 
For want of spices, particularly cloves, mace and nutmeg, Spain and Portugal 
opened the European Age of Discovery. Grown only on the Moluccas Islands (aka the 
Spice Islands) of the Indonesian Archipelago, these highly sought after spices were 
available on the European continent, but only at extremely exorbitant prices from Arab 
and Venetian traders. Seeking to break the Arab-Venetian stranglehold on this very 
profitable trade, Spain and Portugal sent ships to sea in search of a sailing route to the 
Moluccas. Portuguese navigators searched eastward around the Horn of Africa, while 
Spanish navigators sailed to the west. 
Emperor Charles V entrusted the Spanish quest to an expatriate Portuguese 
navigator, Ferdinand Magellan, who set sail from Seville, Spain, on September 20, 1519. 
On March 6, 1521, while sailing across the Pacific, his small fleet passed within 100 
miles of Bikini Atoll before making landfall on the island of Guam. After a brief three-
day stay at Guam, Magellan continued his journey, discovering the Philippine 
Archipelago, where he was subsequently killed on Mactan Island. On September 6, 1523, 
three years after Magellan first set sail, a lone surviving vessel, the Victoria, and a cargo 
of cloves, made it home to Seville, becoming the first ship and crew to circumnavigate 
the world.
91
 
 This significance of the first European circumnavigation of the globe was, 
however, overshadowed by Portugal’s success in finding and establishing an eastern 
sailing route to the Spice Islands that allowed the Portuguese crown to claim the 
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Moluccas as its own. Not accepting the Portuguese success, Charles V sent Juan Garcia 
Jofre de Loaysa to evict the Portuguese from the Moluccas. Following Magellan’s route 
across the Atlantic, de Loaysa lost seven of his nine ships and his life before entering the 
Pacific. When the two  surviving ships finally entered the Pacific, only one, under the 
command of Alonzo de Salazar, continued on, eventually making landfall on a set of 
islands that geographers only much later speculated as Marshallese.
92
 Unable to find a 
suitable anchorage, de Salazar sailed on to the Spice Islands, only to be defeated by a 
Portuguese fleet. The Spanish survivors took refuge on the tiny Spice Island of Tidore. 
In October 1527 Charles V commissioned Alvaro de Saavedra Ceron and yet a 
third fleet to evict the Portuguese from the Spice Islands. Upon finding the few survivors 
of the previous expedition living in a makeshift fort and having no chance of dislodging 
the Portuguese from the islands, de Saavedra took on a cargo of cloves and sailed for 
Mexico. The very strong prevailing winds quickly forced de Saavedra back to Tidore. In 
late spring 1529, de Saavedra set out once again. This time the prevailing winds led to an 
unexpected landfall at the outlying Marshallese Atoll of Ujelang. This accidental landfall 
marked the Spanish discovery of the Marshall Islands. After a brief stay, de Saavedra 
resumed his voyage and happened upon a second outlying Marshallese Atoll, either 
Enewetak or Bikini. After minimal contact with the native populations and finding no 
spices, de Saavedra sailed on, but died shortly after leaving the atolls. His successor 
could not find favorable winds and returned to Tidore joining the survivors of de 
Loaysa’s stranded crew in an unsuccessful attempt to hold out against the Portuguese. 
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After three failed efforts to acquire the Spice Islands, Spain, by treaty with 
Portugal, relinquished its claim to the islands receiving in return the Philippines, Mariana, 
Gilbert, Caroline, and Marshall Archipelagos as well as 350,000 Ducats. While the 
Philippines became a valuable colony, the lack of spices or any other natural resources 
rendered most of the newly discovered islands, particularly the barren Marshall Islands, 
irrelevant to the Spanish Crown. In writing of the Spanish discovery of the Marshall 
Islands, Francis Hezel noted that the islands had no spices or gold and the souls too few 
to convert to the true faith. With their treacherous shoals and reefs, they were regarded as 
“nothing more than navigational hazards that were best avoided.”93 Having no value, 
Spain even neglected to provide the islands with an identity, something that happened 
only after a 1788 British exploratory expedition of two ships under the command of 
Captains John Marshall and Thomas Gilbert made its way through the archipelago and 
the subsequent publication of Marshall’s log.94 During his exploration of the Pacific at 
the turn of the 19
th
 century, Russian Otto von Kotzebue wintered in the Marshall Islands, 
becoming a friend of the paramount Iroij, or chief, of the Ratak Chain of atolls. However, 
when Kotzebue sailed away for the final time, Russia, like Great Britain, left the Marshall 
Islands to a disinterested Spain. Political Scientist Harold Nufer characterized Spanish 
rule in the Pacific as “the absence of islander participation in the running of the 
government; the institution of a limited form of education, mostly in the trades; and 
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economic development which was almost nil.” For the Marshall Islands, it was not even 
“nil.”95 
Collision – The Missionaries 
The first sustained interest in the Marshall Islands came at the middle of the 19
th
 
century from the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM). 
Hearing lurid tales of the debauchery and sin committed by commercial whalers, the 
ABCFM saw the Pacific islanders in need of God’s protection. These missionaries, as 
anthropologist Robert Kiste wrote, “came not only to save souls but to bring to the 
islanders such amenities of Western Civilization as clothing, schools, medical services – 
in effect their intention was to transplant 19
th
 century New England folkways and mores 
as a whole to the Pacific.”96 Insisting on monogamy and western clothing and actively 
seeking to control island politics by curtailing the authority of native chiefs, the 
missionaries waged a largely unsuccessful battle to convert native populations of the 
whaling now accustomed to the less virtuous aspects of western culture.
97
 
Since the Marshall Islands were located far from the major whaling areas, the 
ABCFM initially ignored them, not believing that the Marshallese were in danger of the 
sins wrought by sailors. The reputation of the Marshallese people as being distinctly 
                                                 
95
 Harold F. Nufer, Micronesia Under American Rule, An Evaluation of the Strategic Trusteeship, 1947-
1977 (Hicksville, N.Y.: Exposition Press), 6. 
 
96
 Robert C, Kiste, Kili Island: A Study of the Relocation of the Ex-Bikini Marshallese (Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Eugene Oregon: University of Oregon, 1968), 117; see also Jack A Tobin, Stories from the Marshall 
Islands (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002). 
 
97
 Francis X. Hezel, The First Taint of Civilization, 147; See also C. Hartley Grattan, The Southwest Pacific 
to 1900; A Modern History: Australia, New Zealand, the Islands, Antarctica (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1963); The United States and the Southwest Pacific (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1961, Why we Fought (New York: The Vanguard Press, 1949), and The Southwest Pacific since 1900; 
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1963). 
 
  68 
unfriendly and probably dangerous also tempered the ABCFM’s concern with saving 
Marshallese souls. However, ABCFM interest in the Marshalls grew, particularly as its 
missionaries continued having troubles in the whaling islands. In 1855 ABCFM 
missionary George Pierson had the good fortune to accidentally meet one of the 
paramount Marshallese Iroij, Kaibuki, who promised his protection and assistance. Two 
years later, the American Board established a formal mission presence on Ebon Atoll. 
With the encouragement of Kaibuki, the Marshallese took to Christianity and, unlike their 
whaling island counterparts, readily adopted modest western clothing, particularly the 
Mother Hubbard style of dresses for women. Through missionary efforts, the Marshallese 
also quickly learned English, achieving a literacy level well above eighty per cent of the 
population. In all things Christian, the Marshallese, particularly those on Bikini, proved 
an ideal population for the efforts of the ABCFM becoming in just fifteen years a self-
supporting Christian population viewed by the American Board as “a miracle of grace.”98 
Although it is unclear why, exactly, the Bikinians became devout converts to 
Christianity, the probable answer is rooted in the evangelical Christian belief of strict 
obedience to God and to God’s spokesmen on earth – the missionaries.99 
Collision – Germany and Japan 
The ABCFM’s growing success in the Marshalls was seemingly threatened, 
however, by German traders who began arriving in the islands in 1861. These traders 
hoped to create an export market for copra, and by extension a profitable commercial 
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culture in the islands. The missionaries initially viewed the German commercial quest as 
the embodiment of the unpardonable sin of consumer greed. The traders considered the 
missionaries an overly pious group who encouraged hymn singing and collected steep 
church taxes. Despite this initial antagonism, the relationship between these two groups 
ultimately proved symbiotic and served both sides in an unexpected manner. Because 
missionaries preached the concept of obedience to God and his emissaries, the 
Marshallese people became more and more deferential to foreign presence, making it 
much easier to set up trading stations. As Hezel characterized the relationship, “the 
servants of God and Mammon were prophets of progress, each yard of calico sold was 
another step along the road toward civilization.” 100 Traders realized a profit and 
missionaries a chaste dress code. 
German commercial interest in the Marshall Islands was part of a wider 
Bismarckian effort to acquire territory in the Pacific. With very little regard for Spain, 
and with the tacit approval of Great Britain, Germany unilaterally and successfully 
annexed the Marshalls in 1885.
101
 Ruling the Marshall Islands for the next twenty-nine 
years, Germany, unlike Spain, exercised a direct, day-to-day rule characterized as “a no 
nonsense approach to matters.”102 Also, unlike Spain, Germany took an active interest in 
teaching the Marshallese, instituting a formal education program in 1888. The purpose of 
this program was not to improve the Marshallese, but rather to teach them only enough to 
work, earn, and save money. Ultimately, German rule in the Marshall Islands flagged 
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because copra sales failed to realize substantial profits and the cost of governing the 
islands became too expensive for the Kaiser. Having no significant commercial or 
strategic value, Germany abandoned the Marshall Islands, as it did all of its Pacific 
holdings soon after World War I began. 
A New International Order 
Japan took little notice of European colonial activities until the Meiji Restoration, 
by which time European powers had claimed all of the Pacific territories.
103
 Sensing an 
opportunity created by Germany’s abrupt departure from the Pacific, Japan colluded with 
Great Britain to divide the Kaiser’s Pacific colonies between them. When Germany 
abandoned the Marshall Islands in 1914, Japan, acting with the tacit approval of Great 
Britain, sailed its navy into the archipelago and claimed the islands for their emperor.
104
 
Japan continued its occupation throughout the war and into the first years of peace 
without protest from any of the Allied powers. Japanese occupation of the Marshall 
Islands, although not an issue in and of itself, was part of the larger debate among the 
Allied Powers at Versailles about how to deal with the colonies and territories of their 
defeated adversaries, Germany and the Ottoman Empire. The general practice up to 
Versailles was simply to reallocate the colonies of the losers to the victors. The 
importance and significance of America’s role in the war and especially the fashioning of 
the peace as enunciated by President Woodrow Wilson and his Fourteen Points 
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challenged this custom. Japan’s occupation of the Marshall Islands, by way of a secret 
agreement with Great Britain, was in direct conflict with Point One of Wilson’s 
proclamation which called for open diplomacy. There also was a serious conflict with 
Point 5, which called for “A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all 
colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all 
such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal 
weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.” 105 
However, both Japan and Great Britain had no intention of backing away from their 
secret agreement, which flew in the face of Wilson and his ideals. Although Wilson 
ultimately did not press the issue of sovereignty for Germany’s ex-colonies, neither were 
these territories simply given directly to new colonial owners. Instead, the newly created 
League of Nations took ownership of the territories from the Allied Powers and created a 
mandate system to manage them. This system consisted of three categories - A, B, and C 
- which reflected each colony’s level of political and economic development. All of 
Germany’s Pacific colonies, including the Marshall Islands, were classified as Class C 
mandates, territories that, “owing to the sparseness of their population or their small size, 
or their remoteness from the centers of civilizations … can best be governed under the 
laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory.”106 This status, plus a 
pronounced lack of League oversight, essentially meant that these territories became part 
of the administering nation, which, of course, for the Marshalls meant Japan. The 
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mandate system created a new international order, one that obligated Japan “to promote 
the material and moral well-being and social progress of the natives, to prohibit slavery 
and forced labor, to control traffic in arms, to exclude alcoholic beverages, to refrain 
from building fortifications and military bases, to permit freedom of worship and 
missionary activity, and to submit an annual report to the League of Nations.
107
 The 
limits of this new international order and the mandate system became clear, however, 
when Japan walked out of the League in the early 1930’s and did not return its mandate. 
 Japan, unlike Germany, incorporated the Marshall Islands into its greater political 
orbit. Civil government throughout the islands mirrored that of Japan including an 
emphasis on civic improvements such as roads and sewerage systems. Although Japan 
had no intention of letting the Marshallese participate in their own governance, the 
empire did include Marshallese children in its education system, teaching the same 
curriculum to both Japanese and Marshallese students “in accordance with Japan’s 
general colonial policy.” The curriculum, however, ignored Marshallese culture entirely, 
teaching only Japanese culture, history, language, and etiquette, along with simple 
mathematics.
108
 
Upon withdrawing from the League of Nations, Japan closed off its mandate from 
the wider world. This closure particularly worried the United States military who, since 
the end of World War I, had come to see Japan as a likely enemy in the Pacific. 
Periodically, throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the United States unsuccessfully requested 
permission to enter and inspect the Marshalls for evidence of a military buildup. The lack 
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of access led United Sates military planners to believe that Japan was heavily fortifying 
all Marshallese atolls.
109
 Reality, however, was quite different. Only a few atolls, among 
them Jaluit, Maloelap, and Kwajalein, were heavily fortified. Most atolls, including 
Bikini, were virtually ignored by the Japanese. Also, Japanese civil engineering was 
simply too primitive to effectively fortify every atoll. To compensate for the lack of 
machinery, the Japanese military impressed scores of Marshallese men and forced them 
into military construction projects. While all Marshallese suffered at the hands of the 
Japanese in the years immediately preceding World War II, Marshallese men suffered the 
most, often taken from their home atolls and used throughout the archipelago. Those who 
managed to survive the war often found that that their homes and families had 
disappeared, destroyed by combat operations 
110
 
Collision – The United States 
The Marshall Islands became one of the earliest battlefields in the war against 
Japan. The islands lay between Hawaii, the base of United States operations in the 
Pacific, and Japan. The Navy could not simply sail around the archipelago because each 
atoll and island could be used by the Japanese as unsinkable aircraft carriers for its long-
range bombers. The Marshall Islands had to be captured before the Navy could advance 
toward Japan. This situation came about because of an early American War Plan 
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codenamed Orange. Developed in 1906, Plan Orange stipulated that at the beginning of 
hostilities in the Pacific, all United States armed forces, including Army troops stationed 
in the Philippines, would be relocated to Hawaii. Offensive combat operations would 
begin from there.
111
 Plan Orange was modified after the American military presence in 
the Philippines grew in size. Under the revised plan, the Army in the Philippines, under 
the command of General Douglas MacArthur, was expected to withstand a Japanese 
siege until the Navy, sailing from Pearl Harbor, arrived and destroyed the Japanese 
invasion forces. As the onset of hostilities quickly showed, the revised plan failed in 
several crucial aspects, one of which was not recognizing the strategic importance of the 
many small islands between Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. The Japanese military, 
long before the United States, recognized that modern, long-range combat aircraft made 
these small islands “unsinkable aircraft carriers.” Japanese combat aircraft, stationed in 
the Marshalls, stood between Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. The American Army 
could not be rescued and the entire Philippine Archipelago quickly fell to Japan. 
 At the Trident Conference held in Washington, D.C., in May 1943, President 
Franklin Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff 
approved a new war plan for the Pacific beginning with the capture of the Gilbert and 
Marshall Islands.
112
 Responsibility for implementing the new Pacific war plan fell to the 
Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz. After the horrific 
slaughter of United States Marines at Tarawa Atoll in the Gilbert Islands, Nimitz and his 
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staff developed a unique battle plan, island hopping, for capturing the Marshallese 
Archipelago. The most heavily defended atolls, such as Jaluit, which had no strategic 
importance, would be simply by-passed. Instead Majuro, Kwajalein, and Enewetak Atolls 
were selected for capture because of their logistical importance.
113
 Majuro, the present 
day capital of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, was selected because of its large 
lagoon and its relatively large land mass would make it an ideal supply base. Kwajalein 
was targeted because it was the hub of the Japanese defensive system in the Central 
Pacific and its lagoon, the largest in the world, could be used as a major fleet anchorage. 
Enewetak’s large lagoon and extreme western location in the Central Pacific made it an 
ideal staging area for anticipated operations against the Mariana Islands of Guam, Saipan 
and Tinian. 
 Majuro, which was abandoned early in the war by Japan, was quickly occupied on 
January 31, 1944, and just as quickly turned into a major supply base and rest camp. 
Kwajalein, also invaded on January 31
st
, was the scene of bloody and bitter fighting. The 
capture of Kwajalein Atoll began when troops of the United States Marines Corps 
invaded the atoll’s two northernmost islands, Roi and Namur. Roi fell to the Marines on 
February 1
st
. Namur, connected to Roi by a causeway, did not fall until February 2
nd
. 
Also on January 31
st
, the island of Kwajalein proper, located at the southern extreme of 
the atoll, was invaded by United States Army troops.
114
 Kwajalein Island, with its 
relatively large land mass and a large number of Japanese defenders, did not fall until 
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February 7
th
. Enewetak Atoll was invaded on February 17, 1944, beginning with the 
amphibious assault by United States Marines of the atoll’s northernmost island, Engebi. 
Engebi fell to the Marines six hours after the first troops waded ashore. Enewetak Island, 
800 yards wide and a mile long, took three days to capture. Parry Island, immediately 
adjacent to Enewetak, took two days. The battle for Enewetak Atoll was bloody, taking 
339 Marine and 2,677 Japanese lives. Only 64 Japanese prisoners were taken. No one 
counted the number of Marshallese casualties.
115
 
 Those Atolls thought to be lightly defended, including Bikini, were scheduled for 
capture after the conclusion of the Majuro, Kwajalein, and Enewetak campaigns. Bikini 
was taken with almost no effort. The small boatload of Marines assigned to assault the 
atoll landed only to find the five Japanese stationed on the island dead by their own 
hands. The heavily fortified and by-passed atolls, Jaluit, Maloelap, and Wotho, were used 
for bombing practice until the end of the war. Everyone trapped on the bypassed atolls, 
both Japanese and Marshallese, faced starvation. Out of sheer desperation to avoid certain 
death, many of the Marshallese trapped on the by-passed atolls took to the open ocean in 
small boats hoping for rescue by the U.S. Navy. 
America, the Marshall Islands and the United Nations 
 When American combat forces wrested control of the Marshall Islands from 
Japan, the United States became more than a victorious occupying power. By substituting 
its authority for Japan’s, the United States also assumed responsibility for the League of 
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Nation’s mandate.116 Although this legal responsibility did not mean much during the 
war, it was an issue that ultimately had to be resolved by the League’s successor, the 
United Nations. Seeking to retain control of the islands, the United States negotiated a 
strategic trusteeship with itself as the trustee administrator. The strategic trusteeship gave 
the United States the right to govern the islands with minimal oversight. In this respect, 
the UN strategic trusteeship was very much like its predecessor, the League mandate.  
Immediately after combat operations ceased in the Marshall Islands, Admiral 
Chester Nimitz issued Proclamation Number One, which established the basis for 
military governance of the islands: 
All powers of government and jurisdiction in the occupied territory and 
over the inhabitants therein, and final administrative responsibility, are 
vested in me as Admiral, United States Navy, commanding the United 
States Forces of occupation, and Military Governor, and will be exercised 
through subordinate commanders by my direction. [It is the policy of 
United States Forces] not to make war upon the civilian inhabitants or 
these islands but to permit them to continue their normal lives and 
occupations in a peaceable manner, so far as war necessities and their own 
behavior permit.
117
 
 
While the proclamation was a legal requirement, it had little impact or meaning. The 
Marshallese people had not exercised any substantial form of self rule, or any form of 
civil disobedience, since the arrival of the first missionaries in the middle of the 19
th
 
Century. Having endured privation and starvation at the hands of the Japanese, the 
Marshallese people as a whole were very happy to be captured by American troops. In 
fact, as Dorothy Richard pointed out in her study of Navy administration of the Pacific, 
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“The friendliness of the Marshallese people toward the American military forces was due 
in no small measure to the respect and affection with which American Protestant 
missionaries had been held for almost a century in the islands.”118 On every island and 
atoll, United States troops found shell shocked, starving, and malnourished populations 
living in squalid conditions. One of the most important outcomes of the early months of 
American occupation, a National Geographic correspondent reported, was improved 
sanitation and the elimination of massive fly populations. American troops were so 
popular, that this same correspondent remarked that all Marshallese “want to talk with the 
Americans.”119 The American military was seen as the savior of the Marshallese people. 
 United States military governance, while beneficial for the most part, did create 
problems, particularly for the people of Enewetak Atoll. After capturing Enewetak, the 
Navy began using the atoll as a staging area for fleet operations against the Marianas 
Islands of Guam, Saipan and Tinian. To avoid conflicts with the native islanders, the 
Navy moved the atoll’s entire population, numbering about 140, to the remote northern 
island, Aoman. The natives were given a modicum of food stocks and supplies and 
forgotten. Unintentionally, the Navy had co-mingled the two native tribes of the atoll, the 
dri-Engebi people of the northern half of the atoll and the dri-Enewetak people of the 
southern half. Co-locating both tribes on Aoman Island created the jurisdictional problem 
of deciding which iroij would be in charge. Aoman was nominally governed by the iroij 
of Engebi. This jurisdictional problem was temporarily settled when the dri-Enewetak 
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tribe waded to the adjacent island of Bijiri.
120
 This relocation of the Enewetak tribes to 
Aoman Island was the first step in destroying the two cultural identities of the Enewetak 
islanders. The process would be completed in 1948, when the Enewetak people were 
once again co-located and moved to Ujelang Atoll to make way for Operation Sandstone.  
The Strategic Trusteeship 
The capture of the Marshall Islands, as it did with other island territories, meant 
that the United States had to decide on its postwar role in the Pacific. The nature of that 
role rested on two considerations. First, could the United States give up the islands that 
had claimed the lives of so many Marines, sailors, and soldiers? The answer, for the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, was no. The JCS was firm in its belief “that no forces under their control 
would take any action, make any plans, agreements or statements which directly or by 
implication might serve as a basis for any nation other than United States from obtaining 
sovereignty or any other territorial rights therein.”121 Although it is not clear that the Joint 
Chiefs had a grand post war strategy for the nation’s growing Pacific empire, they 
certainly saw the war in the Pacific as having been an American effort, which gave it the 
right to govern and administer the Marshall Islands, as well as all of Micronesia, “as it 
deemed necessary based on its hard fought and bloody victories.”122  
The second consideration was strategic. The Marshall Islands provided a bastion 
that could be used in the emerging cold war with the Soviet Union. Recognizing this fact, 
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both the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Ernest King, and the Commanding 
General of the Army Air Corps, H. H. Arnold, believed the Marshall Islands were 
important to the future security of the United States and thus should remain in American 
hands. “The future of peace of the world,” they said, “indeed, the fate of mankind may 
depend on it.”123 The JCS was laying the groundwork not only for continued control of 
the Marshall Islands, but for outright acquisition as well.
124
 
As a result of JCS thinking, the United States goal was, in essence, an issue of 
how the Marshall Islands could be claimed under international law. The Joint Chiefs 
argued for outright annexation of the islands. The State Department objected because the 
United States had confirmed the League of Nations’ Marshallese Mandate and its 
assignment to Japan and had now substituted its authority for Japan. The State 
Department also pointed out that the United States was a member of the Principal Allied 
and Associated Powers, the temporary wartime successor to the League and which held 
title to the League’s mandates. As a member of the Principal Allied and Associated 
Powers, the United States could not unilaterally retain control of the Marshall Islands, but 
rather had to negotiate a political solution with the League’s permanent successor. The 
State Department prevailed in the argument and it fell to the United Nations to determine 
the fate of the Japanese mandate. 
The United Nations replaced the mandate system with a similar system known as 
trusteeships. Trusteeships, like the mandates, were based on the belief that some 
territories, such as the Marshall Islands, having small populations, extreme geographic 
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dispersion, and an almost total lack of natural resources could not manage immediate 
independence.
125
 After the United Nations set up its trusteeship system, the United States 
successfully petitioned for the Marshall Islands to be placed in the a special category of , 
strategic trusteeships, which would give the United States  unilateral and unfettered 
control over the islands. Such control allowed the United States to establish military 
bases, erect or increase defensive fortifications, and deploy military forces throughout the 
archipelago. Although this strategic trusteeship provided a political and legal basis for 
continued United States domination of the Marshall Islands, it was “annexation in all but 
name.” The United States essentially obtained an exclusive strategic preserve in the 
postwar Pacific without the onus of being labeled a hypocritical imperial power. In the 
end, strategic trusteeship allowed the United States to “have its cake and eat it too.”126  
The strategic trusteeship also permitted the United States to conduct nuclear tests 
in the Marshall Islands without any United Nations oversight by simply declaring the 
tests national security requirements. Beginning in 1954, the Marshallese people began 
protesting the use of their home land for nuclear testing. Their vehicle of dissent was the 
strategic trusteeship, which gave them access to the United Nations. Although their 
protests were usually quashed by the United States, the issue would not die. When the 
test moratorium ended in 1961, political agitation by the Marshall Islands and other 
countries such as Japan and India insured that testing did not resume in the islands. 
However, the United Nations trusteeship continued for another thirty-two years after 
testing ended. Facing increasing criticism of its continued control of the Marshall Islands, 
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particularly as the last of the other postwar trusteeships were being abrogated, the United 
States did not object when the Marshallese wrote and approved a constitution that 
inaugurated self government in 1979. On June 23, 1983, the Marshall Islands and the 
United States signed a Compact of Free Association. Under the Compact, the Republic of 
the Marshall Islands and the United States agreed to remain connected both politically 
and economically. The United States made the new Republic part of its postal and 
telephone networks, and the dollar remained the official currency of the new republic. As 
part of the Compact, the United States also negotiated the continued use of Kwajalein’s 
massive lagoon as a missile impact area.
127
 In 1986 the United States unilaterally and 
formally declared an end of its United Nations Strategic Trusteeship. The UN followed 
suit in 1990.
128
 The collisions with the western world ended.
129
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CHAPTER 4 
EXILE: BIKINI AND OPERATION CROSSROADS 
At 5:55 am on June 30, 1946, the United States Army Air Corps’s B-29 Bomber, 
Dave’s Dream,130 rotated off the Marshallese island of Kwajalein headed on a course for 
neighboring Bikini Atoll. Dave’s Dream was carrying an atomic bomb christened 
Gilda,
131
 which was to be dropped over a fleet of ships anchored in Bikini’s lagoon. As 
soon as the large bomber safely cleared the Kwajalein’s runway, Leon Smith, a Los 
Alamos electronics expert, crawled into the bomb bay and activated Gilda’s firing 
circuits. Smith completed his task just before Dave’s Dream climbed through 10,000 
feet.
132
   
 
Figure 16. Leon Smith in flight gear. LANL Archives. 
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From an altitude of 30,000 feet, the bombardier of Dave’s Dream released Gilda 
over a target array consisting of Japanese and American warships and the sole surviving 
capital ship of the German battle fleet, the Prinz Eugen. The bombardier’s aiming point 
was the huge United States battleship Nevada, whose superstructure had been painted red 
to aid in target acquisition. Gilda detonated, as planned, 550 feet over Bikini’s lagoon, 
but missed the Nevada by one-half mile.
133
 Since the fleet of target ships had been 
precisely anchored around the Nevada to maximize damage, the miss significantly 
reduced the effect of Gilda’s energy release. Nonetheless, Gilda sank five ships, severely 
damaged eight others, and exposed a large number of pigs, goats, and rats to lethal doses 
of ionizing radiation. Visually, Gilda did not appear all that impressive to observers. As 
reporter William Laurence recalled, “To some of the newspaper men aboard, keyed up to 
the point of expecting the observer ship to be blown out of the water, the spectacle, 
obscured somewhat by an intervening white cloud, was a disappointment. To me, who 
could distinguish between the natural cloud and the atomic cloud, the sight was awesome 
and spine chilling.”134 Unlike the very visible carnage caused at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
much of the damage caused by Gilda simply vanished underwater. The islands of Bikini 
Atoll were undamaged. Atomic testing had entered the postwar phase, but with an 
uncertain rationale and with unsettling results. 
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Figure 17. Crossroads Able. LANL Archives. 
 
 
Figure 18. Damage to the USS Nevada from a miss of one half mile. LANL Archives. 
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The Origins of Crossroads 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki elevated the atomic bomb from the abstract physical 
realm of physics and technology to the reality of military power. The massive devastation 
caused by Little Boy and Fat Man became a singular and immediate concern for high 
ranking military and congressional leaders. While America’s possession of the atomic 
bomb significantly affected matters of military superiority, and would continue to be a 
major factor throughout what would become the Cold War, both military and political 
leaders looked for ways in which the bomb could impact the future. For the military, the 
basic question was which service would control the atomic bomb. For political leaders, 
the question was how to demonstrate America’s new found power to the world. 
Operation Crossroads was an attempt to answer both these questions. 
On August 8
th
, two days after Hiroshima and one day before Nagasaki, General 
Carl Spaatz, the commander of the US Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific, fired the first 
shot in an inter-service rivalry and staked the claim of primacy for the Army Air Corps, 
saying that “the atomic bomb is essentially an air weapon, and, therefore, it is incumbent 
upon the Army Air Forces to provide full cooperation to insure U.S. leadership.” 
Thinking about the future development of the atomic bomb, he argued that “every effort 
must be made to avoid post-war planning of this project on too small a scale. In 
particular, a development site must not be selected which prevents expansion or full 
operation because of terrain, population centers, poor communications or conflict with 
other Government agencies.”135 
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 Politicians, such as United States Senator James O’Brien McMahon, (D-CT), 
wanted to make sure that the world understood how powerful the atomic bomb had made 
the United States. Although Hiroshima and Nagasaki provided proof of the destructive 
power of the bomb against cities, McMahon thought some type of demonstration of the 
bomb’s power against the machines of war would drive home just how powerful America 
had become. On August 25
th
, a week before the surrender document was signed on the 
battleship Missouri, McMahon proposed using the atomic bomb against what remained of 
the Japanese battle fleet, saying in a Senate speech, “In order to test the destructive 
powers of the atomic bomb against naval vessels, I would like to see these [Japanese 
naval] ships taken to sea and an atomic bomb dropped on them. The resulting explosion 
should prove to us just how effective the atomic bomb is when used against the giant 
naval ships.”136 
 McMahon’s proposal was not a new idea. In 1922, the captured World War I 
German battleship, the Ostfriedland, was bombed by both Army and Navy bombers in a 
controlled experiment to provide data on how well a ruggedly built naval vessel could 
withstand aerial bombing. The Ostfriedland withstood several bombings, only to be sunk 
by an unauthorized attack by Army bombers.  The unauthorized bombing and subsequent 
sinking of the Ostfriedland angered the Navy, stoking the fires of inter-service rivalry 
between the Navy and the Army. When high ranking military officers lobbied for a test of 
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the atomic bomb against the remnant of the Japanese fleet, the Navy was eager to break 
the Army’s hold on the atomic bomb. The stage was set for Operation Crossroads. 
During the war, developing the atomic bomb was the responsibility of the 
Manhattan Engineer District, a subordinate unit of the Army, although it carried out its 
mission more or less autonomously. After the war, with the bomb “developed,” the MED, 
without a new mission, lost its autonomy, becoming a caretaker of the nation’s nuclear 
assets for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With the growing interest in a test of the atomic bomb 
against naval vessels, the JCS asserted its authority, creating a working group under Navy 
Commodore William S. Parsons to plan the operation. In addition to being “Navy” 
Parsons was the most logical choice for commanding the study group because of his 
wartime service at Los Alamos. One of a small number of naval officers stationed at Los 
Alamos during the war, Parsons not only was responsible for engineering Little Boy and 
Fat Man into actual combat weapons, he was the acknowledged second in command of 
the Laboratory. His knowledge of Little Boy was so extensive, that he flew on the 
Hiroshima mission, arming the bomb in flight. Parsons was, in short, the military’s 
atomic expert. 
Shortly after arriving at Los Alamos, Parsons, thinking as a naval officer, 
suggested to Oppenheimer that the Laboratory develop a nuclear torpedo. Oppenheimer 
quashed the subject, saying there is “no theoretical encouragement to believe that it [an 
underwater bomb] will be an effective weapon, and we have what I regard as a reliable 
answer to the effect that it will produce inadequate water blast.”137 Parsons, an engineer, 
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could not argue the point with one of the nation’s foremost theoretical physicists. The 
dilemma, then, for Parsons in late 1945 was how to recommend one or more tests that 
simulated naval warfare, including the use of torpedoes, in view of Oppenheimer’s 
assessment. Parsons asked émigré Hungarian mathematician John von Neumann to 
evaluate the use of an atomic bomb underwater, particularly the effects of an underwater 
burst on steel ships.
138
 Von Neumann reported that not only would submersed atomic 
bombs be effective, they could sink a capital ship up to a distance of one-half mile from 
the point of detonation.
139
 Based on von Neumann’s study, Parsons and his group 
recommended an above water test with a bomb suspended from a blimp, a deep water test 
with a bomb suspended one-half mile beneath the surface, a shallow water test in a 
harbor, and an aerial drop by a B-29 bomber. Recognizing the problem of radioactive 
fallout shown by the Trinity test, the group also proposed conducting these tests in the 
Caroline Islands of Micronesia where, among other factors, removing the natives “would 
not be a major problem.” 140 In early January 1946 President Truman authorized the JCS 
to carry out the tests. 
The Joint Chiefs quickly approved three of the four proposed tests, omitting the 
blimp shot. Since the tests were naval in character, the JCS assigned executive 
responsibility for carrying out the operation to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 
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who in turn created Joint Task Force One (JTF-1) under the command of Admiral 
William “Spike” Blandy. It fell to Blandy to select a test site, which had to meet two 
general conditions. First, because of the radioactive fallout from Trinity, the site could 
not be in or near the continental United States. Second, since the bombs would be tested 
against a fleet of ships, the site had to be in a protected anchorage. Nine additional 
specific conditions also had to be met: 
 A protected anchorage at least six miles in diameter to accommodated 
both a large fleet of target ships as well as the JTF-1 support fleet. 
 An unpopulated region situated at least 300 miles from urban areas - to 
prevent any possible exposures to the United States. 
 A location less than 1000 miles from a B-29 base, since at least one bomb 
would be an airdrop.  
 Predictable wind patterns directionally uniform at all altitudes from sea-
level to 60,000 feet to insure a safe dispersal of radioactive debris. 
 Predictable ocean currents of great lateral and vertical dispersion and 
avoiding fishing areas, steamer lanes, and inhabited shores, again to insure 
the safe dispersal of radioactive debris. 
 Minimum distance from continental United States, once again, to prevent 
any exposures to United States citizens and to facilitate logistics. 
 Owned and controlled by the United States to insure uninterrupted 
operations. 
 Temperate or tropical climate that could accommodate outdoor 
operations.
141
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Figure 19. Joint Task Force One Organization Chart. LANL Archives 
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In seeking to meet these conditions, the Blandy looked to the Navy’s empire in 
the Pacific. At the suggestion of Parsons’ group, Blandy first considered Ulithi Atoll in 
the western Caroline Islands. Ulithi had been a major fleet anchorage during the latter 
stages of World War II and retained some of its wartime support facilities.
142
 However, 
Ulithi had two significant drawbacks. First, the atoll’s islands did not have enough land 
mass on which to construct the photographic and instrumentation stations used for 
collecting diagnostic data. Second, Ulithi’s extreme distance from the continental United 
States made the logistics of the proposed tests prohibitively expensive. Looking 
elsewhere, Blandy settled on Bikini Atoll. Significantly closer to the continental United 
States, but still remote, Bikini had a large lagoon as well as sufficient land mass to 
accommodate the required instrumentation stations. Just as importantly, Bikini had a very 
small population, whom the Navy could easily relocate.
143
  
Los Alamos 
While military interest in testing the effects of the Nagasaki-type atomic bomb on 
warships was moving rapidly ahead, practical and political realities threatened to prevent 
the effort entirely. At war’s end, the nation only had one unassembled atomic bomb. 
Although Los Alamos had produced the two combat weapons and could theoretically 
produce more, doing so in peace time was no simple task. During the war, Los Alamos 
literally had a blank check to acquire any and all resources needed to make the atomic 
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bomb a reality.
144
 Even then, it just barely managed that feat. Now, with fewer ready 
resources and no national emergency, such an effort seemed nearly impossible. 
The men and women who worked at Los Alamos during the war were, like those 
who served in the military, eager to return to their prewar lives. The scientists of Los 
Alamos had sacrificed academic careers, their families, and even their health in the 
pursuit of the atomic bomb. In August 1945 they were tired from overwork, but proud of 
their accomplishment. They were also wary of the future, knowing that their creation had 
instantly changed the nature of warfare. Many scientists, including Oppenheimer, had 
university positions they could return to and decided to leave the Laboratory. Others, 
however, decided to stay at Los Alamos believing their knowledge and experience would 
prove useful to the nation. On October 12
th
, his last official day as director of Los 
Alamos, Oppenheimer accepted the Army-Navy “E” Award saying, on behalf of 
everyone, “It is with appreciation and gratefulness that I accept from you this scroll for 
the Los Alamos Laboratory, and for the men and women whose work and whose hearts 
have made it. It is our hope that in years to come we may look at the scroll and all that it 
signifies, with pride”.145 
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Figure 19. Army-Navy E Award Ceremony, October 1945.  Oppenheimer is on far left; flanked by General 
Leslie Groves; Robert Sproul, the President of the University of California; and Commodore William 
S. Parsons. LANL Archives. 
 
As Oppenheimer departed, the facility he left behind was literally falling apart. 
Constructed with great haste in 1943, Los Alamos was never meant to be permanent. The 
rush to build an atomic bomb made speed the only criterion for construction. The most 
severe problem was the very poor housing, which had never been adequate in either 
quantity or quality.
146
 Scientists and their families endured primitive living conditions 
during the war as an act of patriotism. Now that the war was over, such sacrifice was not 
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the least bit noble.
147
 One early report on the condition of Los Alamos noted, “Married 
civilian personnel in many cases were required to live in barracks and dormitories. The 
better homes for the senior personnel were only four-family tenement-type frame 
apartments.” This report also noted that “Residents of Los Alamos had gone through a 
siege of military life, including censorship of mail and telephone calls as well as 
limitations on travel and contacts with their families, which left a general distaste for all 
things military.”148 
Stanford physics professor Norris Bradbury who, became the Laboratory Director 
upon Oppenheimer’s departure, recognized the importance of improving living 
conditions, telling Groves that inadequate housing “caused a morale hazard which, while 
probably out of proportion to the cause, is nevertheless very real.”149 Groves agreed, 
saying “The major factors requiring improvement are the utilities, housing, community 
facilities, and particularly recreational facilities for single persons. This transition from 
war to peacetime community conditions will start immediately.”150 Groves initiated and 
approved a master plan for the community which included schools, roads, and housing. 
Although the future of the MED was in question, Groves recognized the importance of 
keeping Los Alamos viable and acted, as he said, in the absence of national policy, but 
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with the instructions ”to operated the project as I thought best.”151 It was his one 
significant post war contribution to the New World. 
Although the promise of a better community was helpful, it did not address the 
larger concern of scientists, which was the future of atomic bomb research and 
development at Los Alamos. The work of these scientists during the war was of the 
utmost importance and urgency, and they had grown accustomed to being important. 
Now, in the first months after the war, they felt ignored having neither a voice in the 
political discussions about the atomic bomb or even a clear future as an institution. The 
situation worsened after senior staff, including Oppenheimer, Hans Bethe, and Edward 
Teller left Los Alamos, returning to their prewar university professorships. Navy Captain 
Ralph Larkin, the ranking military officer at Los Alamos, told Groves in late August that 
other staffers felt ignored and frustrated, and “University positions are very much in the 
foreground and decisions are being reached every day on definite commitments. Younger 
men will follow this trend.” 152 Many junior staff, whose graduate education had been 
interrupted by the war, did leave to complete their degrees. 
But, despite the loss of their eminent colleagues, political isolation, poor living 
conditions, and the absence of any type of guarantee about the ultimate fate of Los 
Alamos, many scientists stayed. They did not have the stature of their eminent 
colleagues, who had left, nor would they attain such prominence, but they were an able 
group, including Norris Bradbury, Canadian mathematician Carson Mark, Purdue 
physicist Marshall Holloway, and Wisconsin physicist Darol Froman. These men differed 
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from the likes of Oppenheimer in that they had literally built the bomb with their own 
hands.  These men also differed from Oppenheimer in their perspective about atomic 
bombs. While Oppenheimer tended to have an apocalyptic view of the bomb, these men 
were more realistic, believing “that other countries would develop such weapons, and that 
the safety and security of the United States – if not the world – depended upon the 
technical lead of this country.”153 These scientists held the key to the nation’s nuclear 
future. Their collective knowledge and experience gained during the war, coupled with 
the body of recorded documentation held at the Laboratory and the Laboratory’s 
infrastructure could not be easily or cheaply duplicated, nor could it simply be 
transplanted to another institution. The key figure who chose to stay was Bradbury, who 
came to Los Alamos in 1944 while serving in the military as a Naval Reservist. On his 
arrival at Los Alamos, Bradbury was given the job of building and testing the Trinity 
device. Bradbury’s military status, albeit as a reservist, was especially important to 
Groves, who selected him as Oppenheimer’s successor.154  
Along with the staff that stayed, the future of Los Alamos seemed a bit brighter 
when the University of California agreed to continue managing the Laboratory until 
atomic energy legislation was passed. While the university’s role during the war is often 
overlooked, it played a vital role in the wartime success of Los Alamos, giving the 
Laboratory intellectual credibility that had attracted the likes of Teller, who would 
eventually become a professor at the Berkeley campus. The university’s continued 
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presence greatly assisted Bradbury in his efforts to keep Los Alamos functioning in the 
immediate aftermath of the war. 
 
Figure 21. Norris Bradbury sitting in Trinity Shot Cab, July 1945. LANL Archives. 
 
Norris Bradbury was an experimental physicist. Such physicists conduct the often 
laborious and tedious experiments that prove the mathematical constructs of their 
intellectual cousins, theoretical physicists. As an experimental physicist, Bradbury was 
by nature, a cautious and orderly person who, when he became the director of Los 
Alamos, did not rush to make major changes. Instead, he continued the course of action 
put in place by Oppenheimer, who said in an August 1945 memo, “That no steps should 
be taken which commit the Government of the United States to an abandonment of work 
on adequate weapons, or to a ‘crash’ development thereof.”155 Oppenheimer’s reference 
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to “adequate weapons” was particularly important because it referred to a limited 
production of improved Nagasaki-type bombs as well as more advanced designs that 
would more effectively use the very scarce supplies of uranium and plutonium.
156
  
Although it was known in August 1945 that both Little Boy and Fat Man were very 
wasteful of their nuclear fuel, these bombs were used because they were the best options 
at the time. Oppenheimer further understood that the production of nuclear material, 
which slowed to a trickle when the war ended, was the critical factor in governing the 
number of bombs that could be made.
157
 Oppenheimer’s vital memo effectively described 
the realities of the nation’s early postwar nuclear weapons work - an orderly transition 
away from the wartime Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs to more efficient designs - at a 
rate that matched the production of nuclear material. 
Oppenheimer’s memo, however practical in its understanding of the limitations of 
nuclear materials production and the need to improve the existing weapons, did not offer 
a broadly appealing environment for scientists, or a mission that would effectively appeal 
to policy makers and voters, or a strategy that would provide for the long term future of 
Los Alamos. Bradbury understood these shortcomings and offered a complementary 
vision that incorporated the key idea that “the use of nuclear energy may be so 
catastrophic for the world that we should know every extent of its pathology.” He 
furthered argued “that the country requires research and development in fields which are 
fundamental to atomic weapons that have “increased reliability, ease of assembly, safety, 
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and performance.” Bradbury’s vision was dynamic, proposing a continuing need to 
improve atomic weapons, and, at the same time, using this need to justify the 
Laboratory’s continued existence.158 Bradbury’s vision had two significant implications. 
First, it provided a meaningful future for the laboratory’s staff. As one top scientist noted, 
“Technical men become bored doing technically the same thing over and over.”159 The 
vision of continually working on newer and better weapons appealed to the psychology 
of scientists and insured a stable work force. Second, Bradbury’s vision also defined the 
Laboratory’s view of weapon testing. As a scientific laboratory seeking to enhance and 
improve knowledge of nuclear weapons, Bradbury believed firmly in the need for tests 
that confirmed the science of Los Alamos. These proof-of-principle tests, such as Trinity, 
advanced knowledge. Tests, such as those proposed for Operation Crossroads had no 
scientific value and were, in the eyes of Bradbury, of little or no value. Bradbury also had 
two very practical reasons for not liking the proposed Crossroads tests. First, the nation 
did not have a stockpile of weapons and, second, he believed the destruction at Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki had already provided ample proof of the destructive capacity of atomic 
bombs.  
 Bradbury had to wait to implement his vision when instructed to build two new 
Nagasaki-type bombs for Operation Crossroads. Shortages of manpower and nuclear 
materials forced Bradbury to concentrate the Laboratory’s work on producing these two 
new bombs and then supply the staff to assemble and detonate the bombs for the Navy. 
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Figure 22. Bikini Atoll. LANL Archives. 
The Bikinians 
The very first task of Admiral Blandy and Joint Task Force 1 (JTF-1) after the 
selection of Bikini was the relocation of the Bikinians. Few in number, the Bikinians 
were an ancient people having lived on their atoll for 2,000 years. Isolated, even by 
Marshallese standards, the Bikinians had developed a unique culture that was tied 
directly and intimately to their atoll. None of this mattered to the United States and the 
Navy. Bikini Atoll met the technical and logistical requirements of Crossroads, making 
its people an impediment. Navy Commander Ben Wyatt, the military governor of the 
Marshall Islands, met with the Bikinians after a Sunday church service telling them that 
they would be leaving their homeland. Wyatt likened the Bikinians to the biblical 
Abraham, who, at God’s command, left his homeland without question. The imagery was 
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not lost on the Bikinians. As noted by anthropologist Robert Kiste, the Bikinians believed 
in “a literal interpretation of the Bible. From the account of creation in Genesis to the last 
book in the New Testament, the Bible is read as a chronicle of actual historical events. 
The fundamentalist Protestant belief in a heavenly paradise and hell of fire and brimstone 
had been totally accepted.”160 After some discussion, the Bikinians agreed to move. The 
Navy, acted quickly, having already selected the uninhabited atoll of Rongerik. The Navy 
flew Juda, the Bikini iroij, to Rongerik and received his agreement to move his people 
there. Nine of the eleven Bikini alaps (family heads) were willing to cooperate with the 
United States and make the pilgrimage. Once the paramount iroij of the Railik Chain, 
Lajrwe, gave his approval, the Navy quickly constructed twenty-six homes, canvas water 
tanks, screened toilets, and nine concrete cisterns on Rongerik for the Bikinians. Despite 
misgivings and some misunderstandings, especially among the women, and with some 
dissatisfaction and nostalgia, the Bikinians were relocated on March 7
th
. 
Test Able (Gilda) and Test Baker (Helen of Bikini) 
Table 3 
 
Operation Crossroads – Bikini Atoll Lagoon 
 
Test Codename Date Device Nick Name Yield (kt) 
Able 06/30/1946 Gilda 21 
Baker 07/24/1946 Helen of Bikini 21 
Charlie
161
 ~1947 None Est. 21 
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The three tests of Nagasaki-type implosion bombs against naval vessels authorized by the 
JCS were codenamed Able, Baker, and Charlie. Test Able was to be an airdrop from a B-
29 bomber of a bomb christened Gilda. Gilda was timed to explode at an altitude of 
approximately 500 feet over the target ships. The bomb for test Baker, christened Helen 
of Bikini, was to be detonated underneath another set of similarly assembled and arrayed 
target ships. Test Charlie, also was to be submerged, but in very deep water, and again 
detonated underneath a set of target ships. The stated purposes of the Crossroads tests 
were: 
 To determine the effects of atomic bombing on naval vessel, naval material, and 
ships’ crews. 
 To provide the Army Air Forces with expertise in precision (atomic) bombing. 
 To ascertain the effects of atomic bombing on a variety of army material. 
 To show the kinds and extents of biological and chemical effects produced by 
radiations of all kinds. 
 To discover successful means of diagnosing and treating persons exposed to 
radiation. 
 To help answer a variety of hitherto-unanswered scientific questions in the fields 
of blast, meteorology, radioactivity, oceanography, seismography, radio 
propagation, and ionization. 
 To determine the remote detectability of atomic bomb explosions.162   
 To accomplish these goals, the Navy assembled a sizable force of 342 ships, 242 
aircraft, and 42,000 personnel at Bikini. Ninety-three ships, including the Japanese 
battleship Nagato, the German cruiser Prinz Eugen, and the United States aircraft carrier 
Independence, were specifically chosen as targets.
163
 These vessels, carrying varying 
amounts of munitions, fuel, and animals, were anchored in a precise pattern around the 
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projected point of detonation so that the destruction phenomenology of each bomb could 
be accurately measured. 
Los Alamos participated in Operation Crossroads because only the Laboratory 
could build and detonate an atomic bomb. “The plain fact is,” as Parsons told Bradbury, 
“the 1945 Atomic bomb is a one-laboratory instrument and that Laboratory is Los 
Alamos.”164 Subsequently, Los Alamos was directed by Groves to build two Nagasaki-
type bombs for Crossroads. This was a major undertaking, taxing the limits of the 
Laboratory’s scarce manpower and resources, and effectively stopping research and 
development work. In December 1945, the Laboratory’s Technical Board and Weapons 
Panel discussed Crossroads with “considerable pessimism.”165 For one thing, as Bradbury 
wrote to General Groves, “At the present rate of loss of personnel, the predicted naval 
tests will be barely possible in early summer, 1946, and definitively impossible after the 
first of September 1946.” Bradbury went on to say, “Without effective and early 
Congressional action [on atomic energy legislation], I am seriously concerned that the 
Los Alamos Project may be quite unable to provide the technical assistance which these 
navel tests deserve and require.”166 
Tragically, the strain on the Laboratory to meet the demands of Crossroads led to 
the death of physicist Louis Slotin. Slotin’s primary job was to manipulate nuclear 
material in the conduct of criticality experiments, often called “tickling the dragon’s tail.” 
                                                 
164
 W. S. Parson to N. E. Bradbury, Possible Tests of Atomic Bombs Against Naval Vessels, LANL 
Archives, 10/26/1945. 
 
165
 Summary of Technical Board and Weapons Panel Meeting held 6 December 1945, LANL Archives. It 
was Los Alamos’ operating procedure, begun during the war, to have technical committees review all 
Laboratory work. 
 
166
N. E. Bradbury to L. R. Groves, LANL Archives, April 12, 1946. 
 
  105 
The purpose of the experiment was to find the mass of nuclear material that would just 
sustain fission. By their very nature, these experiments are demanding and dangerous. 
The postwar manpower shortage had reduced the number of qualified experimenters to 
just one person – Slotin. When Crossroads required Slotin’s participation, a replacement 
had to be quickly trained. And so, shortly before his scheduled departure for the Marshall 
Islands, while demonstrating his experimental technique to his replacement, Alvin 
Graves, Slotin lost control of the experiment, which immediately went supercritical. 
Slotin received a lethal dose of ionizing radiation and harming six others. Slotin’s death, 
the second in less than a year at Los Alamos, was not only a horrific reminder of the 
serious nature of the Laboratory’s work, but also the problems of working under severe 
time constraints with an inadequate number of personnel.
167
 
 Although unhappy about Crossroads, Bradbury nonetheless provided scientific 
advice. Writing to Groves, Bradbury said, “It is anticipated that a decision will shortly be 
required concerning the character of the second Naval test at Bikini Atoll. It is, therefore, 
desired to record the thinking of Los Alamos in this matter in case our conclusions may 
be of use to those charged with making the final decision.” Bradbury recommended the 
underwater test be “carried out at a depth of about 75 ft. plus or minus 15 ft,” since this 
would better answer “The fundamental question of how an atomic bomb reacts with a 
water surround.” Bradbury also noted that “placing the bomb too deep under water brings 
it too close to the very rough bottom of the atoll, thereby increasing the difficulty of 
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interpretation of the results.” 168 Although Bradbury did not receive a reply, Baker was 
conducted as he suggested. 
Gilda and Helen of Bikini 
 The plutonium parts for Gilda and Helen of Bikini were carried to Bikini in 
backpacks carried by two Laboratory physicists, who flew to California and then sailed 
on the Crossroads command ship to Kwajalein Atoll. One of the couriers, Raemer 
Schreiber, described the security ruse used to protect the plutonium during the sea voyage 
to Kwajalein. The plutonium parts, said Schreiber, supposedly in a strongbox bolted to 
the ship’s main deck, were guarded by a couple of lieutenant-grade MPs with a squad of 
men. Meanwhile, Schreiber and his fellow Los Alamos courier kept track of the real 
components, still in their backpacks stored far below the main deck in the lieutenants’ 
cabin.
169
 Although protecting the bomb parts on the ship was serious business, the biggest 
concern was the possibility of dropping the backpacks while walking down the long 
gangplank from the ship to the dock at Kwajalein Island. Ropes were tied to each 
backpack before the walk down the gangplank.
170
 
 Among those who witnessed Gilda’s detonation were twenty members of 
Congress; 189 reporters, including an editor of Canning Age and Food Freezing 
magazines;
171
 eighteen foreign reporters; and twenty-one representatives, including two 
Soviet representatives from the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. Los Alamos 
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sent 149 scientists and engineers to assemble and arm the two atomic bombs. Only one 
Bikinian, Juda, witnessed test Able. He had been brought back from Rongerik to see the 
vast armada prior to the first test. During the frenzied activities leading up to test Able, he 
was forgotten. Seeing Bikini untouched by Gilda, Juda was not impressed. 
 Twenty-four days after Gilda, Helen of Bikini, encased in a bathysphere 
fashioned from a submarine conning tower, was detonated ninety feet below the surface 
of Bikini’s lagoon.172 The depth of the detonation matched, approximately, that 
recommended by Bradbury. In contrast to Gilda, Helen of Bikini was spectacular. The 
energy of Helen of Bikini burst through the lagoon surface at 11,000 ft/sec pushing over 
2,000,000 million cubic feet of seawater and sediment to a height of 4,300 feet within the 
first minute after detonation. Nine vessels, including the Nevada, were sunk and an 
additional five ships were essentially destroyed, although still afloat.
173
 The damage 
caused by Helen of Bikini was far more serious than it appeared because the sediment 
which Helen of Bikini thrust into the atmosphere contained the radioactive fission 
products created by the bomb. Also contained in the material thrust into the sky by Helen 
of Bikini was radioactive sea water.  Helen of Bikini had activated the sodium in the 
seawater surrounding the conning tower, making it radioactive as well. As the column of 
radioactive sediment and seawater fell back into the lagoon, a base surge of radioactive 
spray, foam, and air, 2,000 feet in height, spread over the remaining ships of the target 
fleet, thoroughly contaminating them. The collapsing column also generated a mini 
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Tsunami that washed over the target fleet spreading debris 200 feet inland on Bikini 
Island. Those ships not sunk were thoroughly contaminated.  
 
 
Figure 23.  Helen of Bikini, LANL Archives. 
 
 In the following days it became very clear that the contaminated ships could not 
be decontaminated. Radioactivity bonded to exterior surfaces and embedded itself in the 
ventilation systems of every ship anchored in the lagoon. One of the contaminated ships, 
the German Cruiser Prinz Eugen, was towed to Kwajalein Atoll in hopes that it could be 
salvaged, but sank because radioactivity prevented salvage crews from entering the ship’s 
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interior to stop the leaks caused by the blast wave. Today, at low tide, the Prinz Eugen is 
visible from Kwajalein Island’s shore. Most of the remaining target fleet was sunk in 
deep water. A few vessels were used for decontamination training before they too were 
scuttled. 
The Assessment 
When the Navy sailed from Bikini after completing Operation Crossroads, it left 
behind a set of islands littered with detritus, such as abandoned structures and vehicles. 
Although the islands were relatively free from radioactivity, the lagoon was contaminated 
with sunken ships that were leaking oil, the organic waste of 42,000 people, and 
radioactivity concentrated in the biota of the lagoon, particularly the algae and shell fish.  
The military assessment of Crossroads, written by Parsons, was limited to a very 
sanguine statement: 
Both tests came off on schedule. A vast amount of information valuable to 
scientists, engineers, and strategists was amassed. The Army Air Forces, 
in the course of its extensive program of training and practicing for the A-
Day drop, gained knowledge of new techniques and achieved reliability 
and precision never before attained. The Navy’s major postwar problem, 
previously only vaguely defined, is now more clearly posed. A sound 
basis has been created for designing ships offering considerably increased 
resistance to the fury of the world’s most powerful weapon, the atomic 
bomb.
174
 
 
The assessment, however, made little sense. Gilda, like Fat Man at Nagasaki, missed its 
aiming point by a significant margin, negating any claims of precision bombing. 
However, like the experience at Nagasaki, Gilda showed that a miss by an atomic bomb 
didn’t really matter much. The damage was considerable, even for ruggedly built naval 
vessels. Helen of Bikini also demonstrated the insidious and intractable problem of 
                                                 
174
 W. A. Shurcliff, Technical Report of Operation Crossroads, 3.73. 
 
  110 
radioactive contamination to both the target ships and to the lagoon’s biota. Ships could 
be rendered unusable by fallout just as effectively as if they were sunk. Bradbury was 
correct in his belief that the tests did not provide anything of scientific substance. As 
historian Barton Hacker noted, “science took a back seat.”175 And, finally, the two 
detonations depleted the nation’s stockpile of nuclear weapons. This was of considerable 
importance because the tests, which both the military and politicians opened up to the 
world to witness, were not as William Lawrence reported, overly convincing. Only 
twelve ships were sunk. 
 Despite the lack of new technical information from Crossroads, the operation 
served Los Alamos in two unexpected ways. First, it provided well paying jobs for many 
of the Laboratory’s graduate students, such as radiochemist George Cowan. For Cowan 
and others, the money they earned participating in Crossroads allowed them to finish 
graduate school and, in many cases, get married. Using his Crossroads money, Cowan 
completed his graduate education, returned to Los Alamos, and became one of the most 
accomplished radiochemists in the country.
176
 Second, Crossroads confirmed the central 
importance of Los Alamos to the military. Parsons was correct in pointing out that the 
atomic bomb was a one laboratory weapon and that laboratory was Los Alamos. 
   The most significant consequence of Crossroads was it impact on the Bikinians 
and their future. The Bikinians, now on Rongerik, were literally forgotten. Although the 
two bombs of Operation Crossroads did surprisingly little physical damage to the atoll, a 
fact Juda had ruefully noted, the Navy had no plans to return the Bikinians to their 
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homeland or even monitor their wellbeing on Rongerik, where they very nearly starved. 
Believing that an evil spirit inhabited Rongerik’s lagoon, the Bikinians did not catch and 
eat any of its fish. When a fire destroyed many of the atoll’s coconut trees, their situation 
became desperate. Not until anthropologists reported to the world press the plight of the 
Bikinians, did the Navy take any action. In response to international criticism the Navy 
planned to move the Bikinians to yet another uninhabited atoll, Ujelang, even though 
periodic surveys of Bikini Atoll found no radiation sufficient to keep islanders from 
returning.
177
 Ujelang, however, was reserved for the natives of Enewetak Atoll who were 
themselves being evicted for the 1948 Operation Sandstone tests. The Bikinians were 
moved, instead, to Kwajalein, where they lived in tents waiting for their future to be 
decided. They were inconsequential, given the importance of testing atomic bombs; their 
atoll was considered disposable, not the home of an ancient people who placed great 
spiritual importance on their tiny islands and who relied on them as their sole source of 
subsistence. Whether intended or not, the relocation of the Bikinians may prove 
permanent. Evicted from their homeland without compensation and sent to what 
amounted to a foreign land, the Bikinians were forced into a modern day Diaspora. 
 Five years after Crossroads, in 1951, Neil Hines, working for the University of 
Washington’s Applied Fisheries Laboratory, travelled to Bikini on one of the expeditions 
that periodically checked for radioactive contamination in and around Bikini. Hines 
found the atoll still littered with the detritus left by the Helen of Bikini’s tsunami, but no 
contamination. With the exception of the continuing oil leaks from sunken ships, the 
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lagoon showed no other signs of contamination.
178
 Bikini had become a nuclear 
graveyard. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE NEW WORLD, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND NEW TESTS 
 President Harry Truman received a deeply disturbing message on April 3, 1947, 
when David Lilienthal came to the White House to apprise the President on the state of 
the nation’s nuclear stockpile. Lilienthal handed the President a brief report to read. As 
Lilienthal recorded in his diary, “When he came to a space I had left blank, I gave him 
the number; it was quite a shock. He turned to me, a grim, gray look on his face, the lines 
from his nose to his mouth visibly deepened. What do you propose to do about it?”179 
 The number of ready weapons in the stockpile was effectively zero. While components 
for a very small number of bombs were available, each weapon took days to assemble.
180
 
Truman learned for the first time that the United States did not have a credible nuclear 
arsenal. As Truman himself noted, “Our Atomic armament was inadequate, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively, and the tempo of progress throughout dangerously 
slow.”181 
  The lack of a credible nuclear stockpile instantly became a critical issue for the 
President, who was becoming increasingly distrustful of the Soviet Union. As McGeorge 
Bundy noted, “any revelation of American impotence would be profoundly shocking, 
most of all to the American people.” In testifying before the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, Lilienthal acknowledged national and congressional expectations that the 
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administration maintain and increase the preeminence of this country in atomic energy 
development and atomic weapons.” J. Robert Oppenheimer, chairman of the AEC’s 
General Advisory Committee, stated the issue more elegantly: “Without debate – I 
suppose with some melancholy – we concluded that the principle job of the Commission 
was to provide atomic weapons and good atomic weapons and many atomic weapons.”182 
 Efforts to replace the wartime administrative apparatus of the MED were earnest, 
but not immediately effective even after the Atomic Energy Act was passed and the 
Atomic Energy Commission took control of the nation’s nuclear enterprise. For the better 
part of a year after the Atomic Energy Act became law in January 1947, the 
Commissioners and their staff struggled to build a major governmental agency from 
scratch. The AEC needed a workforce knowledgeable about nuclear science, a 
management structure capable of rebuilding supervising Los Alamos and the nation’s 
stockpile, and it needed to develop the nuclear weapons programs and policies of the 
nation. Los Alamos, accustomed to having a large measure of independence, was a bit 
wary of its new oversight. Although Bradbury accepted AEC oversight and 
acknowledged that the ownership of atomic weapons is vested in the AEC, he asserted it 
was the Lab’s “primary responsibility for determining the specifications for any 
weapons.”183   
By 1948 the AEC’s administrative structure was in place, including a contractual 
commitment by the University of California to continue its management of Los Alamos 
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on a long term basis. The University’s commitment pleased Bradbury and provided a 
sense of security for the Lab’s scientific staff. By this time as well, Los Alamos had made 
several important advances in weapon design and was ready to conduct proof tests of 
those designs.  The location of these tests would be, as before, a matter of importance and 
the Marshall Islands were again the location. However, instead of using Bikini again, the 
tests were conducted on the islands of a second Marshallese atoll, Enewetak, forcing the 
relocation of its people and creating a second Diaspora. 
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 
 Concern about managing the atomic bomb after the war emerged well before 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the spring of 1945, Secretary of War Henry Stimson created 
an internal, secret War Department committee to advise the President on the wartime use 
of the atomic bomb. On its own initiative, this Interim Committee also discussed the 
issues surrounding the post war management of the bomb. Two committee members long 
associated with the atomic bomb project, James Conant, the Chair of the National 
Defense Research Committee (NDRC) and Vanevar Bush, Director of the Office of 
Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), sponsored a study that proposed a civilian 
executive agency to succeed the MED.  Two War Department lawyers turned the study 
into draft legislation, which the Interim Committee approved and sent on to the President. 
Truman approved the draft legislation and sent it to Congress, where it was formally 
introduced as the May-Johnson Bill. The May-Johnson bill proposed a commission 
consisting of five civilian and four military members who would have “broad powers to 
acquire property, to operate facilities, to conduct research, and to regulate all forms of 
nuclear energy.” May-Johnson drew immediate criticism from Connecticut Senator Brien 
  116 
McMahon as well as a large number of scientists, including many at Los Alamos. 
Concern about May-Johnson led a number of Los Alamos scientists to create a lobbying 
group, The Association of Los Alamos Scientists, to oppose the bill. At issue was 
military versus civilian control of atomic energy. McMahon proposed alternative 
legislation requiring that all commissioners be civilians. The debate and negotiations over 
these two bills ultimately produced an acceptable compromise. The McMahon Bill was 
amended to include a Military Liaison Committee (MLC) that gave the Department of 
Defense a legally defined role in the development of nuclear weapons. The amended 
McMahon Bill was passed by both houses of Congress as the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 
and President Truman signed it into law on August 1, 1946.
184
 The new law created: 
 In Congress: A Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) consisting of nine 
members from each house. The Joint Committee had the responsibility of making 
“continuing studies of the Atomic Energy Commission and of problems relating 
to the development, use, and control of atomic energy.” 
 
 In the Executive Branch: An Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) consisting of 
five presidentially appointed commissioners having the responsibility for meeting 
the overall requirements of the Act. 
 
 Within the AEC: A Division of Military Application (DMA) headed by an officer 
from the armed services. The DMA was the Commission’s executive agent for 
coordinating the design, development, and testing of atomic bombs. The DMA 
coordinated the interests of the Commission, the military, and Los Alamos. 
 
 Within the AEC: A General Advisory Committee (GAC) to advise the 
commission on scientific and technical matters relating to materials, production, 
and research and development. As a panel of experts with international 
reputations, the GAC’s opinion was highly regarded. 
 
 Within the Department of Defense: A Military Liaison Committee (MLC) 
composed of members from the Departments of War and Navy (and later Air 
Force) to manage nuclear matters for the military. The MLC was in many respects 
the equal of the AEC. While the AEC controlled the production of nuclear 
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materials, managed Los Alamos through the University of California, and retained 
legal custody of nuclear weapons, the MLC defined the military requirements for 
nuclear weapons and provided the resources for nuclear tests. If the MLC 
objected to any AEC action with respect to nuclear weapons, it could appeal any 
such concerns to the President through the Secretaries of War and Navy.
185
 In 
practice, all nuclear tests beginning in 1948 were carried out only after MLC 
approval. 
 
 While the responsibilities of each entity created by the Atomic Energy Act appear 
relatively straightforward, they were, in reality, overlapping and often confusing. Los 
Alamos, nominally under the direct supervision of the University, reported as well to the 
AEC’s Division of Military Application, and interacted routinely with the JCAE, the 
GAC, and the MLC. Bradbury and others of his senior staff often gave congressional 
testimony before the JCAE, worked face-to-face with the AEC Commissioners, provided 
the GAC with details of the Laboratory’s technical programs, and interacted with the 
MLC in assessing and developing military requirements. The Laboratory’s relationship 
with the DMA, however, was much more formal than with the other groups. The DMA 
exercised day-to-day control of the Laboratory, providing the formal communication and 
authorization for developing and testing specific nuclear weapons. Very often, the 
military heads of the DMA issued orders to Los Alamos as if the Laboratory was a 
subordinate military unit rather than an elite organization that possessed singular 
knowledge. Los Alamos often chafed under what it thought was dictatorial power and on 
occasion forthrightly challenged DMA orders. This friction, however, never escalated to 
crisis proportions. 
 
National Security 
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 The Commission started slowly because confirmation of its five presidentially-
appointed Commissioners was delayed in the Senate. This was particularly true of David 
Lilienthal, a New Deal Democrat, whose management of the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(TVA) had incurred the wrath of arch-conservative Senator Kenneth McKellar (D TN). 
McKellar’s intense dislike of Lilienthal led him to actively contest Lilienthal’s 
confirmation. A second problem was that Groves and Lilienthal personally disliked each 
other. Groves believed Lilienthal lacked the knowledge and skills to skillfully manage 
atomic matters and delayed the transfer of key MED assets to the new Commission. 
Lilienthal, who did not think highly of Groves, lobbied to exclude Groves from the MLC. 
Their respective actions prevented a fully cooperative working relationship between the 
AEC and the Department of Defense. The Commission also, of course, had to spend 
considerable time and effort defining itself organizationally, building itself into a 
cohesive entity, and hiring competent staff, especially for its Division of Military 
Applications, which kept it from immediately providing the nation with a coherent 
nuclear policy. 
 The lack of a nuclear arsenal heightened Truman’s growing concern about the 
Soviet Union. Since early 1946, the president had been “growing extremely frustrated 
with Stalin,” according to counselor Clark Clifford.186 Truman’s concerns were given 
public voice by Winston Churchill’s famous Iron Curtain speech, which said: “From 
Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the 
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Continent.”187 Truman’s distrust and frustration with the Soviet Union escalated 
throughout the summer of 1946. In July he gave Clifford the task of compiling a report 
on Soviet violations of international agreements. Clifford characterized this assignment 
as “the first peacetime interagency foreign-policy review of U.S. – Soviet relations” that 
would outline “a new foreign policy for the United States.” 188 In late September Clifford 
delivered his report, entitled “American Relations with the Soviet Union,” to the 
president.
189
 In the conclusion, Clifford wrote, “as long as the Soviet Union adheres to its 
present policy, the United States should maintain military forces powerful enough to 
restrain the Soviet Union and to confine Soviet influence to its present area.” The report 
represented the general consensus of Soviet behavior in the Truman administration and 
presaged the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and George Kennan’s “X” article. 
 Clifford’s report was the catalyst for the administration’s decision to revamp the 
structure of national security operations, including the creation of the National Security 
Council. “It was no accident,” wrote Clifford, “that governmental reorganization 
coincided with the development of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, the technical assistance program known as Point Four, and 
the policy of containment.” 190 After considerable debate Congress passed the National 
Security Act of 1947. 
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 Passage of the National Security Act made the path to nuclear testing a byzantine 
dance between Los Alamos, the DMA, the AEC, the MLC and the National Security 
Council (NSC). Each group, with the exception of the NSC, generated ideas for new 
weapons that very often required extensive negotiations to reach a consensus. The 
opinion of Los Alamos was especially important because only the Laboratory could turn 
ideas into reality. Once an agreement was reached on the need for a set of tests, the AEC 
and the MLC sent an official request to the National Security Council. If the NSC agreed, 
the request was sent on for the President’s approval. In reality, because of a quirk in the 
Atomic Energy Act, the President actually approved the expenditure of nuclear material, 
not the tests themselves. As a result, the request for a tests series was couched in terms of 
the quantity of nuclear material to be expended. 
Los Alamos  
While the political situation was being sorted out, the AEC had to rebuild Los 
Alamos, which was unsafe and falling down. As one report stated: 
 Most of the structures were wood frame type, some so radioactively 
contaminated that they were dangerous to personnel or could only be 
worked in for short periods, huddled together in a constricted location to 
form a dangerous fire hazard, with utility supplies woefully inadequate or 
nonexistent, and with ever increasing costs for upkeep and maintenance on 
buildings originally designed and constructed for a ‘one-shot’ 
operation.”191  
 
Accordingly, the AEC committed nearly twenty million dollars to building “a new 
laboratory.”192 The wartime Laboratory, as the image below shows, was a collection of 
hastily built structures arrayed around the small pond used as skating rink by Ashley 
                                                 
191
 The New Laboratory, LANL Archives, ca. 1948. 
 
192
 Ibid. 
 
  121 
Pond’s students. Housing surrounded the Laboratory with only a wire fence separating 
the two. The old laboratory would be completely torn down over the next twelve years 
and rebuilt on an adjacent Mesa. 
 
Figure 24. Wartime Los Alamos Laboratory. LANL Archives. 
 
Crossroads had confirmed Bradbury’s opinion that military effects tests 
contributed nothing to the advancement of nuclear knowledge and that Los Alamos could 
only make useful contributions to the New World by remaining a scientific laboratory. 
Like its wartime success, the Laboratory’s future, Bradbury believed, depended directly 
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on research and development, not military applications. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
bombs were the product of complex problem solving. Once produced, however, these 
World War II bombs ceased to be of scientific interest. They could be marginally 
improved with engineering, but their basic properties remained unchanged. Building the 
two Nagasaki type bombs for Crossroads was a reminder that although complicated, the 
task of routine bomb production was not a long-term job for research scientists. 
Crossroads, Bradbury believed, consumed valuable time and effort that could have been 
spent developing vastly improved implosion designs and the hydrogen bomb. 
 After Crossroads, Bradbury reiterated his vision that Los Alamos should “insure 
that the country continues to have available its present weapon until such time as it is 
certain the weapon is no longer needed.”193 Thus, the activities of Los Alamos “should be 
based upon the basic philosophy that the country requires research and development in 
the fields which are fundamental to atomic weapons.” 194 Bradbury’s vision rested on two 
key assumptions. First, nuclear superiority was time-limited. If the United States could 
build an atomic bomb, so could another country. Moreover, improvements would soon 
follow, making each new nuclear weapon a wasting asset. Second, as a Los Alamos staff 
study concluded, there was no defense against an atomic bomb.
195
 This meant that 
deterrence required an ongoing and continuously improved nuclear capability. Thus, for 
Los Alamos and the country to have a viable future, the Laboratory had to remain a 
scientific laboratory, conducting research leading to a better understanding of atomic 
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phenomenology and better bombs. Just as importantly, Los Alamos needed to convince 
the incoming Atomic Energy Commissioners of this reality. 
 Not everyone at the Laboratory agreed with Bradbury’s vision. David Hawkins, a 
professor of philosophy before the war who then worked directly for Oppenheimer, told 
Bradbury that “we should not (because of default at higher levels) drift or be pushed into 
a position of predisposing, by our actions or words, questions of national policy so basic 
that at the present time even our administrative superiors do not wish to go on record by 
giving us a directive. To assume this responsibility at the present time is I believe 
dangerous and wrong.”196 
 Despite Hawkins’s warning, Bradbury sent a long letter to the Atomic Energy 
Commission on November 14, 1946, outlining his vision and mission for Los Alamos. He 
began with the understated caution that “of the many problems facing your Commission, 
that presented by the Los Alamos Laboratory may well not be the least.” He described in 
detail the Lab’s wartime mission, the postwar situation in which the MED maintained the 
“status quo,” and the resulting belief that the Los Alamos mission ought to be “directed 
not only at maintaining an immediate superiority, but also toward maintaining general 
scientific progress and a concern for basic and long-range developments, which will 
make for strength in the future.” Significantly, Bradbury proposed that Los Alamos take 
on direct responsibility for proof tests of new weapon designs. “It is far from clear,” said 
Bradbury in his continuing understated fashion, “how the laboratory may function 
energetically on weapon development problems without the possibility of periodic tests 
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of its accomplishments.”197 In closing, Bradbury told the Commission that he and his 
staff were very much “concerned with the Commission’s reaction to his proposals.”198 
Despite the importance of the issues and the concern at Los Alamos, Bradbury’s letter 
received no response. The AEC existed only on paper, its commissioners waiting on 
Senate confirmation. As described by Hewett and Duncan, Bradbury’s letter arrived, but 
“there was in fact no one to receive it.”199 
The Sandstone Proposal 
By mid 1947, the AEC was finally able to evaluate the work and mission of Los 
Alamos and its proposal for a test series in 1948. This Los Alamos proposal represented 
an important advance for the organization. Since the end of the war, Los Alamos had 
been wrestling with two technical issues. The first was how to best use the continuing 
scarce supplies of plutonium and uranium. The second issue was determining a better 
implosion design to replace Fat Man. Having developed theoretical solutions to these 
technical problems, Bradbury proposed three tests, which, if successful, would increase 
the stockpile production rate by using the available 
235
U and 
239
Pu more efficiently, 
reduce the overall size of implosion weapons, and achieve greater explosive yields per 
device. One of the proposed tests was of a slightly modified Fat Man that had been 
developed too late for use during the war, but had been put into the stockpile in late 1947 
without testing because it presented no technical doubts about its performance. Now that 
Los Alamos had the opportunity to test, Bradbury wanted to have “certain knowledge on 
                                                 
197
 N. E. Bradbury to Carroll Wilson, LANL Archives, January, 13, 1947. 
 
198
N. E. Bradbury, LANL Archives, November 14, 1946. 
 
199
 Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield. A History of the United States Atomic Energy 
Commission, Volume II, 1947-1952 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 32. 
 
  125 
this point.”200 A second test device held the promise of a significantly increased explosive 
yield, and a third held the promise of reducing the overall size of the Fat Man model as 
well as maximizing use of fissionable material.
201
 Testing three atomic bombs in 1948 
was not without some risk. The tests would expend a significant quantity of the scarce 
nuclear materials, but that was balanced by the potential gains in efficiency.
202
 
Truman formally approved Sandstone during a June 27, 1947, meeting with 
Lilienthal, the Secretaries of War and State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
203
 During this 
meeting, Secretary of State George Marshall and Secretary of War Robert Patterson 
argued for a continental location. Both men hesitated to send nuclear test devices and 
their associated technical expertise outside the United States during a time of increasing 
tensions with the Soviet Union. Lilienthal disagreed. Recalling the widespread radiation 
from the Trinity test, he argued for a remote location in the Pacific. Truman agreed with 
Lilienthal and ordered Sandstone conducted in the Pacific. Although a specific test site 
was not specified, it was tacitly acknowledged that it would be somewhere in the 
Marshallese Archipelago. As was the case in 1946, the Marshall Islands seemed an ideal 
location given their location in the empty expanse of the central Pacific, which it was still 
believed, would swallow any radioactive contamination.
204
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With presidential approval, the AEC turned immediately to the MLC and JCS for 
assistance and support. Like Crossroads before it, Sandstone required the services of 
several thousand support personnel, hundreds of naval vessels, and a small air force. Only 
the military could mount and sustain such a large organization thousands of miles from 
the U.S. mainland. The JCS responded by appointing Army Chief of Staff Dwight 
Eisenhower as the executive agent for the test. Eisenhower created Joint Task Force 7 
(JTF-7) under the command of Army Lieutenant General John S. Hull. 
The major difference between the JTF-1 of Crossroads and the newly created 
JTF-7 was the scientific nature of Sandstone. Another key difference was that the AEC, 
not the military, now owned the test devices and this led to inserting the position of an 
AEC Test Director within the JTF organization. The AEC appointed Navy Captain James 
Russell, a member of its DMA, to this position. Another position inserted into the JTF 
organization was that of Scientific Director, who managed all experiments as well as the 
assembly of test devices. Bradbury appointed Darol Froman to this position. This rather 
complicated command structure worked in the following manner. Hull, with the advice of 
Russell and Froman, selected the test site and coordinated all logistics. Once the site was 
prepared, Russell ordered the movement of the nuclear material from the United States to 
Enewetak. Once the material arrived at Enewetak, Russell authorized Froman to 
assemble the test devices. Froman notified Russell when each device was ready for firing. 
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Russell than turned custody of the devices over to Hull, who then ordered their 
detonation. 
205
 
 
Figure 25. Proof-Test Organization 
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Real Estate 
Hull, Russell, and Froman travelled to the Marshall Islands in October 1947 to 
select the specific atoll and islands for Sandstone. The general real estate requirements 
dictated an atoll with a set of islands having enough land area to accommodate three shot 
towers, a number of photo towers, diagnostic instrument bunkers, command and control 
facilities, and housing for thousands of military and civilian personnel. A specific 
requirement was that the shot islands had to be separated by enough distance to allow the 
simultaneous construction of all three towers. Since shot towers were the key installation, 
minimizing their construction time would also minimize the overall time to conduct 
Sandstone. These requirements ruled out the use of Bikini even before Hull’s party left 
for the Marshall Islands. 
Hull, Russell, and Froman investigated two Marshallese atolls: Kwajalein and 
Enewetak. Kwajalein Atoll, specifically the Roi-Namur islands located at the northern 
apex of the world’s largest lagoon, was the first choice of Hull and his group. The 
location of the two islands seemed nearly ideal. However, the Roi-Namur site also had 
two significant drawbacks. First, the twin islands were too close to permit the 
simultaneous construction of three shot towers. The second and third towers could only 
be built after each preceding detonation, which would significantly increase construction 
costs and the total time to carry out the tests. All of the nearby islands, actually islets, 
were far too small to be of any use. The second drawback was the relatively large average 
amount of rainfall in the area. Frequent rains could delay test operations, and, if they 
occurred immediately after a shot, could prevent the dispersal of the radioactive clouds 
over the open ocean. 
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After ruling out Kwajalein Atoll, Hull, Russell, and Froman flew to Enewetak. 
Almost immediately, the atoll appeared more than suitable. Enewetak was well off the 
normal shipping and air transportation lanes. The absence of commercial traffic would 
make spotting and monitoring Soviet spy ships and submarines easier. The relatively 
large size of Enewetak’s islands and their orientation with respect to the prevailing 
southwestern wind pattern was almost too good to be true. Arrayed in a wide arch around 
Enewetak’s lagoon, the large size of the islands located in the northeast provided ample 
area for the shot towers, instrumentation bunkers, and camera towers. The distances 
between these islands also allowed for the simultaneous construction of the three shot 
towers. More importantly, none of the shots would interfere with each other 
radiologically. The tests would be fired from north to south beginning with the most 
northern of the islands, Engebi. The second test would be fired on the twin islands of 
Aoman-Bijiri, followed by the final test on the island of Runit. The prevailing winds 
would push the radioactive clouds over the previous test islands and then out to sea. 
Enewetak was quickly approved by Hull, Russell, and Froman and construction 
crews began clearing the shot islands of vegetation and constructing the towers and 
instrumentation bunkers. Other islands, particularly Parry and Enewetak, were cleared for 
housing and the test control facilities. Dock facilities were built for the boats used to 
transport men and equipment between islands. A major airstrip was built on Enewetak to 
accommodate heavy transport planes, a fleet of small air taxies, and the drone aircraft that 
would be used to collect radioactive samples.  
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Figure 26. Enewetak Atoll. LANL Archives 
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The Enewetak People 
In the middle of this construction sat the two Enewetak tribes, now numbering 
147 individuals living, as they had been since 1944, on the islands of Aoman and Bijiri. 
The wartime devastation of Engebi and Enewetak kept the two native tribes on Aoman-
Bijiri after hostilities ended. Unlike the Bikinians in 1946, however, the Enewetak people 
could not be arbitrarily relocated. The Marshall Islands now legally belonged to the 
United Nations and were governed by the strategic trusteeship agreement between the 
UN and the United States. Although the trusteeship permitted the United States to 
relocate the Enewetakians and use their atoll for testing, the United States could only do 
so if the displacement was mutually agreed to and the Enewetakians’ well-being insured. 
These conditions meant that the United States had to provide sufficient evidence to the 
United Nations that relocating the Enewetakians would not subject “the local inhabitants 
of the Trust Territory of the Pacific to perceptibly greater danger than say, the people of 
the United States.” This was a curious condition given the fact that testing in the Pacific 
placed the risk of exposures to radioactive fallout squarely on the Marshallese and their 
islands. It was also a curious condition since the Enewetakians would have to be 
temporarily relocated to a naval ship during Sandstone to avoid possible exposure to 
fallout on their new home, Ujelang Atoll” 206 Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett, in a 
disingenuous manner, suggested telling that the UN Security Council that relocating the 
Enewetakians was not significant since they were not now living on their home islands. 
Lovett was completely ignoring the fact that the Enewetakians had been arbitrarily 
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relocated to Aoman Island by the Navy in 1944 and, after the war, largely forgotten. 
Despite the apparent contradictions in the United States’ pronouncements, the UN 
approved the relocation of the Enewetak people. 
 On December 3, 1947, the two Enewetak iroij, Johannes and Abraham, were 
flown to the nearby Ujelang Atoll to judge its suitability for relocation. Both iroij 
approved and on December 20, 1947, the people of Enewetak were relocated to Ujelang, 
although not before one Los Alamos scientist complained that the preparation of Aoman-
Bijiri for the planned second Sandstone test was behind schedule because of the 
natives.
207
 The relocation of the Enewetakians to Ujelang Atoll proved unfortunate for 
both the people of Bikini and those of Enewetak. Ujelang had been selected for the 
Bikinians, who were, by this time, living in tents on Kwajalein Island. The timetable for 
Sandstone, however, called for a quick move of the Enewetak people. Since their 
relocation could not be delayed, the Bikinians remained in their tents. Second, the village 
built on Ujelang for the Enewetakians did not take into account the fact that the Enewetak 
people consisted of two tribes.
208
 When co-located on Aoman in 1944, the two tribes 
quickly separated themselves, with one tribe moving to Bijiri. Also, the Enewetak people 
lived on “watos,” having property lines running from lagoon to ocean. The village built 
on Ujelang grouped both tribes and property together with surrounding land held in 
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common. The result of this intermingling was a permanent dissolution of tribal identity 
through mixed marriages and crossed land rights.
209
  
Operation Sandstone 
 The General Advisory Committee, after hearing a presentation by Bradbury, “was 
convinced of the need for scientific testing in the spring of 1948. Subsequently, Los 
Alamos carefully crafted Sandstone as a scientific operation beginning with the selection 
of the individual devices having improved implosion systems that would more effectively 
use both 
235
U and 
239
Pu.”210 To minimize the number of tests, each device would be a 
proof of principle test of at least two new design features. The operation, itself, was 
modeled after the 1945 Trinity test. Each test would be detonated on a tower, providing a 
fixed point on which to focus all observations and, barring a timing malfunction, all 
diagnostic equipment, particularly cameras. Like Trinity as well, each Sandstone shot 
would be fired just before dawn so that the fireball would be visible against the night sky. 
Since daylight would quickly follow, both manned and unmanned aircraft would be able 
to follow the mushroom clouds, taking radiological samples for analysis. Finally, only 
personnel necessary for conduct of the operation would be at Enewetak. While that 
number was large, just under 10,000 military and civilian personnel, it was well below 
the 42,000 people at Bikini in 1946. 
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Table 4 
 
Operation Sandstone – Enewetak Atoll 
 
Test Codename Date Island Yield (kt) 
X-Ray 04/14/1948 Engebi 37 
Yoke 04/30/1948 Aoman-Bijiri t 49 
Zebra 05/14/1948 Runit 18 
 
Just before dawn, on March 14, 1948, the first Sandstone device, code named X-
Ray, was detonated over the northwest end of Engebi Island. X-Ray’s yield of 37 kilotons 
was a significant increase over the explosive yield of the Nagasaki device. Yoke, fired 
April 30
th
 over the sands of Aoman-Bijiri, gave a yield of 49 kilotons, a further increase 
in the yield potential of nuclear weapons. Zebra, detonated on May 14
th
 over Runit 
Island, had a yield of only 18 kilotons, but because it was designed to produce technical 
data on the use of uranium and not to give a large yield it, too, was considered a complete 
success.
211
 
Radiation Injuries 
Although the each test was a technical success, four radiochemists from Los 
Alamos were injured while recovering fallout debris from a drone aircraft. The injuries 
were the result of touching contaminated filter papers with their hands, rather than with 
tongs. “The medical problem,” as Darol Froman noted, “was that burns from beta rays do 
not always exhibit symptoms immediately.”212 The delay in manifestation prevented each 
man’s exposure from being accurately assessed. 
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Figure 27. Recovery of radioactive debris samples from a B-17 drone aircraft. LANL Archives. 
 
 As the Scientific Director and thus responsible for the debris collection, Froman 
investigated the accident but did not assign blame to anyone because of a lack of formal 
safety standards, a condition that had not changed since the very first radiation accidents 
at Los Alamos in 1945 and 1946. To be sure, there were safety measures in place at 
Sandstone, particularly for the total amount of ionizing radiation any one person could be 
exposed to before being relieved of his responsibilities. However, the accepted practice, 
dating from 1943, was to trust each person’s judgment to stay out of harm’s way. This 
reliance on people’s technical knowledge did have some merit. No one was seriously 
  136 
injured by radiation during the war. However, criticality experiments at Los Alamos in 
November 1945 and again in May 1946 each claimed a life, bringing this practice into 
question. The May 1946 accident also caused injuries to four others.
213
 The radiation 
injuries at Sandstone were a wake-up call, pointing out the need for more comprehensive 
planning and supervision of radiological activities. In final analysis, Froman accepted 
responsibility for the accident saying he, as the scientific director, failed to provide “a 
flawless practical means for ensuring that no individual could expose himself to injurious 
amounts of radiation.”214 All of the injured men returned to work with varying amounts 
of permanent scarring. 
Sandstone and National Security 
 The immediate result of Sandstone, as Froman reported to Congress, was that the 
nation’s nuclear stockpile could be quickly converted to weapons “of improved 
efficiency and performance.”215 The Sandstone tests had melded improved bomb designs 
with better and more efficient use of nuclear materials.
216
 In the long-run, as Froman 
further told Congress, Sandstone also was important to national defense because “Los 
Alamos will undoubtedly be able to further improve the design of atomic weapons.”217 
Sandstone had turned the chimera that was the New World into a hard reality.  Sandstone 
also made the nascent Atomic Energy Commission a success. The Commission had 
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completely replaced the Manhattan Project and breathed new life into the nation’s nuclear 
weapon program. 
The Marshallese 
Operation Sandstone was not kind to the Marshallese.  Even before the operation 
was carried out, the AEC had decided to use Enewetak Atoll as a permanent proving 
ground and viewed the relocation of the two Enewetak tribes to Ujelang as permanent, 
something that was not clear to the Enewetak people. While Ujelang’s environment was 
not the equal of Enewetak, the islanders temporarily adapted a bit better to their new 
home than had the Bikinians on Rongerik. Nonetheless, the Enewetakians never lost their 
desire to return home. In this desire they were somewhat luckier than the Bikinians. The 
geographical orientation of Enewetak Atoll permitted testing on the northwest islands 
which kept the southeast islands relatively free from radioactivity. This geographical 
feature allowed for the return of some Enewetak natives in the 1970s. However, for those 
whose home islands bore the brunt of testing, return is not likely. The Bikinians would 
continue to be unlucky. When Bikini was judged unsafe for their return, they elected to 
move to Kili Island. When the United States, in 1954, increased the boundary of the 
Enewetak Proving Ground to include Bikini, the return of Juda and his people 
evaporated. 
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CHAPTER 6 
FISSION TO FUSION: AN ISLAND GOES MISSING 
Hollywood voice actor and screenwriter Carey Wilson walked the decks of the 
USS Estes with the practiced ease characteristic of his profession. The Estes, sailing more 
than fifty miles from Enewetak Atoll, was the command and control ship for the two 
nuclear tests of Operation Ivy. The first test, codenamed Mike, was to be the detonation 
of the world’s first super, or hydrogen bomb. Stopping periodically to provide dramatic 
pauses by lighting his pipe, Wilson narrated the final hours leading up to the detonation 
of Mike. The screenwriter for the 1925 movie version of Ben-Hur, Wilson was working 
on his third public relations production for the Atomic Energy Commission.
218
 Wilson’s 
smooth camera presence contrasted with those of the persons he interviewed. The 
scientists and technicians appeared ill at ease as they struggled in failed attempts to sound 
professorial. The scientific director for the test, Alvin Graves of Los Alamos, came across 
particularly wooden, almost condescending, in his answers to Wilson’s questions. The 
film made one thing clear – Los Alamos scientists could build a thermonuclear bomb, but 
they could not act.
219
 
 Just after Wilson put on his dark goggles to prevent flash blindness, Mike 
exploded at 2:30 PM Eastern Standard Time on November 1, 1952, with a force of 10.4 
megatons, completely vaporizing the ground zero island of Elugelab along with portions 
                                                 
218
 In the 1970s and 1980s, another Ben-Hur related actor – Charlton Heston - would narrate nuclear 
weapon films for Los Alamos. 
 
219
 Operation Ivy Motion Picture, LANL Archives. 
 
  139 
of two other nearby islands.
220
 The explosion was a boost in the destructive energy of 
nuclear weapons from thousands to millions of tons of TNT equivalence per device. 
Edward Teller, the putative father of the hydrogen bomb, knew within minutes that the 
test was successful. Looking at a seismograph in the basement of the geology building at 
the University of California in Berkeley, Teller waited to see evidence of the shock wave 
from Enewetak Atoll. “At exactly the scheduled time,” said Teller, “I saw the light point 
move. The sound waves took twenty minutes to carry the message under the Pacific and 
arrive at Berkeley.”221 Shortly thereafter, news of the detonation reached Gordon Dean, 
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, in Washington, D.C. by way of the 
Pentagon’s communications system. Dean waited until evening to inform President 
Truman, who was campaigning in the Midwest for presidential candidate Adlai 
Stevenson. In a very guarded conversation required by secrecy rules, Dean told the 
President “On the matter which I discussed with you the other evening this is simply to 
report that the mission was carried out with highly successful results. I’m doing 
everything possible to keep this info from becoming public until after Tuesday [Election 
Day].” Truman was pleased to hear the news. As Dean recorded in his office diary, the 
president said “he appreciated the situation and thanks a lot.”222 
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Figure 28. Mike.  Photo taken from a distance of fifty miles.  LANL Archives. 
 
Figure 29. Mike Crater - shown by large arrow - created when Mike vaporized the island of Elugelab. LANL 
Archives. 
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The Hydrogen Bomb – Origins 
Unlike fission bombs, which liberate energy by splitting atoms, hydrogen bombs 
derive their energy by combining, or fusing, atoms. In thermonuclear reaction very high 
temperatures “bring about the fusion of light nuclei,” and releasing some of the binding 
energy that holds the nucleus of an atom together.”223 The explosive power of hydrogen 
bombs is the total amount of binding energy liberated as hydrogen atoms are fused into 
helium atoms. Despite being relatively simple in concept, it took two independent 
scientific discoveries before Edward Teller, in 1942, first proposed the possibility of a 
hydrogen bomb. The first discovery occurred in 1938 when Hans Bethe solved the 
mystery of solar luminosity - that the very high temperatures found in stars produces 
thermonuclear reactions converting atoms of hydrogen into atoms of helium. In accepting 
the Nobel Prize for his work on the energy production in stars, Bethe said, in his 
characteristically understated fashion, “From time immemorial people must have been 
curious to know what keeps a star shining.”224 In solving this riddle, he provided the first 
discovery leading to the hydrogen bomb. However, the discovery that stellar 
temperatures initiated thermonuclear reactions was, in and of itself, not immediately 
useful information. Stellar temperatures do not exist naturally on earth and could not, 
before World War II, be produced. It took a second discovery, nuclear fission and the 
subsequent development of atomic bombs, to solve the problem of achieving stellar 
temperatures on earth. 
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 In the summer of 1942, at the request of the National Bureau of Standards, J. 
Robert Oppenheimer convened a conference at the University of California with Bethe, 
Teller, and others to analyze the existing research on fission.
225
 During a discussion of the 
mechanics of a fission bomb, Teller, out of the blue, proposed a hydrogen bomb. As 
Robert Serber, one of the conference attendees, recalled, “And then a really remarkable 
thing happened. Edward brought up the super,
226
 a detonation wave in liquid deuterium 
heated by an atomic bomb.
227
 Everybody turned eagerly to discuss the super forgetting all 
about the atomic bomb as if that was an accomplished fact already!”228 Teller, before 
anyone else, understood that an atomic bomb could produce the stellar temperatures 
needed to ignite a hydrogen bomb. It did not matter to him that atomic bombs themselves 
had yet to be created. With further debate, however, the excitement over the super 
quickly died. Even if an atomic bomb could ignite deuterium, the isotope of hydrogen 
used in super bombs, radiation cooling, the Inverse Compton Effect, would stop the 
thermonuclear process before an explosion took place. Despite these critical technical 
barriers, Teller refused to give up on the super.
229
 
When Oppenheimer organized the Los Alamos laboratory a year after the 
Berkeley Conference, he recruited Teller to organize and lead the Laboratory’s 
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Theoretical Division, which was responsible for solving the physics problems related to 
Little Boy and Fat Man. Teller did not see any intellectual challenge in developing 
atomic bombs and chafed at what he thought of as doing pedestrian work.  He was soon 
replaced by Bethe. Teller, with Oppenheimer’s approval, organized a new group at Los 
Alamos to undertake theoretical studies related to the hydrogen bomb. Expanding on the 
findings of the Berkeley conference, Teller and his new group began calculations and 
studies, principally on igniting deuterium, that marginally increased the likelihood that a 
hydrogen bomb could be developed. Although he did not believe a hydrogen bomb could 
be designed, built, and used during World War II, Oppenheimer supported Teller’s 
research because the technical barriers began to look slightly less formidable and because 
the research itself provided stimulating work for a number of very talented scientists. As 
Carson Mark, one of those talented scientists remarked, “The technical challenges 
provided a sense of excitement.”230 What began, in 1942, as an idea far outside the realm 
of possibility was edging closer to reality. However, very few people outside of Los 
Alamos, including the President, knew of the World War II work on the hydrogen bomb. 
In August 1946, Los Alamos Director, Norris Bradbury, sponsored a conference 
at Los Alamos to assess the feasibility of the super, as the hydrogen bomb was 
colloquially known.
231
 Despite major technical hurdles, the conference concluded “that 
the super bomb can be constructed and will work.”232 Recognizing that the vast explosive 
potential of a hydrogen bomb made such a weapon even more terrifying than an atomic 
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bomb, however, these same scientists also concluded that the decision to pursue this 
weapon needed “to be raised to the highest national power.”233 Despite this plea, Truman 
would not learn of hydrogen bomb research for another three years.
234
 Each year, 
Bradbury simply notified the Atomic Energy Commission about the percentage of work 
planned for the super. The AEC never objected.
235
  
The most difficult problem in developing the hydrogen bomb was the Inverse 
Compton Effect, or radiation cooling, which acted like a brake, stopping the fusion 
process before it could fully develop. At the same time, however, significant technical 
advances in atomic weaponry were being made. First, fission bombs had been greatly 
improved (i.e., more energetic); a contribution Hans Bethe believes is often overlooked in 
its importance.
236
 The wartime devices, Little Boy and Fat Man, were not energetic 
enough to light a thermonuclear fire. By 1949, fission devices were smaller, more 
efficient and more powerful. Second, the use of digital computers and computational 
modeling evolved into powerful simulation tools. Scientists now had a method to 
calculate the previously incalculable physical processes of a thermonuclear burn.
237
 
Finally, advances in cryogenic (very low temperature) technology made possible the 
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production of large amounts of deuterium
238
 By late 1949, all but one of the key 
ingredients for the hydrogen bomb had been developed in the course of continuing 
research at Los Alamos.  All this work had been done without any explicit directive or 
knowledge of the president. 
The Hydrogen Bomb - Politics 
Since 1942, when President Franklin Roosevelt authorized the development of the 
first atomic bomb, presidents have made very few large decisions about the development 
and use of nuclear weapons. Their decisions often centered on only one or two specific 
issues such as approving the size of the nuclear stockpile. But one president, Harry 
Truman, made several significant decisions regarding nuclear weapons. He approved the 
first test of an atomic bomb in July 1945, the combat use of Little Boy and Fat Man 
against Japan, supported the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission, and approved 
an accelerated program to complete the design, building, and testing of the world’s first 
hydrogen bomb. Unlike Roosevelt’s decision to build the atomic bomb, which was made 
in secrecy under wartime conditions, Truman’s decision to accelerate the development 
and testing of the hydrogen bomb was made in the glare and political agitation of the 
escalating Cold War, technical uncertainty, and the conflicting political advice from the 
Departments of State and Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission. Throughout the 
debate, Truman remained steadfast in his belief that only the president could balance all 
of the opinions and controversy surrounding the hydrogen bomb and only he could 
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decide the course of America’s nuclear future.239 Much of the literature discussing this 
process, such as Richard Rhodes’s Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb, 
McGeorge Bundy’s Danger and Survival, and David Lilienthal’s The Atomic Energy 
Years, suggests that Truman faced a crisis in 1950, a crisis over whether or not to 
authorize the development of hydrogen bomb and risk starting an arms race with the 
Soviet Union. Many persons thought the atomic bomb too dangerous for any one nation 
to possess and argued that the bomb should be controlled by an international agency. 
Lilienthal, serving as the Chairman of the AEC until February 1950, had pushed for 
civilian and international control of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and he believed 
that developing the hydrogen bomb would kill those prospects. Lilienthal failed to 
comprehend the reality that the nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union started with 
Trinity in 1945 and was confirmed by the detonation of the Soviet’s first atomic bomb in 
1949. The competing nuclear interests of the United States and the Soviet Union made 
international control impossible. For Truman, then, in late 1949 and early 1950, the issue 
was not about developing the hydrogen bomb, but one of accelerating its development, 
particularly after being told that work on the hydrogen bomb had been going on for quite 
some time. The president also believed strongly, as well, that the political climate of the 
Cold War demanded it. Truman’s decision to accelerate work on the hydrogen bomb 
reflected these realities. 
At the instigation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Truman created a special committee 
of the National Security Council (NSC) in July 1949 to review the nuclear posture of the 
United States. While noting some gains in the nuclear stockpile, the military remained 
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worried about its ability to carry out nuclear warfare. The proposed subcommittee, 
Truman believed, would give him a full analysis of the nation’s nuclear assets. Although 
the Chairman of the AEC was not normally part of the NSC structure, Lilienthal was 
asked to join the special subcommittee because the issue directly involved the AEC. 
Joining Lilienthal on the subcommittee were Secretary of State Dean Acheson and 
Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson. Truman instructed the subcommittee “to assess the 
rate of progress being made in our atomic program.” The committee quickly found that 
the nation’s infrastructure was inadequate, with respect to fissionable materials 
production, and recommended to the president that the nation’s atomic program be 
accelerated.
240
 
While the committee’s findings detailed shortcomings and the need for 
improvement, there was no sense of extreme urgency or panic. The United States had, 
after all, a monopoly on nuclear technology. Although the Soviet Union would likely 
develop an atomic bomb at some stage, most authorities believed the effort would take 
years. Some military leaders, such as General Leslie Groves, thought it might take up to 
twenty, while most scientists thought it would take only about five years, but policy 
makers, particularly Truman, as well as the public, had no clear idea of Soviet intentions 
or capabilities. Virtually everyone was surprised, then, when air filters carried by a B-29 
snooper aircraft flying over Alaska picked up radioactive debris created by an atomic 
bomb. Soon after, contaminated rainwater samples collected from the roof of the National 
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Bureau of Standards building in Washington confirmed the B-29 data.
241
 The Soviet 
Union had detonated its first atomic bomb, code named Joe 1, on August 8, 1949.
242
 As 
would later become clear, it was literally a carbon copy, of Fat Man courtesy of Soviet 
espionage agents including Klaus Fuchs, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, David Greenglass, 
and Ted Hall. Fuchs, Greenglass, and Hall had worked at Los Alamos during the war and 
were privy to most of the Laboratory’s work. All but Hall were tried and convicted. Hall, 
who was never arrested, immigrated to the United Kingdom, where he lived out the rest 
of his life.
243
 
While these events heightened concern over about the nation’s atomic program, 
the primary concern of both officials and scientists in August 1949 was explaining that 
the Soviet Union’s nuclear success had been inevitable. President Truman made every 
effort to calm public fears in his announcement of the Soviet test on September 23
rd
, 
saying in part: 
I believe the American people, to the fullest extent consistent with 
national security, are entitled to be informed of all developments in 
the field of atomic energy. That is my reason for making public the 
following information. We have evidence that within recent weeks 
an atomic explosion occurred in the U.S.S.R. Ever since atomic 
energy was first released by man, the eventual development of this 
new force by other nations was to be expected.
244
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Other administration officials also worked to reassure the public and congress. In a news 
conference held the day after Truman’s announcement of Joe I, Secretary Acheson spent 
considerable time and effort reinforcing the President’s message that the Soviet 
detonation was not a surprise.
245
 
 Some scientists, although they knew that the Soviet would eventually build an 
atomic bomb, were nonetheless surprised by the 1949 detonation. Edward Teller stated, 
“It seems that the Russian rate of progress is at least comparable to, if it does not exceed, 
the rate of progress in this country.”246 A senior Los Alamos scientist, John Manley, 
concluded that given American inability to predict Soviet success, United States policy 
should seek “to strengthen our position as rapidly as possible and maintain a rate of 
progress limited only by our resources for a relatively long period of time.”247 The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff along with Edward Teller, Nobel Laureate Ernest Lawrence, and AEC 
Commissioner Lewis Strauss quickly reassessed the recently enlarged nuclear weapons 
program recommended by the National Security Council and concluded that it would not 
be sufficient to counter a Soviet Union armed with nuclear weapons. 
 Strauss, who knew of the Los Alamos work on the super, circulated a memo 
among his fellow commissioners proposing an expansion of the hydrogen bomb program, 
saying “It seemed to me that the time has now come for a quantum jump in our planning 
… that is to say, that we should now make an intensive effort to go ahead with the 
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super.”248 Strauss’ memo “sparked a secret debate within the government about whether 
to initiate a crash program to develop the hydrogen bomb.”249 This debate quickly 
expanded to involve a host of groups, including the AEC’s General Advisory Committee 
headed by Oppenheimer, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the State Department, 
the Defense Department and its Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council. 
 The Joint Committee and the Chiefs of Staff favored developing the hydrogen 
bomb, while Lilienthal and Oppenheimer were opposed. Dismayed by Lilienthal’s and 
Oppenheimer’s opposition, Strauss sought counsel from his friend Sidney Souers, who 
was then the executive director of the National Security Council. Strauss asked Souers if 
Truman was aware of the hydrogen bomb. Souers didn’t know and told Strauss he would 
ask Truman about it the next day. As Souers recalled many years later, “I asked him [the 
President] if he had any information on it. He said, ‘No, but you tell Strauss to go to it 
and fast.’”250 Truman finally knew about the hydrogen bomb, indicated his general 
approval of the work, and his desire that the AEC step up its efforts to develop the 
weapon.
251
 
 A participant in the early Super discussions, physicist Herbert York, wrote, the 
debate over Strauss’ memo centered on one crucial issue:  “Was or was not a high 
priority program for the development of the super bomb the appropriate response” to the 
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first Soviet bomb?
252
 Senator Brein McMahon, now chairman of the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy, “believed a crash program to develop the super” was critical. He was 
joined by Senator Edwin Johnson (D-CO), Edward Teller, Ernest Lawrence, as well as 
Strauss, in this belief.
253
 David Lilienthal and Robert Oppenheimer continued to hold the 
opposite view, believing that the hydrogen bomb was not necessary to insure American 
security and that its destructive potential too murderous.
254
 Both men thought the United 
States had a nuclear stockpile of fission weapons sufficient to protect the country. 
 The debate became public when Senator Johnson remarked in a television 
interview that Los Alamos was working on the hydrogen bomb. Truman had already been 
fending off private inquiries by McMahon about the super, and did not want a public 
debate, which might make him appear defensive.
255
 On November 10, 1949, Truman 
reconstituted the special committee of the National Security Council, again consisting of 
Acheson, Lilienthal, and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson to advise him “whether and 
in what manner the United States should undertake the development and possible 
production of super atomic weapons … and whether and when any publicity should be 
given this matter.”256 Very upset over Lilienthal’s position and his potential influence on 
the Special Committee, Strauss sought to circumvent the process and wrote directly to 
Truman on November 25
th
, saying, “I believe that the United States must be as 
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completely armed as any possible enemy,” and urged the President to “direct the Atomic 
Energy Commission to proceed with all possible expedition to develop the thermonuclear 
weapon.”257 
 Each of the three special committee members differed in their view about the 
super which they expressed at their first meeting. Lilienthal ardently opposed the 
hydrogen bomb on moral grounds – it would kill too many people. Secretary of Defense 
Johnson believed the hydrogen bomb was necessary, echoing the unanimous view of the 
Joint Chiefs.
258
 Acheson slightly favored building the hydrogen bomb. He found 
Lilienthal’s moral argument unpersuasive for practical and political reasons. Regardless 
of what the United States might do, the Soviet Union would not delay their development 
of a super bomb. Equally compelling, “the American people simply would not tolerate a 
policy of delaying research in so vital a matter.”259 Given the lack of a unanimous 
opinion, the special committee’s first meeting ended without a recommendation. A 
second meeting was scheduled for January 31, 1950. 
 Despite his sympathy for Lilienthal’s concerns about the hydrogen bomb, 
Acheson, like Truman, was feeling pressure from the public and Congress to take some 
visible action. Anxious to bring the matter to a conclusion, Acheson prepared a set of 
recommendations that he hoped the committee would present to the President.
 260
 The 
first recommendation centered on the development of the hydrogen bomb and called for 
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the President to “direct the Atomic Energy Commission to proceed to determine the 
technical feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon, the scale and rate of effort to be 
determined jointly by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense.” 
The second recommendation, also related to developing the super weapons gave the 
President the option of deferring the final development of the hydrogen bomb pending a 
possible reexamination “as to whether thermonuclear weapons should be produced 
beyond the number required for a test of feasibility.” The third recommendation 
addressed national and international politics, directing “the Secretary of State and the 
Secretary of Defense to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and 
of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, in the light of our probable fission 
bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union.” The 
fourth and final recommendation addressed how much the President should tell the 
American people: “the president [should] indicate publicly the intention of this 
Government to continue work to determine the feasibility of a thermonuclear program, 
and that no further official information will be made public without the approval of the 
President.
 261
 
 Unknown to the Acheson and the special committee, Truman had already made 
up his mind about pursuing the super. General of the Army Omar Bradley, who met 
privately with the President on three occasions in January to discuss the hydrogen bomb, 
recalled in his memoirs: 
 Truman was deeply troubled because AEC Chairman 
David Lilienthal was a humanitarian whom Truman greatly 
respected. But Truman had a way of seeing things clearly 
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and going to the heart of the matter. If the Russians 
proceeded with the H-Bomb and we did not, and it worked, 
we would find ourselves in an intolerably inferior military 
posture.  To Truman, it was as simple as that.
262
 
 
Bradley’s impression, like Souer’s conclusion after his October meeting with Truman 
was that the President already had his made up about the super. 
 Acheson presented his four recommendations at the Special Committee’s second 
(and last) meeting at 10:15 am on January 31, 1950.
 263
 Secretary of Defense Johnson 
objected to the wording of Acheson’s second recommendation. He did not want any 
encumbrance placed on the production of weapons. After some debate, both Acheson and 
Lilienthal agreed to excise the paragraph. Once this was done, all three committee 
members, including Lilienthal, much to Acheson’s’ surprise, signed the 
recommendations. Lilienthal decided not to directly oppose Acheson and Johnson, 
choosing instead to register his personal reservations about the hydrogen bomb directly 
with Truman.
264
 
 Undersecretary of Defense Stephen Early, a former presidential press secretary 
who attended this meeting of the special committee, suggested that the President would 
be best served and the decision would seem less ominous if his decision were announced 
in a press release rather than at a press conference. Accordingly, a draft press release was 
prepared for the President saying that as Commander-in Chief, he had “directed the 
Atomic Energy Commission to continue its work on all forms of atomic weapons, 
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including the so-called hydrogen or super-bomb.” It concluded that this work was and 
would continue to follow American objectives “until a satisfactory plan for international 
control of atomic energy is achieved.”265 
 Secretary of Defense Johnson, who had a scheduled meeting with the President, 
suggested that the Committee use the opportunity to present its report to Truman. “The 
heat was on,” said Johnson, “and every hour counted in getting this matter disposed of.” 
At 12:35 pm, Acheson handed the President the Committee’s recommendations, which 
Truman started to read. Acheson also told Truman that Lilienthal wished to make a 
statement. Shortly after Lilienthal began expressing his misgivings about the hydrogen 
bomb, Truman cut him off by signing the recommendations and saying that further 
discussions were impossible since Senator Edward Johnson made the issue public. 
“Further delay,” said Truman “would be unwise.” Seven minutes after entering the Oval 
Office, the committee left. Later that day, Truman issued his press release.
266
 
 Truman, according to McGeorge Bundy, believed strongly that secrecy in certain 
situations gave the President time and space to consider problems. Accordingly, Truman 
spoke little of the hydrogen bomb after his January 31
st
 press release.
267
 In a news 
conference held on February 2
nd
, he effectively shut down all inquires on how his 
decision was made. However, the President did allow Dean Acheson to make a quasi-
public speech in February that reflected the administration’s thinking. Noting that many 
                                                 
265
 David Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Vol. 2, 626-633; Dean Acheson, Present at the 
Creation, 348-349; and Harry S. Truman, Public Papers 1950, #26; and Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial 
and Hope, 309. 
 
266
 In his memoirs, Truman does not mention Lilienthal’s attempt to qualify his support, saying only that 
the recommendations were “unanimously signed”. 
 
267
 Harry S. Truman, Public Papers, 1950, #29. 
 
  156 
people were “rightly troubled” by developing this “new and very terrible weapon,” 
Acheson argued that it meant only “that we must be even more calm and even more 
steady than we have been in the past, because the responsibilities and the consequences 
of not being calm and not being steady are more terrible than they were before.”268 
 As a result of Truman’s endorsement of the Special Committee’s 
recommendations, Los Alamos began operating under conditions reminiscent of World 
War II, with scientists working quite literally around the clock seven days a week. This 
work centered on the two equally important problems of designing and building more 
powerful fission bombs as well as a thermonuclear device. More powerful fission bombs 
not only would enhance the nation’s stockpile, they were also needed to light 
thermonuclear fires. Developing the hydrogen bomb of course would meet the 
President’s mandate of achieving thermonuclear weapons. To solve both these problems, 
Los Alamos needed to conduct more tests. Darol Froman proposed replacing a large 
fraction of the Laboratory’s computation and modeling experimentation with “frequent 
real tests.” Froman was driven by his assessment that the United States was “two or three 
years behind where many thought we would be when Russia reached its present stage in 
the development of nuclear explosives.” Only by increasing the rate of testing, could Los 
Alamos catch up with the Soviets and meet its new obligation to the nation. To Froman’s 
argument, John Manley added that American policy rested on the belief that superiority 
in atomic weapons was “a deterrent to war.” As “the atomic weapon research and 
development facility of the nation,” Los Alamos was responsible for insuring that 
position “through research and development,” which required “the most effective usage 
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of the current production of fissionable and other pertinent materials.”269 Somewhat 
counter intuitively, this also meant conducting more frequent bomb tests.
270
 
 As Los Alamos pushed to increase the number of nuclear tests, the usefulness of 
Enewetak as the nation’s only test site, because of its great distance from the continental 
United States, its complicated weather pattern (discovered after Sandstone), the difficulty 
of protecting the atoll in the event of international crisis or war, and its limited amount of 
real estate (again, discovered after Sandstone). Executing a nuclear weapons test at 
Enewetak was a major endeavor, requiring a great number of ships and aircraft to move 
the fissionable material, millions of pounds of supplies, and thousands of personnel to the 
Marshall Islands. The weather, particularly wind patterns, rendered Enewetak unsuitable 
for test operations for half of each year. As the Cold War had become more intense 
Enewetak seemed, potentially, more vulnerable. An enemy attack could capture not only 
any nuclear weapons being readied for testing, but also the trained technical personnel 
and their knowledge of nuclear weaponry. The last deficiency, its real estate, came as a 
surprise. When selected for Sandstone, the atoll land area appeared more than adequate. 
However, no one gave any thought to the long term adequacy of Enewetak’s acreage as 
tests became more numerous and energetic. All of these factors prevented a speed-up in 
the testing needed to develop the hydrogen bomb. 
 As a result of these deficiencies, Los Alamos and the Department of Defense 
began lobbying for a continental test site. The AEC was not enthusiastic. While 
recognizing that a continental test site offered “greater flexibility” and potentially lower 
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logistical costs, the AEC believed that “Under conditions today, continental operations 
will obviously pose difficult domestic and possibly international relations problems; 
however, the magnitude of these problems could in time change, as in the event of a 
national emergency.” The domestic problems, of course, were related to radioactive 
fallout. The AEC did not state what the international relations problems might be. 
Nonetheless, the AEC commissioners agreed to a preliminary study “of possible sites be 
conducted to make possible a more accurate evaluation.”271 
 Accordingly, a search for possible sites was initiated under the codename Project 
Nutmeg. Because mitigating radioactive fallout was the chief issue, great thought was 
given to wind conditions. Project Nutmeg staff concluded that nuclear tests could be 
safely conducted in either the southwest or southeast. Neither area was perfect because 
some fallout would inevitably occur in populated areas. Five sites:  the North Carolina 
Coast, the Gulf Coast of Texas,  the Dugway Proving Ground-Wendover Bombing Range 
in Utah, the Alamogordo-White Sands Guided Missile range (Trinity Site), and the Las 
Vegas Bombing and Gunnery Range were deemed suitable if tests could be kept 
relatively small. 
 Since Los Alamos would conduct the continental tests, the Laboratory was asked 
for its opinion.
272
 A continental test site was attractive to Bradbury since such a site 
would allow for more frequent testing. Bradbury recommended the Nevada site and 
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believed that detonations as large as 50 kilotons could be safely carried out without 
causing damage to nearby Las Vegas. The AEC approved the use of the Nevada site on 
December 12, 1950, followed by the National Security Council on December 15
th
, and 
the President on December 18
th
.
273
 Just a few weeks later, Los Alamos carried out the 
first of five tests in Nevada under the code name Operation Ranger. Not only did the 
comparative ease and speed of the Ranger Operation confirm the utility of having a 
permanent proving ground in Nevada, it also allowed for a much quicker resolution of 
many thermonuclear design issues.
274
 
Table 5 
Operation Ranger – Nevada 
Codename Date Delivery Yield (kt) 
Able 01/27/1951 Airdrop 1 
Baker 01/28/1951 Airdrop 8 
Easy 02/01/1951 Airdrop 1 
Baker-2 02/02/1951 Airdrop 8 
Fox 02/06/1951 Airdrop 22 
 
The First Thermonuclear Fire 
 Even as Los Alamos began testing in Nevada, the second prong of its weapons 
program, the development of a thermonuclear bomb, also was progressing rapidly. Of all 
the technical developments that led to the creation of the hydrogen bomb, the 
development of a fission device energetic enough to light a thermonuclear fire is, as Hans 
Bethe has written, underappreciated. Without a fission device of sufficient magnitude, the 
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hydrogen bomb was not possible. Work on significantly improving the yield of fission 
bombs began immediately after Sandstone. While the explosive yield of the Sandstone 
devices could be increased, in theory to a megaton, such increased yields had negative 
consequences of using significant quantities of nuclear fuel and a very large size that 
would make them unwieldy, inherently unsafe, and of no practical value. The answer to 
achieving a significant increase in fission yield without consuming exorbitant amounts of 
nuclear material or increasing size was to use a technique called “boosting,” the 
technique “of using a fission bomb to initiate a small thermonuclear reaction that 
increases the efficiency of the use of the fissile material.”275 Knowing that boosting was 
the only way to give a fission device sufficient yield to ignite a thermonuclear burn, a 
boosted fission device was scheduled for testing in the 1951 Greenhouse operation. 
Anticipating the need to test a boosted device, Gordon Dean, who had replaced Lilienthal 
as Chairman of the AEC, notified Truman in July 1950 of the need for Greenhouse, 
saying “We have every hope that our progress in research and planning during the 
coming months will justify our return to you at a later date to obtain formal approval for 
this test operation.”276 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
275
Herbert York, The Advisors, 23 and Carson Mark, “A Short Account”, 9. 
 
276
 Gordon Dean to the President, LANL Archives, July 17, 1950. 
  
  161 
Table 6 
Operation Greenhouse – Enewetak Atoll 
Test Codename Date Shot Island Yield (kt) 
Dog 04/07/1951 Runit 81 
Easy 04/20/1951 Engebi 47 
George 05/8/1951 Engebi 225 
Item 05/24/1951 Eberiru 45.5 
 
 Operation Greenhouse was vitally important to the nation’s atomic weapon 
program and to the development of the first hydrogen bomb. Two of the Greenhouse 
shots, Dog and Easy, were vastly improved implosion devices that because of gains in 
efficiency gave yields far in excess of the Sandstone devices. At 81 kilotons, 
Greenhouse-Dog was the largest yield fission device to date, greatly increasing the 
destructive potential of the United States stockpile. Greenhouse-Item proved the principle 
of boosting. Item’s yield, although small in relation to the other Greenhouse shots, was 
easily double that of its non-boosted version. The George shot verified the ability to 
achieve a thermonuclear reaction, leading directly to the Mike shot a little over a year 
later. 
277
 As Jay Wechsler, a Los Alamos weapon engineer said, “The George shot, the 
design of which resulted from the crash program on the H-Bomb, confirmed that our 
understanding of the means of initiating a small-scale thermonuclear reaction was 
adequate.”278 
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While less dramatic, perhaps, than previous test operations, Greenhouse occurred 
in a political and military context which was quite dramatic. On June 25, 1950, North 
Korea invaded South Korea. As United States military involvement grew, so too did the 
need for all of the military’s resources, leading the JCS to seriously consider postponing 
or cancelling Greenhouse. In response, Bradbury sent a long letter to Brigadier General 
James McCormack, Director of the AEC’s Division of Military Application, expressing 
incredulity that Enewetak could not be used “precisely at a time in international relations, 
when the most rapid progress should be made in this field.” Bradbury went on to say that 
while Los Alamos recognized the “good intentions of the Chiefs of Staff, “it is now not 
quite clear to us why Eniwetok seemed such a fine idea since it has become 
embarrassingly obvious that, just as one wants and needs it most, and just as the program 
is accelerated, the chances of using it decrease alarmingly.” 279 In the end, the need to test 
shots Item and George carried the day and Greenhouse was conducted at Enewetak. 
Although the success of George proved that an atomic bomb could now light a 
thermonuclear reaction, the problem of the Inverse Compton Effect still had not been 
solved. A thermonuclear fire could be lit, but it could not be sustained. The answer to this 
persistent problem came to Edward Teller in a fit of anger. While stewing over the 
needling of a colleague, it suddenly occurred to him that the radiation produced by 
atomic bombs could be channeled and used to compress the deuterium, thereby 
enhancing and sustaining the reaction once it started. Teller and every other scientist 
working on the hydrogen bomb project failed to appreciate that radiation, itself, has mass. 
By using this mass to compress deuterium, the thermonuclear reaction became strong 
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enough to overcome the Inverse Compton Effect. The concept of radiation implosion, 
which is the basis for all modern thermonuclear weapons was discovered and used to 
complete the design of Mike in June 1952. 
With a promising design to test, the AEC sought presidential approval. As AEC 
Chairman Gordon Dean noted, the usual method for securing approval was “to get up a 
little paper for Presidential signature which is the authorization for expenditure of the 
fissionable material – which also set the time and place.”280 Truman signed the paper on 
September 10, 1952. 
 
Table 7 
Operation Ivy – Enewetak Atoll 
Test Codename Date Island Yield (kt) 
Mike 10/31/1952 Elugelab 10,400 
King 11/15/1952 Airdrop over Runit 500 
 
 Experience at Trinity, Sandstone, and Greenhouse underscored the difficulties in 
choosing the date and time for firing a nuclear weapon in the atmosphere. The two most 
critical variables for atmospheric testing were the onset of daylight and the direction of 
the prevailing winds. Atmospheric tests are generally fired just as dawn is breaking, 
thereby allowing the fireball to be seen against the night sky, but with daylight coming 
quickly so that the dispersion of the radioactive cloud could be plotted. Since winds 
disperse the radioactive cloud, prevailing patterns that push the cloud over uninhabited 
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parts of the globe are required. In the Marshall Islands, ideal wind patterns occur 
routinely between October and December. Thus, the shot date for Mike was set for 
November 1
st
. However, this date was quite close to the 1952 presidential election. When 
the AEC and leading scientists such as Bethe and Oppenheimer proposed postponing the 
tests “so that irresponsible elements could not use it in a last minute attempt to influence 
the election,” Truman let it be known that he hoped “that technical problems would delay 
the shot.” Dean quickly dispatched a fellow AEC Commissioner, Eugene Zuckert, to the 
Marshall Islands to find out if Mike could be reasonably postponed. The answer came 
back no. Any delay risked losing the prevailing winds and increased the risk of exposing 
nearby populations to radioactive fallout. Also, since each nuclear test requires thousands 
of personnel and hundreds of naval vessels, a stand down would be prohibitively 
expensive. Truman did not change the date.
 
 Mike was fired as scheduled.
 281
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Figure 30. Mike shot cab shown in far background. LANL Archives. 
  166 
 
Figure 31. Mike device along with test personnel. Marshall Holloway is third from the right. LANL Archives. 
  167 
 
Figure 32. Mike device just prior to its detonation. LANL Archives. 
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 Even with dark glasses, Mike was awe inspiring from a distance of fifty miles. Its 
mushroom cloud quickly rose to a height of over 100,000 feet injecting radioactive debris 
into the stratosphere for the very first time. Observers on the helicopters dispatched to 
ground zero found only water where the island of Elugelab had once been. The dark blue 
water over the underwater crater contrasted with the surrounding green water of the 
lagoon.  Mike had dredged a crater in the lagoon’s bottom that was over 200 feet deep. 
The observers in the helicopters also saw that Mike had vaporized large chunks of the 
two nearest islands. 
Two weeks after Mike, Los Alamos detonated the largest ever United States 
fission device, King, in an airdrop over Runit island. King’s yield of 500 kilotons made it 
very powerful in terms of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs, but very impotent when 
compared to Mike. King was a curious device. It was intended to provide the United 
States with a very high yield nuclear weapon should Mike fail. It also was a tortured 
design, massive in size, difficult to assemble, and just as difficult to take into combat. 
King just barely conformed to the limits of nature and the laws of physics. With Mike’s 
success, King was unnecessary and quickly forgotten. 
Legacy 
 The development and use of atomic bombs during World War II made nuclear 
weapons the Cold War coin of the realm. A relative handful of scientists introduced a 
new and very powerful weapon into the arsenals of the United States and, eventually, the 
Soviet Union. These same scientists knew as early as 1942 that the destructive power of 
nuclear weapons could be increased almost beyond comprehension by developing a 
hydrogen bomb. Since scientists rarely abandon even the most esoteric ideas once 
  169 
conceived, the hydrogen bomb was well on its way to becoming reality as soon as the 
possibility was articulated by Teller. When confronted with the possibility of a hydrogen 
bomb, Truman faced a difficult position. He could stop the existing research and 
development and hope that the Soviet Union would reciprocate. Or, he could let the 
existing program continue to creep along, again hoping for a similar response from the 
Soviet Union. Or, he could accelerate research and development on the assumption that 
the Soviet Union would develop this weapon as quickly as it could. Truman, of course, 
adopted the latter position. 
 Despite the many arguments both for and against the hydrogen bomb, the military 
danger Truman had to contemplate was the potential of a preemptive strike by the Soviet 
Union using hydrogen bombs and with the United States having no effective weapons to 
either deter such an attack or to retaliate afterwards. Despite the pleas of Lilienthal and 
the opposition of Oppenheimer, Truman believed he could not risk the security of the 
United States. As his Assistant Press Secretary, Eben Ayers recorded in his diary on 
February 3, 1950, “The President said there actually was no decision to be made on the 
H-Bomb, we have got to have it if only for bargaining purposes with the Russians.”282 As 
subsequent research by David Holloway and Harold Agnew has shown, the Soviet Union 
was indeed developing the hydrogen bomb and, in fact, designed, built, and tested a 
deliverable hydrogen bomb before the United States.
283
 
                                                 
282
 Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun, 407. 
 
283
 See Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun; David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb; Making the Russian Bomb; 
Harold Agnew Oral Interview; and Frank Shelton, Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer, 1-10. 
 
  170 
 In his memoirs Truman delineated the president’s authority in terms of nuclear 
weapons, saying that only the president has the authority to “authorize the use of an 
atomic bomb,” ”decide the nature of the weapons to be made,” “decide whether a weapon 
can be detonated for test purposes,” “where and when the weapons may be shipped or 
stored,” and “set the annual goal of the number of bombs and quantity of material to be 
produced.”284 While Truman was correct about the president’s authority, those decisions 
occurred in a specific context. With respect to nuclear matters, science both bounded and 
enhanced Truman’s authority. The first hydrogen bomb came about first because 
scientists, particularly Edward Teller, saw the possibility of such a weapon and initiated 
research that solved the many technical problems and second, because Bradley, and the 
special committee believed the hydrogen bomb should be developed and provided the 
justification for doing so. 
For Los Alamos, work on the hydrogen bomb was complex and, at times, 
troublesome, particularly concerning Edward Teller. Although no longer affiliated with 
Los Alamos, Teller actively tried to influence the Laboratory’s operations by pushing to 
have Los Alamos initiate a crash development program. As Norris Bradbury recalled in a 
1969 letter to Congressman Chet Holifield, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, “I opposed the “crash program” urged by Edward Teller partly because the 
words meant very little in a practical sense, partly because diffuse, random, and frantic 
effort would probably waste time and money and delay real accomplishment, and partly 
because the only way that anyone at the time could think of going showed little or no 
chance of providing a remotely useful weapon.” Teller, dissatisfied with Los Alamos, 
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would lead the charge to create a second University of California nuclear weapons 
laboratory in 1952 – a topic of chapter nine.  
What did Mike mean for the Marshallese? First, Mike vaporized a significant 
amount of Enewetak real estate and heavily contaminated a number of islands. Second, 
the sheer size of Mike’s energy yield rendered Enewetak too small for future 
thermonuclear tests. Another site was needed to help bear the burden. Hence, Bikini was 
reactivated for the 1954 Castle tests, elimination any chance that the Bikinians could 
return to their ancestral home. Third, and most significantly, Mike fooled Los Alamos 
and others about the phenomenology of radioactive debris injected into the stratosphere 
by a hydrogen bomb. When very little fallout was detected after the detonation, it was 
assumed that the stratosphere had trapped the debris. It was also assumed that the same 
condition would occur in the future. This assumption proved incorrect and led to 
radiation injuries to the people of Rongelap Atoll in 1954. In short, Mike introduced a 
new learning regime that was not understood or even vaguely comprehended – fallout 
from thermonuclear tests does not behave in the same manner as that from fission 
explosions. 
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CHAPTER 7 
WHY BUY A COW WHEN POWDERED MILK IS SO CHEAP? 
After his interview with Carey Wilson aboard the USS Estes, Alvin Graves went 
below deck to watch the detonation of Mike on a television screen in the ship’s 
communications cabin. 
 
 
Figure 33. Carey Wilson, center. Clarkson is on Wilson's left. LANL Archives. 
 
When the detonation destroyed the television link, Graves went topside and watched 
Mike’s mushroom cloud as it rose high into the Pacific sky, a massive and awe inspiring 
site even from a great distance.
285
 Although Mike ushered in the thermonuclear era, 
Graves knew that the device - standing three stories tall, weighing forty tons, and 
dependent on a high-maintenance cryogenic fuel system – was not a weapon of war. If 
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the United States was to have deliverable thermonuclear weapon, Mike had to be made 
significantly smaller, lighter, and easier to maintain. Graves anticipated that the 
Laboratory would take a very deliberate and iterative approach to turning Mike into a 
weapon of war and that he, as the chief Los Alamos weaponeer, would lead that effort.
286
 
Alvin Graves and his wife, Elizabeth,
287
 had come to Los Alamos from the 
University of Chicago in 1944. Both were physicists and had taken part in Trinity, 
operating radiation detection equipment in nearby villages. Both had elected to remain at 
Los Alamos after the war. In May 1946, Graves was injured in the Slotin criticality 
accident and lived primarily because Slotin’s body protected him from receiving a lethal 
dose of ionizing radiation. After his recovery, Graves became the deputy scientific 
director for Operation Sandstone in1948. In 1951, he became the scientific director for 
the 1951 Greenhouse Operation and continued in that role for Operations Ivy and Castle. 
By the time of Castle, Graves had achieved wide respect in both the scientific and 
military communities making him the nation’s preeminent authority on the testing of 
nuclear weapons. In this capacity, he greatly influenced the planning of Operation Castle 
and for the manner in which the Castle tests were executed. 
Graves would lead the effort to turn Mike into a weapon of war, but not in the 
manner he anticipated. Mike changed the dynamics of nuclear weapons development, 
shifting the emphasis almost entirely from fission to fusion weapons. This shift 
accelerated when the Department of Defense demanded a deliverable thermonuclear 
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bomb by 1954. The drive to meet this requirement led two Los Alamos scientists, Harold 
Agnew and Hans Bethe, to conclude that the Laboratory should develop and test a radical 
new thermonuclear device, codenamed Bravo, during Castle. Bravo would be a 
significant technical achievement, making possible true thermonuclear bombs. However, 
Bravo was also notable because its radioactive fallout became an international issue. 
Marshall Islanders, Japanese fishermen, and American troops were injured, but even 
more damaging from a political standpoint, was the injection of radioactivity into the 
atmosphere, potentially exposing the entire world to fallout. Thus, Bravo not only 
advanced American knowledge about thermonuclear weapons, it also led, ultimately, to 
the 1958 test moratorium. 
Castle Planning 
Planning for Operation Castle began with the conclusion of Operation 
Greenhouse in May 1951. Using data from Greenhouse, Los Alamos scientists, put 
forward a plan of “3±1 tower or ground shots” of fission devices in 1953. However, as it 
seemed more and more probable that the Mike test would be successful, Los Alamos told 
the AEC that a second thermonuclear device could be testing as part of Castle.
288
 An 
AEC budget analyst immediately protested, saying that another thermonuclear test, 
coming so soon after Mike, was both too excessive and too expensive. Expenses related 
to thermonuclear testing, such as building and maintaining a cryogenic plant for a one-
time use in the very hot and humid Pacific environment, were astronomical. 
Unaccustomed to budget constraints, Los Alamos scrambled to provide a suitable 
justification for its proposal. Darol Froman, previously the Sandstone Test Director and 
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now Laboratory Associate Director, astutely reminded the AEC that official United States 
policy as enunciated by President Truman, was “to make progress as rapidly as possible 
in the thermonuclear field as well as in the development of fission bombs.” As Froman 
further noted, “it would appear most illogical to limit test activities for budget reasons 
because these activities have proven remarkably successful in the desired progress.” 289 
Although Froman’s argument effectively stifled the AEC’s objection, it was unnecessary. 
The Department of Defense, having witnessed the successful Mike test, wanted 
thermonuclear weapons sooner rather than later and issued a military requirement calling 
for “a capability in thermonuclear weapons in early 1954.”290 This requirement was 
codified in the little known Emergency Capability Program (ECP), which was, in effect, a 
crash development program for a deliverable thermonuclear bomb. 
The Emergency Capability Program 
The national military requirement for a deliverable thermonuclear bomb was not 
unwelcome news to either the AEC’s Commissioners or to Los Alamos. Mike’s success 
gave both the confidence that a deliverable thermonuclear weapon could be designed, 
built, and put into the stockpile by the required time. AEC Acting Chairman, Henry 
Smyth, told the Military Liaison Committee that Mike’s “behavior leads us to believe that 
adaptation of its design to a weapon or weapons offers real promise,” although that 
adaptation, “involves a great amount of engineering and process development and 
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testing.”291 Los Alamos scientists were especially confident in their ability to produce 
such a weapon. Los Alamos theoretician Carson Mark noted that even without a proof 
test designing such a device could be produced “simply by trying to place ourselves as 
favorably with respect to the important parameters as conditions of weight, size, materials 
available, etc., would permit.” As Mark further noted, “the yield to be expected of any of 
these particular devices is consequently more a quotation of the yields … than an 
estimate of the expected behavior”292 Norris Bradbury seconded Carson Mark’s 
evaluation, telling the AEC’s Director of Military Applications that “only non-known 
characteristics of any such device will prevent its delivery by existing aircraft in time of 
war.”293 In other words, Los Alamos believed it could design and build a smaller and 
lighter version of Mike with a reasonable assurance that it would work. 
Los Alamos did succeed, producing an ECP weapon, in essence a miniature 
version of Mike, by late 1953. This weapon was designed and built as Carson Mark had 
predicted, by reducing size and weight, but as an untested crude prototype, it was a 
logistical nightmare. If required in a national emergency, this first ECP bomb would be 
filled with its cryogenic fuel and loaded on a partially fueled B-36 bomber stationed at 
Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Since Albuquerque’s mile-high 
elevation would prevent a fully fueled B-36 from taking off while carrying this very 
heavy thermonuclear weapon, the half fueled bomber would first have to fly to Roswell, 
New Mexico, to complete its fueling before continuing on to Limestone, Maine, where 
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the thermonuclear fuel in the weapon would be replenished and the bomber again 
refueled. The bomber would then have to make another stop at Thule, Greenland, before 
flying on to its target in the Soviet Union.
294
 When retired shortly after the completion of 
Castle, this ECP device had the shortest stockpile life of any United States nuclear 
weapon. 
Bravo 
 Although the Defense Department’s ECP accelerated the move into the 
thermonuclear era, another potent force - scientific inquiry – increased that acceleration. 
Mike had successfully demonstrated that cryogenic devices worked well, but with  two 
significant drawbacks. First, maintaining a cryogenic system over any length of time was 
very difficult and expensive, since constantly replenishing its low-temperature fuel made 
effective stockpiling nearly impossible. Second, the very large physical mass of such 
devices severely restricted delivery options. Only the massive and increasingly outdated 
strategic bomber, the B-36, could carry such devices. With the planned replacement of 
the B-36 fleet with smaller B-47 bombers, size and weight became a driving feature in 
designing thermonuclear weapons. Research at Los Alamos strongly suggested that the 
cryogenic fuel could be replaced with a dry fuel, which would significantly reduce 
overall weight and eliminate the need for constant maintenance. However, Bradbury was 
hesitant to change the focus away from cryogenic fuel to dry fuel because he believed 
that Mike’s already proved cryogenic system could be downsized sufficiently to meet the 
ECP requirements.. 
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 But not everyone at Los Alamos shared Bradbury’s view. Harold Agnew argued 
for moving quickly to adopt new technology, rather than a slower response of improving 
Mike, saying that Los Alamos should “consider, in the light of new developments, the 
reasonableness of the overall endeavor.”295 Though mildly worded, Agnew’s challenge to 
the development and stockpiling of cryogenic weapons represented a serious questioning 
of the Laboratory’s thermonuclear development program and by extension the planning 
for Operation Castle. Agnew realized that his assessment would carry little weight and 
likely be ignored unless he found someone with clout to join forces with him. Hans Bethe 
recognized the significance and importance of Agnew’s challenge and co-signed a memo 
outlining Agnew’s argument. Bradbury could not ignore Bethe’s assessment and agreed 
to test Bravo. Twenty five years later, Agnew, now director of Los Alamos, told 
Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger that the memo could have cost him his job, 
saying, “I authored it and if I hadn’t been clever enough to have had Bethe sign it, I 
would have been fired.”296 Although Agnew was engaging in a bit of hyperbole, he was 
not wrong in saying that there could have been unpleasant consequences for challenging 
Bradbury. 
From Enewetak Proving Ground to Pacific Proving Ground 
When the United States Navy sailed out of Bikini’s lagoon after completing 
Operation Crossroads in the summer of 1946, it left the atoll abandoned and deserted. 
Although it had been adequate for the two Crossroads detonations, its land area was 
deemed too small to accommodate both an expanded and permanent experimental 
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infrastructure planned for Operation Sandstone as well as future tests operations. Bikini’s 
weather also was suspect, because the unpredictable winds that swirled above it could 
carry radioactive debris to nearby Rongerik, Rongelap, Wotho, and Utirik Atolls. The 
possibility that fallout from Crossroads could harm the Bikinians, who had just been 
relocated to Rongerik, prompted the Navy to place the islanders on a ship during the 
tests. For an unknown reason, the natives of Rongelap Atoll, which is closer to Bikini 
than Rongerik, were not temporarily moved during the tests. Except for an occasional 
visit by scientists monitoring for residual radioactive contamination from Crossroads, it 
seemed that no one, except Bikini’s now nomadic natives, gave Bikini a second thought. 
Bikini, however, was not forgotten. When Enewetak’s limitations became acute, Alvin 
Graves took the first steps to reactivate Bikini for Castle. 
When originally selected for Operation Sandstone, Enewetak Atoll had met the 
requirements of remoteness; a small population that could be easily relocated; and 
sufficient real estate to accommodate the supporting infrastructure of housing, 
laboratories, and data collection facilities as well as the three planned detonations. The 
significantly larger yields of the Greenhouse tests demonstrated, however, that Enewetak 
did not have enough land mass to accommodate the testing devices of ever increasing 
energy. After the first three Greenhouse tests contaminated all of the shot islands, Alvin 
Graves, the Los Alamos Test Director, was forced to increase the allowable exposure 
levels for personnel critical to carrying out the fourth and final detonation. As Graves 
commented with some understatement, “The fourth test in Operation Greenhouse was a 
major effort.”297 By the end of Greenhouse, it was generally accepted that Enewetak 
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Atoll could no longer continue as the sole test site in the Pacific; a fact dramatically 
confirmed a year later when Mike vaporized the entire island of Elugelab. Any test of a 
thermonuclear device at or near ground level, as Mike dramatically demonstrated, was 
problematic, requiring additional real estate. 
The first mention of using Bikini again came in June 1952, when Graves told 
Bradbury that “the lack of real estate at Eniwetok is seriously limiting the number of tests 
which can be expected there in a given period.” Graves further pointed out that trying to 
protect the land by limiting single detonations to a relatively small yield of thirty kilotons 
would be useless in proving megaton-yield designs. Consequently, Graves told Bradbury, 
“although I am not yet ready to recommend that Bikini be reactivated to a sufficient 
extent to permit some tests to be done on that Atoll, I believe the Laboratory should take 
the position that it may so recommend in the near future and strongly oppose any 
decision which might jeopardize that possibility, such for example as the return of the 
natives to that Atoll.” Bradbury concurred and notified the AEC that “a preliminary 
investigation of the cost of reactivation of Bikini for one or more Castle shots had been 
begun.”298 
Major General Percy Clarkson (USA), the Greenhouse and Ivy task force 
commander who would continue in that capacity for Castle, proposed using Ujelang. As 
Clarkson told Graves, “I believe the most serious consideration should be given to 
detonating Castle on UJELANG Atoll, Bikini, or elsewhere. The problem at UJELANG 
involves the relocation of 158 natives, but I do not believe this to be an insurmountable 
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obstacle.” In speaking of Bikini, Clarkson, with unintended prescience, stated that “There 
is a rad-safe hazard to the following inhabited civilian communities in the vicinity of 
BIKINI: Rongelap 112 inhabitants, Utirik 178, Wotho 30.”299 Graves summarily 
dismissed Ujelang because it lacked of insufficient real estate to accommodate the 
planned large yield tests of Castle. He told Clarkson, as well, that Enewetak was 
problematic because the tests of the upcoming Operation Ivy operation might 
contaminate many islands making them unusable. Finally, he observed that the facilities 
on “the atoll of Eniwetok represent an important asset to the AEC and to the country and 
we will risk its loss to us if we continue to use up its real estate for tests.”300 
If Bikini was unsuitable for the kiloton-yield Sandstone tests, what made it 
suitable for the planned megaton-yield Castle devices? The answer was three-fold. First, 
Bikini was relatively close to Enewetak (130 miles) allowing the use of that atoll’s 
extensive logistical facilities to support testing on Bikini. For instance, test devices could 
be assembled at Enewetak and floated to Bikini on barges. With the exception of tent 
camps for operational personnel, Bikini would have no structures other than those 
required at the two proposed ground zero locations. 
The second reason for reactivating Bikini was that the atoll was uninhabited. 
Since being removed in 1946, the Bikinians had lived on Rongerik Atoll, where they 
nearly starved; then on Kwajalein, where they lived as squatters in tents; and finally sent 
to Kili Island, which was less than ideal. As a solitary island, it did not have a lagoon for 
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fishing. Wind and waves prevented supply ships from even docking at the island for 
significant portions of each year. Growing food crops on Kili also was difficult and the 
specter of starvation rose again. Even more significantly, Kili belonged to the iroj of 
Jaluit Atoll, meaning the Bikinians were, in effect, living in a foreign land. Although no 
effort was being made to return the Bikinians to their homeland, Graves wanted to 
quickly reactivate the atoll to prevent any such action. 
Carroll Tyler, the AEC manager at Los Alamos, also weighed in on the issue of 
Bikini. Although he never travelled to the Marshall Islands, Tyler did not hesitate to tell 
Brigadier General Kenneth Fields, his immediate superior and Director of the AEC’s 
Division of Military Applications, that useable real estate was the driving issue in 
selecting Bikini. Alternative Marshallese sites, such as Taka, Bikar, and Taongi Atolls, 
had been evaluated and quickly dismissed because of a lack of land area. While Rongerik 
had sufficient real estate, it was in Tyler’s estimation, too close to Rongelap. As he noted, 
in much the same vein as Clarkson, “any large scale detonations at Rongerik would 
almost certainly require evacuation of the natives from Rongelap and might even 
contaminate that area so as to restrict return of the Rongelap people.” Bikini, Tyler failed 
to note, was closer to Rongelap than Rongerik. Having made his case for reactivating 
Bikini as a test site, Tyler told Fields that Bikinians were not an issue in the discussion. 
Although he had received two conflicting reports about the Bikinians, Tyler was adamant 
that “Bikini is most suitable as to land area and location.”301 Tyler then recommended 
that the Department of Interior, the trusteeship administrator, be told that the Bikini 
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natives can never return to that atoll, and if necessary, the Bikini people could be moved 
to another atoll.
302
 
 Tyler’s assessment, albeit sweeping and uninformed, reflected the general belief 
the Bikini Atoll was needed for testing and its people were inconsequential. The 
Bikinians’ initial sacrifice of their atoll to the national security interests of the United 
States was now a permanent condition. After Bravo contaminated Bikini, the Bikinians 
signed an agreement giving the atoll to the United States.
303
. 
 The third reason why Bikini became suitable once again for nuclear tests was the 
use of barges as ground zero sites. Barges, which were anchored in Bikini’s lagoon, 
eliminated much of the need for real estate. Four of the six Castle tests were conducted 
on barges. These tests, all ECP devices, did not require extensive instrumentation, only 
proof that they worked. Two tests, Bravo and Koon, however, because of their novel 
designs and future stockpile implications, required extensive diagnostics and had to be 
detonated on one of Bikini’s islands. 
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Table 8 
 
Operation Castle: Bikini-Enewetak Atolls, February 1954 – May 1954 
 
Codename Date Laboratory Atoll Venue Yield (Mt) 
Bravo 02/28/1954 LASL Bikini Surface 15 
Romeo 03/26/1954 LASL Bikini Barge 11 
Koon 04/06/1954 UCRL Bikini Surface 0.11 
Union 04/25/1954 LASL Bikini Barge 6.9 
Yankee 05/04/1954 LASL Bikini Barge 13.5 
Nectar 05/13/1954 LASL Enewetak Barge 1.69 
 
 At 6:45 am local time on February 28, 1954, Castle Bravo burst into the sky from 
a sand spit that had been built immediately adjacent to Bikini Atoll island of Nan. 
Bravo’s energy yield, fifteen megatons, instantly proved Bravo an exceptional and 
significant technical success and the most energetic of all United States nuclear weapons 
tests. Within seconds, Bravo’s blast wave swept over the entire atoll destroying and 
contaminating everything in its path. The six men of the firing party, housed in a steel 
and concrete bunker thirty miles from ground zero, were trapped until radiation levels 
dropped low enough for an emergency rescue by helicopter.
304
 Also in those first few 
seconds, Bravo’s mushroom cloud rose into the sky streaking toward the stratosphere. 
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Within a few hours, high intensity levels of radioactive contamination were detected on 
Rongerik, Rongelap, and Utirik atolls forcing the evacuation of all three.
305
 
 
Figure 34. Castle Bravo. LANL Archives. 
 
 Radioactive fallout also fell on the ships of the Joint Task Force sailing fifty miles 
off Bikini. Ten sailors working on the flight deck of the USS Bairoko were contaminated. 
The next day, a ship of the Pacific Micronesian Line, the S.S. Roque, sailing under 
contract to the Trust Territory, unexpectedly entered Utirik’s lagoon. Exposure levels on 
the Roque’s deck could not be accurately characterized because the ship had passed 
through a series of rain squalls. The ship’s master was instructed to wash down decks “as 
soon as convenient.”306 On March 16th, the Associated Press announced that radioactive 
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debris from Bravo had fallen on a lone Japanese fishing trawler, ironically named the 
Lucky Dragon, which had sailed undetected into the declared exclusion zone surrounding 
Bikini and was approximately eighty miles from the atoll when Bravo was ignited. 
Reminding Japan of the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the fallout that fell on the 
Lucky Dragon created an ugly international incident for the United States especially 
when sales of pelagic fish were suspended and one of the Lucky Dragon’s sailors died, 
possibly from complications related to his exposure. Although Bravo’s energy yield, 
fifteen megatons, instantly proved the device an exceptional and significant technical 
success; its fallout made it the most infamous. 
Bravo 
 Understanding and evaluating the performance of Bravo required that the test 
device be detonated at a precise location at ground level, and this required extensive 
construction. Most of the instruments would be connected to Bravo by of line-of-site 
pipes. These airtight pipes would be evacuated prior to the detonation so that the data 
could be transmitted thousands of yards through a vacuum to collection stations housed 
in steel and concrete bunkers. Knowing that Bravo, like Mike, would vaporize any island 
on which it was detonated, an artificial island was constructed for the test and connected 
to the island of Nam by a causeway. The causeway had two functions. First, obviously, it 
provided access to the artificial island. Construction crews and equipment were landed at 
the dock facilities on Nam and then driven to the shot island, as was the Bravo device. 
Second, the causeway supported the line-of-sight pipe that connected the device to the 
distant instrument bunkers. 
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Figure 35. Bravo Test Site. The large concrete building is the test cab. Note the outhouse at the edge of the sand 
spit. LANL Archives. 
 
Since the Trinity test, scientists had known that surface detonations were 
particularly dirty. Thousands and even millions of tons of the surrounding environment 
are vaporized by each test and made radioactive when they are entrained in the 
mushroom cloud. As the cloud cools, all of the vaporized and irradiated debris solidifies 
and fall back to earth. Bravo was going to be dirty, but because Mike’s radioactive debris 
disappeared, very little attention was given to the potential fallout. It was believed that 
most of Mike’s radioactive debris had been injected into the stratosphere where it would 
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remain trapped for a very long period of time - time enough for the debris to cool into 
radiological insignificance.
307
 This belief would cause serious problems for both the 
United States and for the Marshallese, particularly those living on Rongelap Atoll. 
 
 
Figure 36. Bravo device inside concrete shot cab. LANL Archives. 
 
When Bravo exploded two very significant events occurred.
308
 First, a portion, but 
not all, of the nuclear material was converted to energy in the forms of a blast wave, 
intense heat, and blinding light.
309
 The blast wave swept over the entire atoll with the 
force of a major hurricane. The firing party, thought to be safe in a very stout concrete 
bunker about thirty miles from ground zero, knew very quickly they were in trouble when 
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their bunker began to roll and sway much like a ship at sea. Those inside became queasy 
and seasick. While the ground was moving, radiation detectors in and around the bunker 
went off the scale, indicating very intense contamination. The firing party was trapped for 
three days, waiting for the radiation levels to drop sufficiently so that they could wrap 
themselves with bed sheets and canvass and make a wild jeep ride to the nearby airstrip 
where ship-based helicopters rescued them.
310
 
Second, the unconsumed part of the Bravo device, along with the massive 
concrete shot bunker, steel pipes, and cables were vaporized and rose into the atmosphere 
as part of the mushroom cloud. Other materials near Bravo, including an estimated ten 
million tons of Bikini coral and sand, also were sucked into the inferno and the quickly 
growing mushroom cloud. All of this material became radioactive and would become 
radioactive fallout. By one minute after detonation, Bravo’s mushroom cloud and all of 
its contents, had reached an altitude of 45,000 feet and had expanded to a width of more 
than four miles. By five minutes after detonation, the cloud had punched through the 
stratosphere topping out at 115,000 feet. At ten minutes the cloud was more than seventy-
five miles wide and still expanding. This enormous mushroom cloud caused widespread 
contamination and became the visible symbol of the public’s new awareness of the 
dangers of atmospheric testing. 
Castle – The Consequences  
Clarkson, Graves, and everyone in the Task Force needed no instrumentation to 
know that Bravo was enormously successful. Their eyes could see the mushroom cloud 
towering over them and knew immediately that Bravo’s yield was much larger than 
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expected. Combined with the enormous practical advantages of this bomb design, Bravo 
also spelled the end of cryogenic thermonuclear designs. Harold Agnew, the champion of 
Bravo, wanted to be the first to let his bosses back at Los Alamos know that the nuclear 
world had changed. In a cleverly written message that could be sent on an unclassified 
communications channel, he said “Why buy a cow when powdered milk is so cheap?” 
Because of Bravo, dry devices became the future of thermonuclear weapons, and all 
cryogenic work was immediately stopped, including the testing of one such device during 
Castle. In the blink of eye, quite literally, Bravo changed the course of nuclear weapons 
development. 
But in another sense, Bravo had been too successful. Its fifteen megaton yield was 
over twice what had been predicted and the consequences of this miscalculation were 
immediate and severe. The most serious result, the topic of the next chapter, was the 
radioactive fallout that fell on Rongelap, Rongerik, and Utirik and which forced 
emergency evacuations of those atolls. On Bikini, itself, residual radiation rendered the 
entire atoll unlivable. One of the oddest occurrences of any test operation occurred when 
Bravo’s fallout contaminated two work camps on Bikini. The work crews were moved to 
ships for Bravo expecting to return to their camps after three days. Since their stay on 
ships was to be brief, they were ordered to leave most of their belongings in camp. Bravo, 
of course, contaminated everything left behind, including clothing. Restitution was slow 
in coming. No one, it was determined, had the authority to make restitution. Only after 
Bradbury insisted, was restitution made – but only if each worker submitted a detailed list 
of lost clothing. Even as millions of dollars was being spent conducting Operation Castle 
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without qualm, the anxiety about reimbursing a few hundred dollars for clothing reached 
all the way back to Washington, D.C. 
 
Figure 37. Tare work camp prior to Bravo. LANL Archives 
 
Figure 38. Tare work camp after Bravo. LANL Archives 
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The remaining Los Alamos tests, like Bravo, had yields in excess of what had 
been predicted. They were designed and built, as Carson Mark had suggested, by 
reducing weight and size. Their yields, as Mark also suggested, were estimates of 
possibilities with little likelihood of accuracy.
311
 
 
 
Figure 39. Castle Romeo. LANL Archives. 
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Figure 40. Castle Union. LANL Archives. 
  
 
Figure 41. Castle Yankee. LANL Archives. 
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The Thermonuclear Learning Regime 
 All but one of the Castle tests produced energy yields far in excess of what had 
been predicted.
312
 This was good technical news, giving the work of Los Alamos an 
unexpected benefit. But the unexpected higher yields also meant that Los Alamos did not 
yet fully understand thermonuclear reactions. In effect, thermonuclear testing added 
complexity to the learning regime of testing. Future tests would have to resolve the 
differences between predicted and actual yields. One of the complexities introduced by 
thermonuclear testing was the creation of very large amounts of radioactive debris. 
Although this basic phenomenon was no surprise, its phenomenology was misunderstood. 
The behavior of Mike’s radioactive fallout led to the conclusion that the increased energy 
yields of thermonuclear detonations simply injected most of the radioactive debris into 
the stratosphere, where it was trapped. This condition, known as stratospheric trapping, 
was accepted without experimental proof and generalized without question to include all 
thermonuclear detonations. Bravo disproved this theory when its fallout severely 
contaminated the atolls of Rongelap, Rongerik, and Utirik; along with a Japanese fishing 
trawler, the Lucky Dragon; and even ships of the Castle task force injuring many. When 
Bravo disproved the theory of stratospheric trapping, radioactive fallout became a 
worldwide issue; one that made testing in the atmosphere an issue the world could not 
ignore. 
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CHAPTER 8 
"THE WORLD, WE THINK SHE START OVER AGAIN” 
Had the theory of stratospheric trapping been accurate, Bravo’s radioactive debris 
would have been injected into the stratosphere, where it would have cooled into 
insignificance and been forgotten. But, instead, Bravo’s debris fell out of the Marshallese 
sky on ships of the JTF task force, on the inhabited atolls of the entire northern end of the 
archipelago, and, most significantly, on a Japanese fishing trawler, The Lucky Dragon. 
Both the JTF and the United States kept the news of the Marshallese exposures quiet, 
even after evacuating three atolls. But when the Japanese press broke the story about the 
Lucky Dragon, Bravo’s fallout became an international issue, evoking memories of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, calling attention to the plight of the Marshallese islanders, and 
creating worldwide concern about radioactive fallout. All of this happened, said Alvin 
Graves, because “the theory of stratospheric trapping has not been substantiated by the 
facts of Bravo.”313 
The first indication of a radiological problem came at 3:00 pm on March 1, a little 
less than nine hours after the detonation of Bravo, when the needles of the radiation 
detection instruments on Rongerik Atoll went off scale. At the same time, many of the 
Task Force ships, particularly the aircraft carrier Bairoko, reported radioactive fallout. 
Not until 8:00 pm, fourteen hours after Bravo exploded, was the Commander in Chief of 
the Pacific, Admiral Felix B. Stump, told of the fallout on Rongerik and the likelihood of 
“minor” fallout on Rongelap Atoll. Stump was notified because only he could authorize 
the use of the ships needed to carry out any emergency evacuations. 
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Atoll Evacuations 
Since the twenty six military and two civilian personnel stationed on Rongerik 
were not trained in the use of the radiation detectors, a task force radiation officer flew to 
Rongerik aboard a Navy PBY flying boat to assess the situation.
314
 The officer quickly 
confirmed the existence of high levels of contamination and the need to evacuate the 
twenty-eight men. Acting on his own initiative, the radiation office used his PBY to fly 
the men to Kwajalein, where their medical situation could be evaluated. The evacuation 
took place in two waves and was completed thirty- five hours after Bravo’s detonation. 
Alarmed by the presence of fallout on Rongerik, the JTF ordered aerial monitoring of 
Rongelap Atoll, which lay directly between Bikini and Rongerik. When high levels of 
radioactivity were discovered, the JTF decided to evacuate Rongelap. 
A destroyer escort, the USS Philip, was detached from its security patrol at Bikini 
and ordered to Rongelap, reaching the atoll in the early morning of March 3
rd
. A 
representative of the Trust Territory and his Marshallese interpreter were waiting for the 
Philip, having flown to the atoll by PBY float plane. Under international law, only a Trust 
Territory official could authorize an evacuation. A landing party consisting of three 
officers from the Philip, four radiation monitors, and the Trust Territory representatives 
were met on the beach by the Iroij of Rongelap, John. The monitors confirmed high 
levels of radioactive contamination and the need to evacuate the island. With John’s 
concurrence, and the approval of the Trust Territory official, the evacuation of Rongelap 
began immediately. Sixteen persons, ranging in ages from six to eighty three, deemed too 
old or too sick for transport by the Philip, were placed aboard the PBY and flown to 
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Kwajalein. The remaining forty eight natives were ferried to the Philip by whaleboat. 
Each person was allowed only a small handbag with a few personal belongings. 
Radioactive fallout had contaminated everything else, including sleeping mats. 
Aboard the Philip, men and women were segregated. Marshallese women, modest 
by culture, were especially nervous in their new surroundings. While everyone showered 
to wash off as much external radioactivity as possible, clothes were collected and 
laundered for the same reason. The Philip’s crew donated personal clothing to replace 
garments that could not be decontaminated. Immediately after undergoing 
decontamination, the children were given milk. A bit later, the Marshallese went through 
the ship’s mess line. As commander of the Philip reported, “The meat course was the 
least popular. The majority asked for more soup, bread, and vegetables. Hot soup was 
most in demand. Ice cream was the natural favorite of the children.”315 
 Before the Philip could set sail for Kwajalein, eighteen additional Rongelapese, 
fishing in the lagoon of nearby Ailinginae Atoll, had to be located and brought aboard the 
Philip. Once this second group was boarded, the Philip left for Kwajalein, arriving at 8:30 
am on March 4
th, nearly seventy two hours after Bravo’s detonation. “The Marshallese,” 
the Philip’s commander wrote, “were excellent passengers, most cooperative, never 
demanding, and exemplary in conduct.” The evacuation of Rongelap created a third 
Marshallese Diaspora, one that continues today.
316
 
 When aerial monitoring confirmed high levels of radioactivity on a third atoll, 
Utirik, a second destroyer escort, the USS Renshaw, was dispatched with orders to 
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evacuate the atoll. The Renshaw, which sailed from Enewetak, arrived on the morning of 
March 4
th
, and, like the Philip, was met by a PBY carrying a Trust Territory official and 
interpreter.
317
 Radiation readings taken by the ship’s crew confirmed the need to evacuate 
the islanders. The process was much like what occurred at Rongelap the previous day, but 
was complicated by the fact that the Renshaw could not navigate the entrance to the 
atoll’s lagoon, forcing the evacuation to take place over the open ocean. The 154 natives 
of Utirik, beginning with the women and children, were loaded on rafts, floated over a 
reef, and then transferred to whale boats capable of reaching the Renshaw’s anchorage. 
Wind and waves hampered the evacuation nearly capsizing two rafts. Still, all of the 
natives were aboard the Renshaw in just over two hours, leaving behind the most “forlorn 
set of dogs as you have ever seen.” 
 
Figure 42. USS Renshaw. LANL Archives. 
 Immediately after setting course for Kwajalein, the crew of the Renshaw fed their 
new passengers meat loaf, bread, mashed potatoes, and oranges. The meat loaf went 
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untouched. The Utirik people were not as comfortable as the Rongelapese when it came 
to decontamination. It was a struggle to get them to take showers. The islanders ate a 
supper of boiled fish and rice followed by ice cream and cookies. After an uneventful 
night, they ate a large breakfast of hot cakes and bacon before arriving at Kwajalein. The 
commander of the Renshaw wrote of his passengers as they disembarked, “As they went 
over the side one could not help but observe and admire the innate dignity of these simple 
human beings and their naïve but forthright and optimistic attitude toward life.” When 
asked what he thought of his situation, the Utirik iroj replied, “The world, we think she 
start over again.”318 
 
 
Figure 43. Map showing atolls evacuated after Bravo. LANL Archives. 
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 A week after the evacuations, a third destroyer escort, the USS Nicholas, carried a 
radiological survey team to the Rongelap, Utirik, and Rongerik Atolls. Again, because of 
the trusteeship status, a Trust Territory representative met the Nicholas at Rongelap to 
oversee and authorize all actions. While the survey team conducted radiological 
assessments, the Nicholas’ crew secured the property and belongings the islanders were 
forced to leave behind and dealt with the livestock. At both Rongelap and Utirik, all 
native property was secured in houses, which were closed up to prevent damage by 
weather and livestock. All food stocks were dumped outside as feed for the chickens and 
pigs, and anything that could hold water, even clamshells, was filled with water. Dogs 
and cats were killed since they were a menace to the islanders’ chickens. Finally, water 
and soil samples were collected and tested for radioactivity.  At Rongerik, all food was 
dumped in the ocean and all equipment packed and placed aboard the Nicholas.
319
 
 The Nicholas returned again to Rongelap on March 25
th
 to conduct a more in-
depth radiological survey of the atoll and collect the domestic livestock and wild rats to 
evaluate their internal radioactive contamination. Six pigs and five chickens were 
captured. The lone boar, too big to capture and transport, was killed and autopsied. Soil, 
fruit, and vegetation specimens were collected as well. The Nicholas’ crew did not have 
enough time to capture any rats because the second of Castle’s tests, Romeo, was 
schedule for firing the next day, March 26
th
. The data collected on Rongelap confirmed 
that the atoll was seriously contaminated and could not be reoccupied in the near 
future.
320
 
                                                 
319
 Radsafe Survey 8-11 March 1954; LANL Archives. 
 
320
 Report of Rongelap Survey Trip 25-26 March 1954; LANL Archives. 
  201 
 
Dealing with the Complications 
The evacuations of the three atolls did not cause any immediate or apparent 
anxiety in Washington. General Kenneth Fields, the AEC’s Director of Military 
Applications, told Clarkson and Graves that although he anticipated “being pressed by 
higher authority for an explanation regarding the circumstances that led to the exposures 
of the natives, and why they were not evacuated in advance,” no one seemed particularly 
worried about the situation.
321
 In fact, no public announcement was even planned. Alvin 
Graves immediately protested, sending a strongly worded “eyes only” teletype to Fields 
arguing that openness about the situation was important. Specifically noting that the 
Soviet Union had dissented from the UN approval for the evacuation of the Enewetak 
people in 1948 and intended to review the outcome of the current situation, Graves said 
“I should regret very much the impression that we are being furtive in our actions with 
regard to these people.”322 
 Fields did not respond to Graves but, on March 11
th
, told Clarkson that the 
following statement had been released to the press: 
During the course of routine atomic tests in the Marshall 
Islands, 28 U.S. Personnel and 236 residents were 
transported from neighboring atolls to Kwajalein Island 
according to plans as a precautionary measure. These 
individuals were unexpectedly exposed to some 
radioactivity. There were no burns. All reported well. After 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
321
 TWX, Fields to Clarkson, LANL Archives, March 5, 1954 
 
322
 TWX, Graves to Fields, LANL Archives, March 5, 1954. 
 
  202 
completion of the atomic tests, they will be returned to their 
homes.
323
 
 
This statement was, in several respects, inaccurate beginning with the characterization of 
the tests as “routine.” These early thermonuclear tests, particularly Bravo, were highly 
speculative, their yields not well characterized prior to their detonations. Bravo’s fallout 
created an emergency situation and seriously disrupted the time table for the remaining 
Castle tests. The most disingenuous statements, however, were the characterizations of 
the evacuations a “precautionary measure” and that there were “no burns.” The 
evacuations were not precautionary, but emergencies. The high levels of contamination 
and exposures were serious, particularly for the islanders who had very little protection 
from Bravo’s fallout and were not evacuated until days after fallout began on their atolls. 
Particularly disingenuous was the statement about the absence of burns, since as Darol 
Froman noted during Sandstone, beta burns do not manifest themselves immediately. 
 This press release generated little public interest. Then, on March 16
th
, the 
Japanese press reported that a Japanese fishing trawler, ironically named No. 5 Fukuryu 
Maru (The Lucky Dragon), had somehow sailed undetected to within eighty miles of 
Bikini on the morning of March 1
st
. Like those persons on Rongelap, Rongerik, and 
Utirik, the ship’s crew was exposed to high concentrations of radioactive fallout. They 
reported that, “the skies in the west lighted up and a great flare of whitish yellow light 
splashed against the clouds and illuminated the water,” as if “the sun rose in the west.” A 
short time later, “the ship seemed to tremble as though shaken from below and a great 
sound wave enveloped the ship, seeming to come at once from above and below.” About 
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two hours after the detonation, falling ash began accumulating on the deck of their ship. 
One crewman likened it to a snowstorm, with footprints visible on the exposed deck.
324
 
 Not comprehending what had happened, the Lucky Dragon continued on, not 
returning to Japan until March 14
th
. By that time, the crew exhibited symptoms of 
sickness, including vomiting and hair loss. After examination by a local doctor, the crew 
was quarantined and late transferred to a Tokyo hospital. A reporter for the Yomiuri 
Shimbun, hearing rumors that the Lucky Dragon had been exposed to radioactivity, 
investigated the incident and broke the story in the paper’s March 16th morning edition.325 
When the story of the Lucky Dragon became public knowledge, all hell broke loose. The 
Japanese nation, sensitive to atomic detonations because of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was 
shocked and horrified that some of its people had once again become the victims of 
radiation from an atomic bomb. As the newspaper Asahi Shimbun reported, the Japanese 
people were “made to feel acutely once again the horrors an atom bomb.”326 
 The immediate question raised by the press release was the fate of the Lucky 
Dragon’s crew. Their exposures were not well documented by the doctors who examined 
them. The only evaluations of the nature and extent of their exposures were drawn from 
eyewitness accounts of the crew. Their medical treatment became a minor international 
dispute when Japanese doctors refused American offers of medical assistance. The 
Japanese medical community, smarting from a display of professional disrespect by 
American doctors who stopped a team of Japanese physicians from entering Hiroshima 
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and Nagasaki, absolutely refused to let American doctors examine the Lucky Dragon’s 
crew. This antipathy was made worse when one American scientist stated publicly that 
Japanese doctors were “not well equipped to deal properly with the radiological aspect of 
the problem.”327 What this same American scientist failed to mention was that there was 
no treatment for radiation exposures, other than to guard against infections. Ultimately, 
one of the Lucky Dragon’s crewmen died from an unidentified cause, although Japanese 
public opinion believed it to be from radiation. 
 A second repercussion of the Lucky Dragon incident, and one that exacerbated 
the already tense relations between Japan and the United States, was contaminated tuna. 
Once word spread that some contaminated tuna had reached Japan, millions stopped 
buying the fish. Some parents even forbid their children to swim in the Pacific.
328
 Making 
matters worse, Japan’s tuna export market collapsed when the United States imposed 
strict monitoring standards on tuna imports and, at the same time, increased the size of 
the exclusion zone around Bikini. Although the intent of expanding the inclusion zone 
was to prevent a repeat of the Lucky Dragon incident, Japan quickly objected, saying that 
the increased dimensions meant that nearly 300 tuna boats and sixty-five percent of the 
annual tuna catch had to make major detours around the exclusion zone, adding days to 
their voyages. When asked to comment on the Japanese complaint, Clarkson replied, we, 
JTF-7, “believe that the importance of atomic tests to our atomic weapon program and to 
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national security are such that tests should be conducted when our scientific laboratories 
desire them to be conducted.”329 The feeling of Japan and its people was summed up by a 
protest banner which said, “It doesn’t take a bullet to kill a fish seller. A bit of Bikini ash 
will do the job.”330 
 The third and longest lasting repercussion of the Lucky Dragon incident was a 
heightened world-wide awareness and fear of radiation fallout. While exposures to a few 
Marshallese islanders could be ignored, exposures to the Japanese fisherman could not. 
The people of world suddenly felt vulnerable when it became known that fallout from 
thermonuclear weapons, particularly stratospheric debris, might fall on them. Bravo and 
the remaining Castle thermonuclear tests created public anxiety as people everywhere 
struggled “to understand the perils of the H-bomb.” 331 Indian Prime Minister Nehru 
became the unofficial spokesperson for ending nuclear testing, asking very pointedly 
“how can we be sure that our children may not go gradually blind or contract some 
internal disease.”332 Nehru would make the issue of testing a concern of the third world 
which, of course, included the Marshall Islands. As noted by historian Robert Divine, 
people “seized on the potential hazard from the by-products of testing that floated back to 
earth in indiscriminate fashion, falling on rich and poor, strong and weak, Communist 
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and non-Communist alike.” Bravo’s indiscriminate fallout made became the catalyst for 
ending nuclear testing in the atmosphere. 
 Bravo prompted many questions. How did radioactive fallout contaminate so 
many atolls, ships, and people? Why had the Marshallese not been evacuated? What were 
the consequences of their exposures? How did the Lucky Dagon go undetected, and what 
were the consequences of exposure to radioactive fallout for its crew? And, because 
Bravo injected radioactive debris into the stratosphere, what were the consequences for 
the world? The many efforts to answer these questions have been debated, without 
resolution, for over sixty years, and the debate will doubtless continue. One thing that is 
clear, and places the entire catastrophe in perspective, is that Mike had introduced a new 
learning regime – that of thermonuclear testing - but the new regime went unrecognized. 
The learning regime of testing fission devices did not translate to the thermonuclear era. 
 It was easy to understand Mike as an explosive phenomenon, ushering in the 
thermonuclear age, but the test provided surprisingly little information about the 
phenomenon of radioactive fallout from a thermonuclear detonation. Local fallout was 
heavy, as it is with all above ground nuclear tests, but most of Mike’s radioactive 
contamination, about ninety-five percent, “seemed to have disappeared from the face of 
the Earth.” The common assumption was that the missing debris had been injected into 
the stratosphere, and trapped there where, it was further assumed, it would cool long 
before falling back to earth.
333
 Based on the radiological experience of Mike, it was 
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assumed that all of the Castle thermonuclear tests would behave in a similar fashion.
334
 
As Clarkson wrote, “It is anticipated that the shot hazards introduced into the Pacific 
Area during Operation Castle will, with one exception, closely parallel those encountered 
on the IVY-Mike shot.”335 It was this faulty assumption, based on the experience of only 
one thermonuclear test, which led to the contamination and emergency evacuations of 
Rongerik, Rongelap, and Utirik Atolls. The fallout from this assumption would lead to a 
test moratorium in 1958 and to the eventual abandonment of the Marshall Islands as a 
nuclear test site. This assumption, as well, made the plight of the Marshallese people 
visible to the world stage and thus gave them a political voice that became increasingly 
difficult to ignore. 
Radioactive Fallout  
Radioactive fallout is all of the material that the intense heat of a nuclear 
detonation vaporizes, makes radioactive, and thrusts into the sky, where it forms a 
mushroom cloud. As the mushroom cloud rises and cools, the vaporized material 
condenses, solidifies, and falls back to earth as radioactive fallout. The material in the 
mushroom cloud becomes radioactive by one of three phenomena: vaporization of any 
unconsumed nuclear material; activation, which is the process of making matter 
radioactive by the bombardment of neutrons released at the moment of detonation; and as 
the byproducts created by the fission process. The first phenomenon occurs at the 
moment of detonation when the intense heat of a nuclear detonation vaporizes the 
environment surrounding ground zero, including any unconsumed nuclear material of the 
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device, uranium or plutonium.
336
 This vaporized radioactive material rises into the sky 
and mixes with all of the other material entrained in the cloud. As the cloud rises and 
cools and the radioactive material, now mixed in with the other materials, condenses into 
particulate matter that is radioactive. 
The second phenomenon, activation, creates hundreds of radioactive isotopes 
when elemental atoms are bombarded by neutrons. These isotopes also are part of the 
mushroom cloud and become a major constituent of fallout. Two of these radioactive 
isotopes, 
90
Sr and 
137
Ce, are of particular concern because they can negatively impact 
human health. Strontium, because it is chemically similar to calcium, is a “bone seeker.” 
The human body readily absorbs strontium and deposits it in bones. Once lodged in 
bones, the beta particles thrown off by strontium can cause cancer. For children, whose 
skeletal structure is still forming, strontium is a very nasty element. Cesium, another beta 
emitter, seeks out soft tissue and also can cause cancer. Both 
90
Sr and 
137
Ce are 
significant problems because their very long half-lives make any land area they 
contaminate uninhabitable for long periods of time.
337
 The chart below lists the most 
common isotopes created by activation.
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Table 9 
Principle Fission Products 
 
Isotope Symbol Half Life 
Strontium 
89
Sr 53 days 
Strontium 
90
Sr
 
28 years 
Yttrium 
90
Y
 
64.2 hours 
Yttrium 
91
Y
 
57 days 
Niobium 
95
Nb
 
65 days 
Zirconium 
95
Zr
 
35 days 
Molybdenum 
99
Mo
 
68.3 hours 
Ruthenium 
103
Ru
 
39.8 days 
Ruthenium 
106
Ru
 
1 year 
Rhodium 
103
Rh
 
57 minutes 
Rhodium 
106
Rh
 
30 seconds 
Tellurium 
132
Te
 
77.7 hours 
Iodine 
131
I
 
8.1 days 
Iodine 
132
I
 
2.4 hours 
Xenon 
133
Xe
 
5.27 days 
Cesium 
137
Cs
 
30 years 
Barium 
137
Ba
 
2.6 minutes 
Barium 
140
Ba
 
12.8 days 
Lanthanum 
140
La
 
40 hours 
Cerium 
141
Ce
 
32.5 days 
Cerium 
144
Ce
 
290 days 
Praseodymium 
143
Pr
 
13.7 days 
Praseodymium 
144
Pr
 
17.5 minutes 
Neodymium 
147
Nd
 
11 days 
Promethium 
147
Pm
 
2.6 years 
Promethium 
149
Pm
 
54 hours 
 
The third phenomenon, the creation of radioactive by-products, occurs when 
atoms of uranium or plutonium are split. The splitting of a uranium atom, for instance, 
produces radioactive isotopes of barium and krypton. These byproducts are radiologically 
very hot and have very short half lives. The two isotopes of barium have half lives 
measured in minutes and days. These by-products do not present a human health hazard 
because they fallout close to ground zero and cool quickly. 
  210 
The total amount of debris produced by a nuclear detonation is determined by the 
energy yield of the test device and where the device is detonated. Explosions with energy 
yields up to 500 kilotons, if detonated on or close to the earth’s surface, vaporize tens of 
thousands of tons of debris and lift that debris to varying heights in the troposphere, 
usually no greater than 30,000 feet. Debris injected into the troposphere begins circling 
the earth generally at the latitude of the detonation and falls out relatively quickly. Hence, 
most of the radioactive debris from the fission devices tested at Bikini and Enewetak fell 
out over the vast Pacific. The behavior of fallout for fission devices was quite well 
understood before Bravo and was a major component of the fission learning regime. 
Explosions with energy yields above 500 kilotons, if detonated at or near the surface, can 
produce millions of tons of radioactive debris- a hundred times more than smaller devices 
– and they inject it into the stratosphere, typically above 60,000 feet, where it is trapped 
for an undetermined amount of time. This knowledge was the extent of the thermonuclear 
regime derived from Mike’s explosion phenomenology. Mike, however, did not reveal 
any information about the longevity of stratospheric trapping. Bravo showed that 
stratospheric trapping was not an absolute outcome. 
A third constraint on the amount of radioactive fallout is the fact that fallout is 
produced by only ten percent of the energy yield of any one detonation. In every nuclear 
explosion fifty percent of the energy given off is in the form of blast waves. Blast waves 
account for almost all of the destruction caused by nuclear weapons. Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki were destroyed by the blast waves generated by Little Boy and Fat Man that hit 
both cities like giant hammers. Thirty five percent of the energy from a nuclear 
detonation is given off as heat and light. These energy forms are extremely destructive as 
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well. The intense heat, of course, vaporizes everything in the surrounding vicinity of a 
detonation. The intense light given off by a nuclear detonation can cause both temporary 
and permanent blindness. Bradbury, among others, had suggested in 1945 that the 
Japanese be “tricked” into looking at the sky at the moment Little Boy and Fat Man 
exploded to produce blindness.
339
 The remaining fifteen percent of energy from a nuclear 
detonation is given off in the form of very high energy known as ionizing radiation. This 
ionizing radiation consists of two forms – prompt (five percent) and delayed (ten 
percent). Prompt radiation is produced at the moment of detonation chiefly in the form of 
gamma rays and neutrons. Prompt radiation is lethal near the point of detonation, but 
quickly loses its energy as it moves further from ground zero. Delayed radiation in the 
form of alpha particles, beta particles, and other radioactive isotopes are created in the 
immediate aftermath of a nuclear detonation. Delayed radiation, then, which constitutes 
the radioactive fallout, comes from less than ten percent of the energy released from a 
nuclear detonation.  The table below summarizes this radiation.
 340
 
 
Table 10 
 
Radioactivity 
Form Characteristic(s) Hazard Source 
Alpha Particles +2 Charge Internal Pu, U, and 
Activation 
Beta Particles -1 Charge Internal and 
External 
Activation 
Gamma Rays No charge or mass Whole Body Prompt  
Neutrons No charge  Whole Body Prompt 
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Since these phenomena were relatively well understood, why did Bravo prove a 
radiological disaster? The answer is that the experience of Mike was accepted without 
question. Mike was detonated on the surface, entrained millions of tons of coral and sand 
in its mushroom cloud, and injected the debris into the stratosphere, where it remained, 
apparently trapped. This phenomenon, known as stratospheric trapping, was thought to 
occur because of a temperature inversion between the troposphere and the stratosphere. 
Whereas the troposphere gets colder with altitude, the stratosphere does just the opposite. 
The temperature inversion between the troposphere and the stratosphere was thought 
sufficiently strong enough to prevent radioactive particles from falling back to earth. 
The Decision not to Evacuate 
 The decision not to evacuate Rongelap, Rongerik, and Utirik for the Castle tests 
was made by the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), Admiral Felix B. 
Stump. Like all military organizations, JTF-7 reported to multiple higher authorities. One 
of those higher authorities was CINCPAC, who provided the ships of JTF-7, specifically 
those used for security patrols around Bikini and Enewetak. Stump did not order 
evacuations based on his discussions with JTF-7 about past radiological experiences and 
a “policy of austerity in all phases of the operation dictated by recent reductions in fiscal 
year 1954 service budgets.” As Stump explained, “The decision to evacuate Ujelang 
[during Ivy] was predicated not only on reducing health hazards to the indigenes to an 
acceptable minimum, but also to protect them from possible radiation hazards beyond the 
shadow of any adverse reflections on the U.S. government.” Since there were  no adverse 
reflections, Stump ordered that “No special efforts will be implemented by JTF-7 in 
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support of …evacuation of native populations.” 341 In the event that any natives had to be 
evacuated, JTF-7 was, however, authorized to use its Stump’s ships The Philip and 
Renshaw were those ships. 
 The commanding officer of Task Force 7, Major General Percy Clarkson, 
authorized the firing of Bravo also based on past experience. As he noted, “The 
operational aspects of the Bravo experience were planned and conceived in the light of 
experience from previous operations.”342 But, Clarkson also noted in retrospect, this 
experience was limited and included only one thermonuclear detonation – Mike. In 
responding to General Field’s question about why the inhabited atolls were not 
temporarily evacuated for Bravo, Clarkson told Fields, “The Natives were not evacuated 
because, on the basis of information available to us, it was not considered necessary and 
no significant fallout was expected on inhabited areas.”343 Only one person, Los Alamos 
scientist William Ogle, the Technical Director for Castle, worried about a radiological 
catastrophe. Ogle, like his immediate superior, Graves, came to Los Alamos in 1944 and 
had played a small part in Trinity. He witnessed firsthand all of the Pacific tests, and his 
technical knowledge and testing experience were second to none, including that of 
Graves. Ogle was concerned about what could happen when the large Castle devices 
were detonated and thought it was simply luck that had prevented any radiological 
disasters to date. 
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Pathology and Exposure 
 Human exposure to radioactive contamination occurs by two general pathways:  
external contact and ingestion. External contact occurs when radioactive debris falls like 
dust and coats whatever it touches. External exposures typical occur when humans come 
into contact with any surface, such as vegetation, that is coated with fallout. All of the 
people of Rongerik, Rongelap, and Utirik were contaminated in this fashion. The major 
concern with external exposures is prolonged contact with beta particles, which produce 
burns. Because beta particles have little penetrating energy, clothing and shoes provide a 
great deal of protection. However, beta particles cling to whatever surface they fall on 
and continue to cause damage until washed off. The second manner of exposure is the 
ingestion of food and water contaminated by fallout. Whereas external exposures are 
usually limited to beta particles, eating and drinking contaminated food and water 
introduces radioactive strontium and cesium to bones and internal organs, and this can 
lead to cancer. This second exposure pathway was significant for the Marshallese, 
particularly for the people of Rongelap, who cooked and ate outdoors and drank from 
uncovered cisterns. 
Ten sailors working on the flight deck of the USS Bairoko were exposed to beta 
particles when they remained on the ship’s flight deck securing the ship’s helicopters 
after fallout was detected. Fortunately, by Navy dress code, they were relatively well 
protected simply because they wore pants, shoes, and shirts with long sleeves. Their beta 
burns occurred generally around the waist, when shirts had became untucked, and around 
the backs of necks. Even though these men remained on the flight deck for several hours 
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before they went through the decontamination station, their burns were relatively minor 
and they were eventually returned to duty.
344
 
 The twenty six military service personnel and two civilians stationed on Rongerik 
as part of a weather outpost also were fortunate. Like the men on the Bairoko, these men 
wore regulation uniforms, including long-sleeved shirts. They also had the presence of 
mind to stay indoors, protected by the roofs of their living quarters. Both factors 
significantly reduced their exposure to beta radiation, and none received any burns. Their 
exposures came from contact with contaminated soil and vegetation. Their film badges 
recorded very high readings from walking between shelters. Even though rescue came 
thirty hours after Bravo exploded, they were relatively unaffected. All of these men were 
ultimately returned to active duty, and no long term studies of their health were ever 
conducted.
345
 
 The men on Rongerik also were exposed to an additional, potentially harmful 
effect – the intense light given off by a nuclear explosion. Even though Rongerik is 
approximately 120 miles from ground zero, Bravo’s light was intense. One man, coming 
out of the washroom had to protect his eyes against the bright light. The potential of eye 
damage from the bright light of a nuclear explosion had been known since the Trinity test 
in 1945 and would later play a role in abandoning the Pacific Proving Ground as a 
nuclear test site. 
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Conditions on Rongelap and Utirik were much different. The islanders did not 
wear long sleeved shirts and often went barefoot. They also had no idea that they should 
take cover, although the thatched roofs of their houses would have provided adequate 
protection. The food and water they consumed was unprotected and subsequently 
contaminated. The well on Rongelap, for instance, was uncovered, and drinking water 
became contaminated. The JTF had not given any instructions or advice to the islanders 
on how to protect themselves in the event of fallout. As a consequence, the people of both 
atolls carried on their normal lives until evacuated by the Philip and Renshaw. As a 
result, the people of Rongelap and Utirik experienced both external and internal 
exposures for a considerable period of time. Initial estimates calculated their 
contamination levels ten times more than the men on Rongerik.
346
 
The people of Utirik fared a bit better overall than their Rongelapese neighbors. 
Being further away from Bikini, they received a bit less fallout. In addition, their water 
well was covered, thereby reducing internal exposures. The people of Utirik also 
benefitted from being evacuated on the ocean side of their atoll. Although the ocean 
swells and waves had soaked every one during the evacuation, making their evacuation 
treacherous, the waves also washed off much of their external radiation in the process. 
Consequently, the Utirikians did not need to go through the same decontamination rigors 
experienced by the Rongelapese.  A survey of the Utirik people on March 30
th
 reported 
that “the necklace, scalp, [m]axillary and foot lesions observed and previously described 
in daily reports are believed to be due to radiation as a result of contamination with 
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fallout material.
347
 None of the Utirik people exhibited signs of radiation sickness and 
after a period of observation on Kwajalein, they were relocated to Ebeye Island until the 
conclusion of Castle. In the fall of 1954, they were allowed to return to their atoll. 
The Aftermath of Exposure 
 On March 5
th
, Clarkson flew to Kwajalein from his headquarters on Enewetak to 
personally assess the situation of the evacuated islanders. Clarkson reported finding the 
iroj of Utirik “in good spirits [who] with great delight discussed his reactions to the light 
and bang.” When Clarkson asked John, the iroj of Rongelap, what he felt after Bravo, 
John “reached out and gave me a push.” A representative of the AEC’s Division of 
Military Application, who accompanied Clarkson to Kwajalein, reported that the “health 
situation of the natives is satisfactory … [and] there were no symptoms of radiation 
sickness.” The islanders asked Clarkson “when could go they back to their islands,” 
expressing concern about their livestock and valuables. Clarkson had no answers, telling 
them only that their atolls had to be surveyed and that they could not return until after the 
completion of test operations. After having his picture taken with a number of the natives, 
Clarkson returned to his headquarters convinced that the native situation had been dealt 
with appropriately.”348 
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Figure 44. Clarkson talking to Rongelap natives. LANL Archives. 
  219 
 
Figure 45. Clarkson with Rongelap children. LANL Archives. 
Five days after his visit, Clarkson again reported on the condition of the 
Natives, saying: 
Great efforts being made to keep natives comfortable on Kwaj. They are 
contented. Utirik group will be sent to nearby island Ebeye when High 
Commissioner [of the trust territory] directs and studied intermittently. 
Rongelap group retained Kwaj for intensive study by AEC/DOD research 
team. No decision as to time of return to home islands. Recommend wait 
until after series completed then recheck radiation levels again.
349
 
 
However, the situation soon deteriorated. On March 13th, the first urinalysis 
report showed that the Rongelapese had suffered internal contamination caused by 
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ingestion of iodine, plutonium, strontium, and barium.
350
 On March 15
th
, Bill 
Ogle told Bradbury that although no radiation burns had been reported, two adults 
and five children were experiencing hair loss. In addition, physical examinations 
of the natives had found widespread impetigo among the children and pulmonary 
disease in the adults.
351
 On March 19, Clarkson reported to the Chairman of the 
AEC that:  “two four Rongelap natives epilating [losing hair]. In areas of 
epolation [sic] unusually dry, pigmented, popular, scaling lesions are appearing in 
folds of neck and extending outwards.” He concluded, oddly, that “all natives are 
feeling well.”352 The outward signs of exposure reached their peak at the 
beginning of April. A TWX message reported that while none of the 
Rongelapese: showed signs of radiation sickness, although “[Thirty two] have 
shown varying degrees of epilation [sic]. Many have stopped epilating. Two of 
[eighteen] Ailinginae have shown slight epilation. Skin lesions involve scalp, 
forehead, neck, feet and toes. Three Rongelapese have lesions on one or more 
sites.”353 
 Another TWX message said that the white cell counts continued very low, 
and resembled chronic radiation sickness. However, as this same message 
revealed, the white cell counts were no longer dropping.
354
 By April 5
th
, the skin 
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lesions were “definitely regressing.” Even though all of the Rongelapese were 
suffering from colds, there were no serious complications.
355
 
 By April 12
th
, the health condition of the Rongelap people had stabilized 
even though white cell counts were slow in returning to normal. At the request of 
Graves, the head of the health division at Los Alamos, Doctor Thomas Shipman, 
prepared a study, “Project Hardy (The Return of the Native),” to help determine 
when the Rongelap people could return to their atoll. A primary assumption of the 
study was that “it seems impossible that the natives can be returned to Rongelaap 
[sic] before September or October [1954] at the very earliest.” A survey party sent 
to Rongelap on April 14
th
 found long-lived contamination and recommended that 
their “return be delayed for at least one year.” The delay lasted four years. The 
Rongelap people returned to their homes in 1957, but remained wary of 
radioactive contamination.
 356
 When contamination did not completely disappear, 
the Rongelapese, with the assistance of Greenpeace, left their homes again in 
1985, and continue to wait in exile until their atoll can be decontaminated. 
Bravo’s Radiological Ramifications 
Bravo represented a key turning point in the history of nuclear testing because of 
the consequences of fallout. While the danger to American servicemen was apparently 
limited and effectively minimized by the AEC’s public statements, that was not true for 
the Marshallese people and the crew of the Lucky Dragon. It was the damage to the 
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Japanese fishermen, with echoes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the collateral economic 
consequences that stirred international and American concerns. Although the AEC 
continued to issue disingenuous claims about the incident, American public opinion 
began emerging from its anticommunist paranoia to recognize the potential danger of 
nuclear weapons and their testing in the atmosphere. 
The Marshallese suffered the most serious physical and psychological harm, and 
the responsibility for that was never fully revealed or assigned. No one involved in 
conducting the tests, including Admiral Stump, General Clarkson, and Al Graves were 
ever seriously questioned about Bravo, either about the lack of adequate preparation and 
safeguard, or about the very long time it took to evacuate Rongelap and Utirik. The delay 
in the evacuations, compounded by being shoeless and their cooking and eating habits 
exposed these islanders to significantly more radioactivity than the American servicemen. 
No one in the JTF ever talked to the islanders about how to cope with fallout if it should 
appear. Despite Grave’s protest, the Division of Military Applications and the AEC down 
played the radiological exposures to the Marshallese. Questions continue to be asked 
about the long term effects of exposure to fallout including the incidence of birth defects 
and cancer. The people of Bikini, Enewetak, and Rongelap suffered a loss of land and 
culture, a loss that continues, as does the fear that Bravo’s fallout could still have latent 
health effects. 
The sole positive aspect of Bravo, for the Marshallese, was that international 
awareness pushed the United Nations to begin paying closer attention to their plight, but 
it would take four more years before testing would end. The strategic trusteeship that 
gave the United States seemingly unlimited authority in the Marshall Islands, also gave 
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the Marshallese the right to protest the use of their nation as ground zero sites. Before 
Bravo, such protests were easily squashed by the United States. After Bravo, such 
protests could not be ignored. The Marshallese protest was taken up by the third world, 
particularly India. The result was a growing demand to end testing. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE END OF TESTING: REDWING, HARDTACK I, AND SILENCE 
The two years between the conclusion of Operation Castle in 1954 and the 
beginning of Operation Redwing in 1956 saw a significant three-part transformation of 
the nation’s nuclear weapon program. The first transformation was a change in the 
development of atomic bombs. Beginning with Trinity and lasting through Castle, atomic 
bombs were the exclusive product of scientific research and development. Beginning 
with Redwing, atomic bombs became commodities tailored to meet military 
requirements. This transformation was clearly apparent when a B-52 strategic bomber 
dropped a thermonuclear bomb, codenamed Cherokee, over the tiny Bikini atoll island of 
Namu on May 20, 1956. Cherokee gave the United States a deliverable thermonuclear 
weapon, fulfilling the goal of the Emergency Capability Program, begun three years 
before.
357
 After Operation Castle, noted by LASL mathematician Stan Ulam, the co-
inventor of the hydrogen bomb, “One cannot help feeling that the field of weapon design 
is being exhausted and at least without a relatively new idea, there will be no big 
surprises.”358 
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The second transformation was the participation the University of California 
Radiation Laboratory (UCRL) in nuclear testing as an equal to Los Alamos. The UCRL 
was created to provide competition to Los Alamos. The idea of providing competition 
originated with Edward Teller, and two other University of California professors, E. O. 
Lawrence and Herbert York, who were disenchanted with the speed of thermonuclear 
work at Los Alamos. When the AEC refused to create a second laboratory, Teller took 
his cause to both the Joint Committee and the Department of Defense. Both saw the need 
for competition and successfully forced the AEC to change its mind.
359
 Under Teller’s 
tutelage, the new laboratory sought to differentiate itself from Los Alamos by advancing 
radical weapon designs as well as very large yield hydrogen bombs. The upshot of this 
strategy was that three of its first four tests, including the Castle-Koon event, failed. 
Koon’s failure abruptly ended UCRL’s brief participation in Castle. However, UCRL 
scientists learned from their experience and became, during Redwing and Hardtack I, an 
equal participant in the nuclear test program. With the creation of the UCRL and its 
continued operation of Los Alamos, the University of California played an exclusive role 
in the nation’s nuclear weapons program until 2007.360 
The third transformation was the persistent and growing worldwide concern about 
radioactive fallout. This concern, of course was not new, having originated with 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but now had to be factored into the conduct of 
nuclear tests. Los Alamos responded by developing and testing “clean” versions of some 
                                                 
359
 Peter Westwick, The National Labs: Science in an American System, 1947-1974 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2003), 123-127. 
 
360
 In 2007 the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semi-independent arm of the DOE, turned over 
management of the Los Alamos Laboratory to a privately held LLC.   
 
  226 
atomic bombs. This third transformation led to a moratorium on testing that began in late 
1958 and continued until late 1961. The moratorium was, essentially, a gentleman’s 
agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, one that was only “a 
symbolic obstacle against the spread of nuclear weapons.”361 
These transformations had two ramifications for the Marshallese. The first 
ramification was an increase in the number of tests conducted at Bikini and Enewetak. 
Redwing’s seventeen tests equaled the combined total number of tests conducted during 
Crossroads, Sandstone, Greenhouse, and Ivy. Hardtack’s thirty five tests equaled the total 
number including those of Redwing. The increase in the number of tests was the result of 
a second weapon laboratory conducting its own tests and because of the new emphasis on 
weapon development that required the testing of many different types of weapons. The 
second ramification was especially significant for the Marshallese because it increased 
the total amount of energy expended at Bikini and Enewetak. The combined energy 
yields of Redwing and Hardtack, 50 megatons, was very near the 59 megatons expended 
in all previous operations. 
Military Requirements 
 Recognizing that nature had no more deep secrets, such as fission and fusion, to 
exploit, the AEC and the DOD redefined the nation’s nuclear weapons program, 
codifying it in “An Agreement between the AEC and the DOD for the Development, 
Production, and Standardization of Atomic Weapons.” The objective of the agreement 
was to “delineate the responsibilities to be assumed by the AEC and the DOD 
respectively in connection with the determination of programs for proposed atomic 
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weapons, their development, test, standardization, and production in accordance with 
military requirements.”362 The agreement represented a shift from the supply-side 
economics of scientific discovery to the demand-side economics of military 
requirements. 
 Military requirements for nuclear weapons during the 1950s were of two general 
types. The first requirement was for specialized weapons, such as a nuclear-tipped 
torpedo to destroy submarines.
363
 The second requirement was for weapons that could be 
matched to an ever growing variety of delivery platforms. The huge and relatively slow 
strategic bombers, the B-50 and B-36 were being replaced by smaller and faster jet 
propelled aircraft such as the B-47, B-52, and B-57.
364
 An even more significant change 
in delivery platforms was rocketry. Ballistic missiles first used by Germany during World 
War II, were being developed by both the United States and the Soviet Union. The 
United States Air Force was particularly interested in nuclear-tipped missiles as a way to 
differentiate itself from the other armed services, and used the need for nuclear warheads 
as part of the Defense Department’s argument for a second weapons laboratory. 
The growing influence of military requirements on the testing program was 
apparent to Bradbury well before Redwing. Responding to a request from the head of the 
AEC’s Director of Military Applications, Colonel Kenneth Fields, for his thoughts on the 
future of nuclear weapons, Bradbury noted that “being uncertain as to just which tactical 
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employment (or employments) should have priority, [the military] has requested the 
development of practically every type of application conceivable.”365 The devices tested 
during Operations Redwing and Hardtack I were, as Bradbury characterized, of every 
conceivable type, providing the nation with a variety of nuclear weapons that would enter 
the stockpile beginning in 1959.
366
 
 A third and more specific military requirement, safety from an unintended 
detonation, became apparent when the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 allowed the military 
to take physical custody of nuclear weapons Before Redwing and Hardtack, nuclear 
weapons were prevented from detonating by the physical separation of a bomb’s nuclear 
material from the bomb’s high explosives until a complete weapon was required. AEC 
agents retained custody of nuclear material, even aboard bombers, until the material was 
placed inside the bomb casing, a process known as in-flight insertion. When technical 
advances made in-flight insertion impossible, control mechanisms had to developed that 
would prevent an accidental detonations. A number of tests conducted during Redwing 
and Hardtack were proof tests of built-in safety control mechanisms. The need for such 
mechanisms was more than evident when an Air Force B-36, on a routine flight south of 
Albuquerque, New Mexico, lost its thermonuclear bomb when the device broke its 
shackle and crashed through the bomb bay doors. The bomber, its back literally broken, 
landed in Albuquerque, never to fly again. The bomb, itself, broke into pieces on impact 
with ground, but did not explode. It was also evident when a B-52 bomber collided in 
mid air with an aerial tanker over Palomares, Spain. Four thermonuclear bombs fell from 
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the B-52 bomber. Three fell on the tomato fields of Palomares and one disappeared into 
the Atlantic. None of the bombs exploded, although the United States had to buy the 
region’s entire tomato crop when one of the bombs broke apart on impact and 
contaminated the surrounding area.
367
 A third and more chilling example of the need for 
safety mechanisms occurred when exploding rocket fuel punched an intercontinental 
missile with a thermonuclear warhead from its silo in Mississippi - through a seven 
hundred ton door.
368
 Although heavily damaged by the explosion and fire, the warhead 
did not detonate, although it took several harrowing hours to find. 
The New Weapons System: Los Alamos and the University of California Radiation 
Laboratory (UCRL) 
The most significant aspect of Redwing and Hardtack was the new role for the 
UCRL. Not surprisingly, Bradbury did not support the UCRL’s creation and its inclusion 
in the nation’s weapons program. As Bradbury told Fields, “in no research institution 
known to us is competition used as an incentive, because it is “wasteful of research 
talent,” and would mean the insulation of one group from another resulting in duplication 
and overlap of efforts as well as the failure to cross-fertilize staff with new ideas and 
developments.”369 The competitive environment generated by the creation of the UCRL 
was, as Bradbury had predicted, not beneficial. As a result of trying to differentiate itself 
from Los Alamos, the UCRL’s first bombs were costly failures, such as its Castle Koon 
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test, and did not lead to any major technical advances in nuclear weaponry.
370
 The 
competition created by the existence of the UCRL had yet an even more deleterious 
consequence. It created a lasting animosity between the two laboratories. 
 The catalyst for this animosity began with the reorganization of JTF-7 for 
Operation Redwing. The joint task force system created for Operation Crossroads had 
proved remarkably stable, with only relatively minor changes taking place between 1946 
and 1954. A primary reason for this stability was the unique and singular working 
relationship that had evolved between the military and Los Alamos, most particularly 
between Clarkson and Graves who worked together in Operations Greenhouse, Ivy, and 
Castle. Their working relationship had melded the competing interests of the military and 
the AEC into a unified effort. The introduction of a second laboratory changed this 
working relationship, leading to a major reorganization of Joint Task Force 7. 
The reorganization began when Clarkson retired shortly after the completion of 
Castle and ending the Army’s role as the nation’s executive organization for nuclear 
testing. By informal custom, responsibility for nuclear testing rotated among the military 
branches.
371
 Redwing, by this custom, became the responsibility of the Navy with Rear 
Admiral Charles (Swede) Momsen assuming command of JTF-7 in July 1954. Momsen’s 
appointment lasted just over a year, as he marked time until his retirement in September 
1955. In his brief time Momsen created the first serious rift in the here-to-for smooth 
military-civilian working relationship when, in December 1954 he formally requested 
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that “criminal jurisdiction over civilians in the Pacific Proving Ground be transferred to 
the military.” Civilians living and working in the Marshall Islands, including those of Los 
Alamos, were subject to Trust Territory law. Momsen told the Chief of Naval Operations 
“that a serious problem exists concerning criminal jurisdiction over civilians within the 
area of the Pacific Proving Grounds,” because of divided authority between the JTF and 
the Trust Territory of the Pacific. Momsen believed strongly in a unified command and 
argued that the commander of the JTF should be the ultimate authority in the Pacific 
Proving Ground.
372
 From the Los Alamos perspective, Momsen’s claim made no sense. 
Major crime and espionage were nonexistent and had been since 1946 Crossroads tests. 
All civilians had security clearances, were continually vetted by the AEC, and had never 
posed a criminal threat. And, of course, the Marshallese were never a problem. However, 
Momsen claimed, sensibly from a military perspective, that as the commanding officer of 
JTF-7, he should have complete control over all aspects of his command, including 
criminal jurisdiction over civilians. 
Alvin Graves responded for the AEC, giving Momsen a civics lesson in the 
process saying “that such a concentration of executive, legislative, and judicial power is 
contrary to American principles, especially since there was no “serious inadequacies of 
the present jurisdictional arrangements.”373 Graves’s argument carried the day and the 
Chief of Naval Operations let the issue die. But, it was remembered by Los Alamos. 
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During Redwing, a number of Los Alamos scientists created a flag with six stars and flew 
it near the two-star flag of the rear admiral who commanded JTF-7. The Los Alamos flag 
had its desired effect – enraging the admiral all the while knowing he could not punish 
the offenders.
374
 
 When Momsen retired, he was replaced by Rear Admiral B. Hall (Red) Hanlon. 
Bowing to the reality that military requirements now governed nuclear weapons 
development and testing, the AEC abandoned its practice of naming a scientific director 
and named Hanlon as its senior representative. This appointment eliminated the division 
of authority that existed between the task force commander and the scientific director. 
Although the task force commander always held final authority, this only became 
effective after the scientific director turned over custody of the test device. The position 
of scientific director was replaced with the position of Deputy Task Force Commander 
for Scientific Matters, who reported exclusively to the task force commander. Graves was 
appointed to this position, but had to resign because of a heart attack and was replaced by 
William Ogle.
375
 As a deputy task force commander, Ogle worked for JTF and not for his 
nominal employer, Los Alamos, a fact that the UCRL would later question. 
The specific change to the task force structure, and the one that ignited the 
animosity between the two laboratories, was the creation of the Task Group system to 
carry out the major activities of Redwing. Task Group 7.1 (TG 7.1), the Scientific Task 
Group, co-located the work of Los Alamos and the UCRL. The commander of TG 7.1, 
Galen Felt who, in this capacity, also worked for the JTF rather than his nominal 
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employer, Los Alamos. After a series of decisions by Felt, the UCRL bitterly disputed his 
organizational loyalty. Felt was a scientist, not a diplomat and as the task group 
commander made a number of rational personnel decisions without consulting the senior 
UCRL scientist, Gerald Johnson, who believed that the decisions were both arbitrary and 
capricious and not in the best interests of the UCRL. When Johnson protested Felt’s 
actions to Ogle, he was rebuffed. Still believing that Felt’s decisions were purposely 
relegating the UCRL to secondary status, Johnson lodged a bitter complaint with his 
boss, the director of the UCRL, Herbert York. York, in turn, passed on Johnson’s 
complaints to Felt, who tried, unsuccessfully, to explain the situation in his rational 
physicist manner. Although Felt freely acknowledged the existence of “extraordinarily 
diverse interests” between Los Alamos and the UCRL, he nonetheless refused to give any 
credence to Johnson’s and York’s complaint.376 The dust-up, while relatively minor, 
occurred at an early stage of the Los Alamos UCRL relationship and tainted all futures 
interactions. Los Alamos never fully accepted the equal status of the UCRL and that 
institution thereafter would go to great lengths to separate itself intellectually and 
physically from Los Alamos. 
The UCRL quest for separation dovetailed with an ongoing effort by the DMA to 
find a new test site. Among other things, the introduction of high altitude testing 
introduced the hazard of flash blindness, making both Enewetak and Bikini less and less 
suitable as test sites. The UCRL investigated the area north of the Brooks Range and east 
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of Point Barrow in Alaska, but found the area unsuitable because of is weather.
377
 JTF-7, 
at the direction of the DMA, investigated the Tristan da Cunha group of islands located in 
the South Atlantic as well as a number of islands in the Pacific including Malden and 
Starbuck. The Tristan da Cunha group was ruled out because of “unfavorable or 
topographic reasons.” The islands also were populated and under the control of Great 
Britain. Malden and Starbuck islands also were ruled out for similar reasons.
378
 The 
upshot of these investigations was that there was no geographical location sufficiently 
better than the Marshall Islands to warrant development of another remote site. 
By chance, the UCRL was investigating a third Marshallese Atoll, Taongi, for its 
very large thermonuclear devices.
379
 Taongi is the most remote of all the Marshallese 
atolls, lying nearly 300 miles north and east of Bikini.
380
 Desolate and dry, Taongi was 
never inhabited. Early in World War II, Taongi was part Japan’s Ribbon Defense, serving 
as a very small seaplane base and weather station. Too remote to be of any military value, 
the atoll was abandoned by the Japanese Navy in early 1943.
381
 Taongi was not unknown 
to the AEC and JTF-7. It had been briefly considered for Operation Castle, but had been 
dismissed because of its small land area. The UCRL, however, believed that the atoll’s 
remote location and prevailing wind patterns were nearly ideal and its lack of real estate 
could be compensated for. 
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Figure 46. Taongi Sea Chart. LANL Archives. 
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Both the AEC and JTF-7 supported the UCRL’s investigation of Taongi since 
Bikini might soon prove unsuitable because of the likely repatriation of the Rongelap 
people planned for 1957. If that happened, the UCRL believed, the AEC might impose 
“severe limitations on future use of Bikini, including a cap on the energy yield of test 
devices”382 The proximity of Bikini to Rongelap also posed the problem of eye burns to 
the atoll’s natives from the light flashes of high altitude tests. The only possible way to 
prevent eye burns was to make sure the Rongelapese “were gathered together and faced 
away from the target area at shot time.” Coordinating the protection of the islanders with 
zero times was particularly difficult in an environment where instant communications 
were nearly impossible and since zero times often were delayed.”383 A second reason the 
AEC and JTF-7 supported the investigation of Taongi was that the atoll’s remote location 
and wind directions were indeed much more favorable than those of Bikini. Assuming the 
winds cooperated, fallout from a test would travel more than a thousand miles over an 
empty ocean before making landfall. And, finally, since as many as thirty tests were 
being considered for Hardtack, a third test site offered the means of conducting such a 
large number of tests in the shortest possible time.
384
 
The AEC authorized surveys of the atoll by both the Scripps Institute and the 
United States Navy. These surveys confirmed the issues that were already known: a 
shallow channel, a shallow lagoon, and very little land area. The UCRL did not consider 
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any of these problems. The problem of the shallow access channel could be overcome by 
operating aboard ships in the open ocean around Taongi. While somewhat difficult, the 
technology was available to do so. The UCRL further proposed detonating its first device 
in the lagoon’s entrance, followed by successive underwater tests that would excavate the 
entrance and a channel. Subsequent shots would further excavate the lagoon. Despite its 
many advantages, the possible use of Taongi was abandoned for budgetary reasons and 
then rendered moot when the Pacific Proving Ground was abandoned in the wake of the 
1958 test moratorium.  
Concern about Fallout 
 The final transformation that affected both Redwing and Hardtack was the 
heightened worldwide concern about fallout that threatened to severely restrict, if not 
end, nuclear testing. Scientists involved with the development and testing of nuclear 
devices, particularly Edward Teller, did not believe that atmospheric fallout was a public 
health issue. Other scientists, notably Linus Pauling, as well as a significant portion of the 
world, believed just the opposite. Neither view was entirely correct, or conversely, 
entirely wrong.
385
 Harm to the public from fallout could neither be proved nor disproved. 
However, both laboratories, particularly Los Alamos, reacted to the public’s concern by 
seeking to reduce the amount of radioactivity its tests put into the atmosphere. One 
method was to increase the use of barges as ground zero sites, the other was to develop 
and test “clean” devices. By using barges and testing clean devices, Los Alamos hoped to 
alleviate public fear and forestall a test moratorium. 
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 Although barges were first used to conserve real estate, they proved effective as 
means of reducing fallout. Still, they were not without problems. Because they reduced 
the need for real estate, barges increased the total number of tests that could be conducted 
during any one operation. Furthermore, barge shots reduced, but did not eliminate, 
radioactive fallout. Even though sea water contains very little solid matter, the megaton 
yields of test devices vaporized millions of tons of sea water. The sheer volume of the 
entrained sea water provided a substantial amount of solid material which, along with the 
vaporized barge and the unconsumed portions of the test device, became radioactive. 
Finally, and somewhat ironically, barges did not eliminate the need for real estate. 
 
 
Figure 47. Test Apache, a barge shot at Enewetak. LANL Archives. 
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 Thirteen Redwing and Hardtack detonations required expensive instrumentation 
and had to be detonated on the surface. The May 4, 1954, Lacrosse detonation left a large 
crater in the reef off Enewetak island of Runit. The Seminole test of June 1955, 
consumed a significant chunk of another Enewetak island – Bogin. Seminole’s crater 
quickly filled with sea water, creating a lake in the middle of what little was left of the 
island. The May 1958 Cactus test, conducted immediately adjacent to the Lacrosse crater, 
consumed a significant portion of Runit Island.
386
 
 
 
Figure 48. Lacrosse Device with Line-of-Sight Pipes. LANL Archives. 
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Figure 49. Lacrosse Test set-up on Runit reef. LANL Archives. 
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Figure 50. Seminole. LANL Archives. 
 
The second response, primarily by Los Alamos, to the concern about fallout was 
the testing of clean thermonuclear bombs. Since most radioactive contamination, 
particularly 
90
Strontium and 
137
Cesium, comes from the fission process, bombs were 
fashioned that derived less energy yield from fission and more from fusion. If tests 
produced less fallout, Los Alamos reasoned, public concern would abate and atmospheric 
testing could continue.
387
 The desire to convince the public that clean bombs worked as 
advertised led the AEC to invite a delegation from the United Nations to observe the 
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detonation of a clean bomb during Hardtack and then analyze bomb’s debris.  Such 
analysis would show, it was planned, that American nuclear tests were not placing large 
amounts of radioactivity into the atmosphere. Planning for what was known as the United 
Nations Observer shot was well advanced before both Los Alamos and the Department of 
Defense forced its cancellation by arguing that allowing scientists from other countries to 
analyze bomb debris was tantamount to giving away American nuclear secrets.
388
 
Although the clean bomb tests produced marginally less fallout, such bombs made 
little technical or military sense. It is impossible to produce bombs which are actually 
clean because all thermonuclear devices require fission to initiate the thermonuclear 
process, and this produces radioactive debris. Clean bombs were also less than optimal as 
weapons of war because they were not as energetic as their dirty versions. Design 
requirements also made clean bombs bigger and heavier, again making them less 
desirable to the military.
389
 The continued presence of radiation, the desire for optimum 
weapons of war, and the technical problems relating to size meant this effort would be 
taken no further. 
Redwing and Hardtack I 
 All of the Redwing tests were scientifically and operationally unremarkable. They 
were confirmation tests of weapons that were about to enter the stockpile and were 
conducted as scheduled without any delays or surprises. As described earlier, the drama 
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related to Redwing was the complaint by the UCRL about its treatment at the hands of 
Los Alamos. 
 
Table 11 
 
Operation Redwing – Bikini and Enewetak Atolls 
 
Test Date Laboratory Location Venue Yield 
Lacrosse 05/04/1956 LASL Enewetak Surface 40 kt 
Cherokee 05/20/1956 LASL Bikini Airdrop 3.8 Mt 
Zuni 05/27/1956 UCRL Bikini Surface 3.5 Mt 
Yuma 05/27/1957 UCRL Enewetak Tower 0.190 kt 
Erie 05/30/1956 LASL Enewetak Tower 14.9 kt 
Seminole 06/06/1956 LASL Enewetak Surface 13.7 kt 
Flathead 06/11/1956 LASL Bikini Barge 365 kt 
Blackfoot 06/11/1956 LASL Enewetak Tower 8 kt 
Kickapoo 06/13/1956 UCRL Enewetak Tower 1.49 kt 
Osage 06/16/1956 LASL Enewetak Airdrop 1.7 kt 
Inca 06/21/1956 UCRL Enewetak Tower 15.2 kt 
Dakota 06/25/1956 LASL Bikini Barge 1.1 Mt 
Mohawk 07/02/1956 UCRL Enewetak Tower 360 kt 
Apache 07/08/1956 UCRL Enewetak Barge 1.85 Mt 
Navajo 07/10/1956 LASL Bikini Barge 4.5 Mt 
Tewa 07/20/1956 UCRL Bikini Barge 5 Mt 
Huron 07/21/1956 LASL Enewetak Barge 250 kt 
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 Hardtack was to be a continuation of Redwing, but the looming prospect of a test 
moratorium changed the thinking of Los Alamos and the UCRL. Should a moratorium 
become likely, Hardtack might be the only opportunity, for an unspecified period of time, 
to generate experimental data sufficient to keep the United States nuclear program viable. 
Hence, both laboratories submitted requests to conduct more than thirty tests. Unable to 
accept so many proposals, the DMA initially limited Hardtack to total of twenty tests 
evenly divided between the two laboratories.
390
 Bradbury immediately protested, noting 
that since Los Alamos was responsible for six weapons and the UCRL only three, an 
even split of tests hampered the ability of Los Alamos to meet its “immediate and definite 
responsibilities.”391 What that meant, Bradbury said, is that “our program with one or two 
exceptions, are nose-to-the-grindstone programmatic experiments related to things we 
have to do with specific weapon designs; they are having fun.”392 The UCRL response to 
the DMA proposal was, in its own way, equally visceral. Still smarting from their 
treatment at Redwing, the UCRL said that it would accept full responsibility only for its 
specific tests and would not accept any obligation beyond that. In other words, they 
would not be subject to any Los Alamos interference. The relatively minor personnel 
issue in 1956 had grown into full-blown animosity between the nation’s two nuclear 
weapon laboratories. 
 Despite the serious hostility, two factors prevented the situation from disrupting 
Hardtack. First, the looming moratorium increased the need for generating and collecting 
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all possible data. As a result, the DMA rethought its original limitation on the number of 
tests, and secured presidential permission for thirty five tests, of which thirty two were 
slated to be carried out at Bikini and Enewetak. Even though the number of tests was split 
approximately evenly between the two laboratories, seventeen for Los Alamos and fifteen 
for the UCRL, Los Alamos had more than enough shots to allay Bradbury’s concerns 
about parity. The second event that muted the animosity was a change in the leadership of 
JTF 7.1. Felt, the Los Alamos protagonist at Redwing, resigned as commander of JTF 7.1 
to take a job in Massachusetts. He was replaced by Don B. Shuster of the Sandia 
Corporation, which engineered the designs of Los Alamos and the UCRL into actual 
weapons. As a Sandia employee, Shuster was a neutral entity. Jerry Johnson, the UCRL 
protagonist, was relegated to the sidelines when he was assigned to plan the United 
Nations Observer shot. These changes blunted the conflict and allowed Hardtack to be 
carried out without incident. 
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Table 12 
Operation Hardtack I – Bikini and Enewetak Atolls 
Test Date Laboratory Location Venue Yield 
Cactus 05/05/1958 LASL Enewetak Surface 18 kt 
Fir 05/11/1958 UCRL Bikini Barge 1.36 Mt 
Butternut 05/11/1958 LASL Enewetak Barge 81 kt 
Koa 05/12/1958 LASL Enewetak Surface 1.37 Mt 
Wahoo 05/16/1958 LASL Enewetak Underwater 9 kt 
Holly 05/20/1958 LASL Enewetak Barge 5.9 kt 
Nutmeg 05/21/1958 UCRL Bikini Barge 25.1 
Yellowwood 05/26/1958 LASL Enewetak Barge 330 kt 
Magnolia 05/26/1958 LASL Enewetak Barge 57 kt 
Tobacco 05/30/1958 LASL Enewetak Barge 11.6 kt 
Sycamore 05/31/1958 UCRL Bikini Barge 92 kt 
Rose 06/02/1958 LASL Enewetak Barge 15 kt 
Umbrella 06/08/1958 LASL Enewetak Underwater 8 kt 
Maple 06/10/1958 UCRL Bikini Barge  213 kt 
Aspen 06/14/1958 UCRL Bikini Barge 319 kt 
Walnut 06/14/1958 LASL Enewetak Barge 1.45 Mt 
Linden 06/18/1958 LASL Enewetak Barge 11 kt 
Redwood 06/27/1958 UCRL Bikini Barge 412 kt 
Elder 06/27/1958 LASL Enewetak Barge  880 kt 
Oak 06/28/1958 LASL Enewetak Barge 8.9 Mt 
Hickory 06/29/1958 UCRL Bikini Barge 14 kt 
Sequoia 07/01/1958 LASL Enewetak Barge 5.2 kt 
Cedar 07/02/1958 UCRL Bikini Barge 220 kt 
Dogwood 07/05/1958 UCRL Enewetak Barge 397 kt 
Poplar 07/12/1958 UCRL Bikini Barge 9.3 Mt 
Scaevola 07/14/1958 LASL Enewetak Barge 0 
Pisonia 07/17/1958 LASL Enewetak Barge 255 kt 
Juniper 07/22/1958 UCRL Bikini Barge 65 kt 
Olive 07/22/1958 UCRL Enewetak Barge 202 kt 
Pine 07/26/1958 UCRL Enewetak Barge  2 Mt 
Quince 08/06/1958 UCRL Enewetak 
 
Surface 0 
Fig 08/18/1958 UCRL Enewetak Surface 20 tons 
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Silence 
 Shot Juniper, fired by the UCRL on July 22, 1958, was the last nuclear test to take 
place at Bikini Atoll. Less than a month later, on August 18
th
, Shot Fig disturbed the early 
morning calm of Enewetak. Fig’s energy yield, just 0.20 kiloton, was barely noticeable, 
particularly after the very large boomers that preceded it. Two days after Fig’s faint noise 
faded, President Dwight Eisenhower wrote directly to Norris Bradbury saying, “I am 
today announcing that the United States will suspend nuclear weapons tests for a period 
of twelve months and, under certain conditions of progress toward real disarmament, 
continue that suspension on a year-to-year basis.” Although it was not known at the time, 
Enewetak and Bikini would never again tremble from a nuclear detonation. Nuclear 
testing in the Marshall Islands had come to end. 
 The President’s announcement of a moratorium was not a surprise. A cessation of 
testing had been in the making in some form since the bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. Early postwar efforts to control atomic energy, such as the Acheson-Lilienthal 
Report put forward at the United Nations, failed to gain traction, prevented by increasing 
tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.
393
 Bravo changed the political 
discussion, opening the debate to the entire world. Japan was the first nation to protest, 
followed by the Marshallese, and then by India, the leading proponent of neutrality. Japan 
reacted viscerally to the contamination of the Lucky Dragon, the temporary collapse of its 
tuna export market, and continued testing at Bikini. The horrors of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki were all too real. The Marshallese, surprisingly, because of their natural 
reticence, complained to the United Nations that “its people on two small coral islands 
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suffered ill effects from nuclear tests in March.” The Indian government took up the 
Marshallese cause, arguing before the United Nations that the United States did not have 
the right to use the Marshall Islands for nuclear testing “in the same way as New 
Mexico.”394 Indian involvement would eventually lead to the Bandung Conference of 
1962 and the creation of the non-aligned countries movement. 
 Anticipating an international push to stop nuclear, Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles asked the AEC to comment on the ramifications of a test moratorium. The AEC, 
in turn, forwarded Dulles’ request to Los Alamos and the UCRL. The two laboratory 
directors, Norris Bradbury and Edward Teller, responded saying that their “technical 
advice is, in the main, negative.” A moratorium on testing, particularly one of long 
duration, would freeze the current state of knowledge. This would mean Los Alamos and 
the UCRL would in all likelihood wither as scientific institutions as their scientific staff 
sought challenging work elsewhere. The question, then, was who would take care of the 
stockpile and insure its safety and vitality. The second problem that worried Bradbury 
and Teller was the absence of any technical means of monitoring Soviet compliance, 
since, as they noted, “Long range detection is insufficient to give a measurement of the 
size of any explosion.” By keeping energy yields low, the Soviets could effectively hide 
nuclear tests and advance their weapons program. Bradbury and Teller believed that “any 
agreement would be rigorously observed by ourselves whereas the it might be 
circumvented or at an appropriate moment openly violated by Russia.”395 
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 Missing from the Bradbury and Teller analysis was any mention of fallout. 
Scientists who worked with nuclear weapons, particularly Teller, did not worry about 
fallout. Their scientific understanding of radiation led them to believe that testing did not 
produce anywhere near the amount of contaminated debris needed to harm humans. Both 
men, but particularly Teller, erroneously believed that a moratorium could be averted and 
public anxiety about fallout allayed by restricting the energy yields of tests. Their hope 
was to continue testing low-yield devices, which would allow both laboratories to 
continue developing tactical weapons for the military.
396
 But their hopes and beliefs were 
unrealistic, even naïve in their understanding of public opinion. 
 The Moratorium was a disturbing possibility because the AEC had no 
contingency plans to cope with a cessation of testing. The AEC provided little useful 
advice and guidance to the labs, simply saying that “some conjecture must necessarily be 
involved in supposing the world to have taken such an enormous step as to have actually 
agreed to a safeguarded and fully inspect disarmament or even test moratorium.” This 
guidance from acting AEC chairman W.F. Libby, went on to suggest that the lab should 
mark time during a test ban by analyzing the data gathered during recent operations. That 
activity should, it was hoped, keep Los Alamos viable for a year or two. Libby also 
suggested that Bradbury make plans to reorganize Los Alamos to keep the Laboratory in 
“the best scientific trim.” By that, Libby meant that Bradbury should promote pure 
research or invent other activities that would keep the scientific staff engaged. Libby 
further instructed Bradbury to do his planning in secret to “prevent there developing a 
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feeling that you, and we, believe a moratorium or cessation is immediate.” Apparently, 
Libby thought that Los Alamos scientists did not keep up with world affairs.
397
 
 Although not happy about a moratorium, Bradbury and Los Alamos did not see it 
as an immediate threat to its existence. There were more than enough weapons about to 
enter the stockpile to keep the nation strong if the cessation was of short duration. In this 
attitude he differed violently with the UCRL and its desire to continue testing.
398
 But 
beyond what the labs might do during a moratorium was the larger question regarding the 
maintenance of the stockpile. Just as the moratorium was taking affect, serious safety 
concerns were discovered in the fundamental designs of the current weapons.  This safety 
issue could not be corrected without testing and hence remained unresolved until testing 
resumed in 1961. 
 Ultimately, it was the President who provided Los Alamos with its only real 
guidance. In his August 22
nd
 letter to Bradbury, Eisenhower wrote, “it will be necessary 
that we maintain our weapons development progress during the period and with no less 
urgency than in the past.” To this directive, John McCone, the Chairman of the AEC, 
added the caveat that Bradbury “should keep in mind the uncertainty as to whether the 
Soviets Union will fulfill the conditions that the President has set forth as prerequisite for 
continuation of the moratorium.”399 The only way to meet the President’s guidance was 
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to replace the real world of testing with the imagined world of paper and pencil 
calculations. 
 On October 30
th
, the UCRL detonated the final test, codenamed Titania, before 
the moratorium became effective. Titania’s very low yield, like that of Fig, was 
anticlimactic, particularly in bringing an end to a period nuclear testing that involved both 
the world’s first atomic and hydrogen bombs. The first test, Trinity, made known to Los 
Alamos both the extraordinary destructive power of atomic bombs and the nasty problem 
of radioactive fallout. Although these problems were made very clear to the public with 
the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the public “shrugged aside warnings of 
Armageddon as fantasies of some fairly remote future.”400 When the United States moved 
its testing to the Marshall Islands, the problem of fallout disappeared from public concern 
until Bravo. This test not only ignited worldwide concern about fallout, it also raised the 
question about the value of nuclear weapons themselves. Did their value to national 
defense override concern for public health? The moratorium was a partial answer to the 
question of public health as well as “a practical and symbolic obstacle against the spread 
of weapons.”401 
 Although both Edward Teller and Norris Bradbury thought the moratorium could 
be deleterious to their labs, the effect was minimal. Los Alamos turned its expertise to the 
design of nuclear reactors for interstellar rockets in a program called Project Rover. The 
lab also explored the use of nuclear explosions in an early form of fracking. The huge 
amount of data generated by the Hardtack tests was largely unused with the exception of 
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the data related to the safety flaw discovered during the last days before the moratorium. 
When testing resumed in 1961, Los Alamos picked up where it had left off, but not in the 
Marshall Islands. By that time, the Pacific Proving Ground had been abandoned. 
  253 
CHAPTER 10 
EPILOG 
 
When the test moratorium went into effect, the AEC knew that Bikini had 
outlived its usefulness for nuclear testing. The primary reason was Bikini’s proximity to 
Rongelap and the likelihood that thermonuclear tests, particularly if conducted at high 
altitude, could cause eye burns to the recently returned islanders. If the islanders of 
Rongelap were injured a second time, the United States would suffer in the court of world 
opinion. Also, Bravo’s lingering radiation had rendered all but two of the atoll’s island 
unusable for any test activities, such as for rocket launch sites. Having no value, Bikini 
Atoll was abandoned. After its brief era of notice and notoriety from 1946 to 1958, Bikini 
was again all but forgotten.  
 Enewetak was viewed differently. Believing that the moratorium would be 
temporary, the United States kept Enewetak in a state of readiness for a short time under 
the codename Project Switch. A small work crew was stationed there to maintain the 
facilities and construct a balloon factory on Engebi Island.
402
 Tethered balloons had been 
successfully used in Nevada to lift test devices to very high altitudes before detonation, 
and JTF-7 was confident that balloons could be used for the same purpose at Enewetak 
despite the constant winds, which could reach speeds of twenty-five knots. As the 
moratorium wore on, however, Enewetak became an albatross, and as the costs of 
maintaining Enewetak in readiness grew, the decision was ultimately made in early 1961 
to abandon the facilities. The entire Pacific Proving Ground had outlived its usefulness. 
                                                 
402
 The facility was never built. 
 
  254 
When JTF-7 was formally disbanded and Project Switch cancelled, control of both 
Enewetak and Bikini, was reverted to the Trust Territory, which  was left to pick up the 
pieces left by sixty-six nuclear tests conducted on, under, and over six square miles of 
land and water and that had forced evacuations of the Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, and 
Utirik islanders. The three charts below summarize, statistically, nuclear testing in the 
Marshall Islands. 
 
 
Figure 51 Number of tests in the Marshall Islands by year. 
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Figure 52. Marshall Islands Tests by Atoll. 
 
 
Figure 53. Energy Yields by Year. 
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The Moratorium and The Marshallese 
Although the moratorium ended testing in the Marshall Islands, it had little other 
positive effect on the plight of the peoples of Bikini, Enewetak, and Rongelap. A cleanup 
effort on Bikini during the 1960s led to the return of a few families in the early 1970s, but 
their return was only temporary. The cleanup could not remove all of the 
137
Cesium and 
90
Strontium in the soil. These two radioactive isotopes migrated to the plant stocks that 
were the staple of the Bikinians’ diet. After just a few years of living on Bikini, the 
returnees had accumulated significant body burdens of these isotopes and were returned 
to Kili. In 1980 the Department of Energy published a pamphlet, “The Meaning of 
Radiation at Bikini Atoll,” in an attempt to explain why the Bikinians could not live on 
their homeland.
403
 The pamphlet offered no hope that the atoll could ever be reoccupied, 
and Bikini remains, today, uninhabited and uninhabitable. 
 A 1970s cleanup of the southern half of Enewetak atoll permitted the return of 
some of its people in the 1970s. The southern half of the atoll had been used for housing 
and laboratories and was only slightly contaminated by testing. The northern half of the 
atoll, however, was used for ground zero sites and, as a consequence, was heavily 
contaminated. Despite a massive cleanup effort, the northern islands remain contaminated 
and uninhabitable. Engebi and Runit islands have the distinction of being some of the 
most bombed real estate in the world. The DOE published a second pamphlet, “The 
Enewetak Atoll Today.”404  It, too, was an attempt to explain the effects radioactive 
contamination and explain why part of the atoll will likely remain uninhabitable. 
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Despite the continuing notoriety of Bravo and the Lucky Dragon, the plight of the 
Rongelap people has disappeared from view. The Rongelapese and the islanders of Utirik 
were the only Marshallese to be physically harmed by a United States nuclear test. The 
harm to the Rongelapese was particularly severe because they cooked and ate outside in 
the midst of Bravo’s fallout and drank water from uncovered well. Their exposure to 
radioactive contamination was made worse by the delay in their evacuation. The islanders 
of Rongelap, and to a lesser extent those of Utirik, suffered because there was (and is) no 
medical cure for exposures to radiation. Only the body can repair and replace cells 
damaged by radiation – if the damage is not too severe. Treatment is limited to the use of 
antibiotics to prevent infections from low white cell counts and salves to ease the 
discomfort of beta burns.
405
  Lingering radioactive contamination, particularly 
137
Ce in 
the atoll’s soil, prevented the Rongelap people from being returned to their homes after 
the conclusion of Castle.  They were moved to a small island in Majuro Atoll where they 
waited for their atoll to cool.
406
  Repatriated in 1957, the Rongelapese witnessed the 
many tests of Operation Hardtack I with unease. In 1985, the islanders, fearing lingering 
radiation, left Rongelap with the assistance of Greenpeace. They moved to one an 
uninhabited island in Kwajalein Atoll waiting yet for their atoll to cool. 
The Learning Regime 
 From a technical perspective, nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands was 
enormously successful. The crude fission bombs of World War II were improved and 
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perfected, particularly at Operation Sandstone in 1948. Thermonuclear weapons became 
a reality because of Operation Castle in 1954. Operations Redwing and Hardtack 
provided the militarily with specialized weapons and advanced the technology of safety, 
but not the science of weapons. The cumulative effect of the learning regime was to 
transform the chimera that was the New World in 1945 into a reality. This transformation 
occurred primarily because of the activities Los Alamos and the work of its scientists, 
who viewed the atomic bomb, and its continuous improvement, as a necessary part of the 
nation’s defense. Believing that its work was important to the country, Los Alamos 
assumed the responsibility for keeping the learning regime alive after the end of World 
War II. Bradbury and his staff understood, better than anybody, that Little Boy and Fat 
Man were the foundation of the nuclear learning regime.  
 The learning regime was not without its problems, particularly with respect to 
radioactivity. When Trinity showed that radioactive could travel thousands of miles, the 
response was to move testing to the Marshall Islands. Bikini and Enewetak provided a 
remote area surrounded by a seemingly empty ocean. Radioactive debris, Crossroads 
planners believed, would simply be swallowed by the Pacific. For the most part, this 
scheme worked, until the testing of thermonuclear weapons. Bravo demonstrated that the 
world was not big enough to hide the radioactive fallout from a thermonuclear 
detonation. Even after the subsequent efforts to reduce fallout by moving testing to 
barges, radioactive debris continued to thrust into atmosphere in significant amounts  he 
learning regime, which had been based on fission devices, could not be sustained once 
the public became aware of the threat posed by thermonuclear testing. Shortly after 
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testing resumed in 1961, nuclear testing moved underground, and a new learning regime 
was developed. 
Nuclear testing has had a lasting and profound impact on both Los Alamos and 
the Marshall Islands.  After the test moratorium ended in September 1961, Los Alamos 
detonated twelve high yield devices at high altitudes near Christmas Island in the Pacific 
and seven more high above Johnston Island, also in the Pacific. Then, beginning in July 
1962, all United States nuclear tests moved underground with the majority such tests 
conducted in Nevada. On September 23, 1992, Los Alamos detonated a test codenamed 
Divider deep underground at the Nevada Test Site. Data collected from the test was used 
to insure the integrity of the United States’ very large and sophisticated nuclear stockpile. 
Nine days after Divider was fired, President George H.W. Bush, announced a unilateral 
moratorium on the testing of nuclear devices. Bush’s successor, Bill Clinton extended the 
moratorium and further announced his intention to pursue a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT).
407
 Although the United States Senate has not ratified the CTBT, the 
nuclear test moratorium initiated by President Bush remains in effect, making Divider the 
last of 1,030 nuclear tests carried out by the United States. Although many at Los Alamos 
feared that the cessation of testing would cripple the Laboratory, the years following 
Divider have proved otherwise. Los Alamos continues to maintain the nuclear stockpile 
ash a well-funded research facility high in the mountains of northern New Mexico. 
Unlike Los Alamos, the Marshall Islands has not prospered. Fifty-seven years 
after the last nuclear test was conducted in the Marshall Islands, Bikini Atoll, the site of 
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twenty three nuclear tests, including the largest ever United States detonation, remains 
uninhabited. The Bikini people, removed from their homeland in 1946 for the Crossroads 
tests, constitute a modern day Diaspora living in enclaves on Kili and Ejit Islands and in 
the United States. The Enewetak people, relocated to nearby Ujelang Atoll prior to the 
Sandstone test series in 1948, constitute a second, albeit smaller, Diaspora. More 
fortunate than their Bikini counterparts, some of the Enewetak people have been able to 
return to part of their homeland. However, many of their individual islands are not likely 
to be resettled. And, because of the manner in which the Navy managed the 1948 
relocation, the identities of two ancestral tribes of Enewetak has been all but 
obliterated.
408
   
The memory of nuclear testing persists among the Marshallese. The radioactive 
contamination of Bikini, Rongelap, and Enewetak is ever present. In 1994, after a series 
of revelations that a small number of Americans had been injected with plutonium during 
the course of medical treatment, then Secretary of Energy Hazel O’Leary began an 
openness initiative.  Although the immediate goal was to discover who, exactly, had been 
injected with plutonium and why, the initiative quickly expanded to include everyone 
who had been exposed to radiation, including the Marshallese.
409
 In July, Tony deBrum, 
a senator in the Marshallese parliament submitted testimony about the effects of nuclear 
testing in his country to the Commission on Human Radiation Experimentation. He had 
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grown up on Likiep Atoll, witnessed a number of nuclear tests, was involved in the 
rehabilitation of Bikini, had assisted in the resettlement of the atoll, and its subsequent 
evacuation. deBrum’s testimony had one theme: the United States had used the 
Marshallese, particularly the people of Rongelap, Utirik, and Ailuk, as “subjects of 
human radiation experiments.”410   
deBrum’s testimony was significant for three reasons. First, it underscored the 
fact that no good explanation was ever given about why Rongelap, Utirik, and other 
inhabited atolls had not been evacuated prior to Bravo and why no one was held 
accountable. Second, deBrum’s testimony highlighted the fact that the Marshallese were 
never accorded, as the United Nations trusteeship stipulated, protection equal to that of 
United States citizens. Bikini and Enewetak Atolls were taken by the United States 
without legal recourse and testing clearly placed many Marshallese in harm’s way. When 
the Marshallese finally protested to the United Nations in 1954, the United States 
effectively quashed their petition. Finally, deBrum’s testimony highlights the differences 
in the memory of nuclear testing in the Pacific between those who detonated atomic 
bombs and those who bore the burden of those detonations.
411
 For the Marshallese, the 
memory persists. For Los Alamos, it is non-existent. 
Were the Marshallese people, as deBrum charged, guinea pigs, purposely exposed 
to the radioactive fallout from atomic bombs? The President’s Advisory Committee on 
Human Radiation Experiments, established in the early 1990s to investigate such charges, 
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found no such evidence and concluded that the exposure of the Rongelap people, and by 
extension that of all the Marshallese, was an accident.
 
The known evidence supports this 
finding.  Los Alamos scientists grossly underestimated the explosive power of Bravo and 
four other Castle test devices. Military weather experts miscalculated both wind and 
fallout vectors.  Most significantly, everyone involved with Bravo believed the unproved 
theory of stratospheric trapping. The budgetary constraints cited by Admiral Stump that 
led to the decision not to evacuate the nearby inhabited atolls added to list of “accidents” 
that led to harming the people of Rongelap. Although the President’s Advisory 
Committee was technically correct in concluding that the Marshallese people were not 
guinea pigs, the fact remains that many of the nuclear tests conducted at Bikini and 
Enewetak spread fallout throughout the archipelago. The question that remains then, did 
knowing about the widespread fallout constitute human experimentation? Again, the 
answer is technically no since the exposures were not planned, but accepted as a cost of 
doing business. To be fair, the fallout, while detectable, did not meet the established 
threshold for concern.  However the fact remains that, with the exception of a few 
American scientists and military personnel, only the Marshallese, as group of people, 
were put in harm’s way. 
The Advisory Committee did fault the medical care given to Rongelap people. A 
lack of concern for cultural and linguistic differences affected the quality of medical care. 
Like the issue of human experimentation, the analysis of this finding is difficult to state 
with certainty.  The medical care given to the Rongelapese was appropriate, but not very 
helpful, since there is medical cure for radiation exposures. The body is either to heal 
itself through cell regeneration, or not.  The health status of exposed individuals was 
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tracked through blood and urine samples. Antibiotics were used to treat and prevent 
infections in those cases where immune systems had been compromised. However, in 
treating the Rongelap people, medical personnel did not, and perhaps could not, tell the 
people what was happening, or why, as the only population harmed by radioactivity, they 
were being observed and studied. Nor, were the islanders told about possible long-term 
consequences to their health. 
Enewetak, Bikini, and Los Alamos 
On a bright January morning in 1999, an Air Marshall Islands passenger plane 
buzzed the runway on Enewetak Island. Built in 1953 for Operation Castle, the runway 
extends the length of the island. Although deteriorating in the marine climate, the runway 
is still used for the occasional Air Marshall Islands flights that service Enewetak. Most 
days, however, the runway serves as the only paved road on Enewetak.  Buzzing the 
runway signaled the plane’s arrival, but more importantly, chased away a small herd of 
free roaming pigs. 
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Figure 54.  Runway on Enewetak Island, 1999. LANL Archives. 
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Figure 55. Enewetak Welcome Sign. Author’s Collection. 
 
 On the plane was a group of men mostly from Los Alamos. Among the group 
were several who had participated in the Pacific test operations. Both the United States 
Department of Energy (DOE) and Los Alamos had arranged for them, in the twilight of 
their lives, to visit Enewetak and Bikini along with a few of their much younger 
colleagues, many of whom had never witnessed a nuclear test. The older men were the 
last living link between testing in the Marshall Islands and Los Alamos and, it was hoped, 
they would share their experiences with their much younger colleagues. Jack Clark and 
Darol Froman had participated in Operation Sandstone.  It was Clark who had 
complained in January 1948 about the delay in relocating the Enewetakians to Ujelang. 
Clark also had been trapped in the Bravo firing bunker in 1954. Galen Felt, who had a 
hand in the difficulties with the UCRL in 1956, was along as well. Another passenger, 
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Herb Grier, also had been trapped in the timing and firing bunker on Bikini’s Enyu Island 
by Bravo’s radioactive fallout. Norris Bradbury, the long-time director of Los Alamos, 
completed the group of Pacific veterans. 
 
 
Figure 56. From left to right: Herb Grier, Jack Clark, and Galen Felt in Bravo Firing Bunker. Author’s 
Collection 
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Figure 57. Norris Bradbury. Author’s collection. 
 
Three small pickup trucks of a local construction crew met the flight and took the 
passengers to the dormitory and mobile homes reserved for visitors. Three Marshallese 
women also met the plane, decorating the passengers with colorful leis. Although 
Enewetak Island was home to 900 islanders, very few were visible on the ride to the 
dormitory. After dinner in an outdoor common area, the visitors began showing videos of 
test operations.  Instantly, the area was crowded by islanders interested in watching 
events they were too young to remember.  When the visitors gave gifts of cartoon videos 
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to the children, the ice was broken and the islanders became constant companions for the 
remainder of the visit.
412
  
 
 
Figure 58. Enewetak Governing Council. Author’s Collection. 
 
Beginning the next day, several trips were made by small Boston Whaler sport 
fishing boats to the outer islands, including Runit, Aoman, and Bogin.  On Runit, the 
group literally had to bushwhack its way to the site of the Hardtack Cactus crater and 
dome. During the 1970s, to enable the Enewetak people to return, a cleanup effort had 
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been at Enewetak, and all of the radioactive debris collected had been dumped in the 
Cactus crater and covered with a massive concrete dome. 
 
 
Figure 59. Aerial view of the Cactus Dome and Lacrosse Crater. Author’s Collection. 
 
After leaving Runit, the group floated over the underwater crater created by Mike 
It was, as the helicopter observes saw in 1951, a distinctive deep blue, which contrasted 
sharply with the green shallow water of the surrounding lagoon.  The last stop on the visit 
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was Bogin Island, site of the Redwing Seminole test.  Seminole’s crater, open to the sea, 
is now a saltwater lake filled with a particularly aggressive species of small sharks. 
 
 
Figure 60. Aerial View of Mike Crater. Author’s Collection. 
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Figure 61. Airport terminal at Bikini. Bikini, Ejit, and Kili are the islands on which most Bikinians now live. 
Author’s Collection. 
 
Figure 62. Wading into the surf at Enyu Island. Author’s collection. 
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From Enewetak, the group flew to Bikini Atoll, landing on Enyu Island.  The 
most physically demanding part of the trip was wading into the lagoon’s surf to board the 
transport boats. Enyu’s coastline is extremely rocky and cannot be approached by even 
small boats. Fortunately, at Bikini Island, the transport boats were pulled on shore by a 
small bulldozer. At Bikini, Clark, Grier, and Felt were able to enter their timing and 
firing bunker that had protected them from the worst of Bravo’s fallout. Somewhat 
surprisingly, none of them showed any emotion. 
The only person to show any emotion during the trip was Bradbury, who recalled 
on more than one occasion, the tremendous burdens he shouldered for Los Alamos as the 
Laboratory carried out its work. Despite repeated promptings by the DOE 
representatives, none of the men said much about their experiences. For them, nuclear 
testing was a distant memory. When these men passed away, over the next several years, 
so too did the last living connections between Los Alamos and the Marshall Islands. The 
only visible reminder that the Los Alamos was involved in the Marshall Islands are two 
street signs – one for Bikini and one for Enewetak.  Few at Los Alamos know the 
meanings of the names. 
In the United States, including Los Alamos, there is almost no memory of testing 
in the Marshall Islands. Bikini is more famous for the swimsuit than the site of forty-three 
nuclear detonations. Those who work in the Laboratory’s administration building walk 
past murals and exhibits of Laboratory achievements that make no mention of nuclear 
testing. For the Marshallese, the memory of testing is immediate and ever present.  Each 
morning, the people of Bikini and Rongelap wake up in places far from their ancestral 
homes. So too, do half of the Enewetak people. If these people are ever able to return 
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home, then perhaps, as the iroij of Utirik said in 1954, “The world, we think she start 
over again.”413 
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Absorbed dose When ionizing radiation passes through matter, some of its  energy 
is imparted to the matter. The amount absorbed per unit mass of 
irradiated material is called the absorbed dose, and is measured in 
rems and rads.  
 
Activation The process of making a material radioactive by bombardment 
 with neutrons, protons, or other nuclear particles. Also called 
 radioactivation.  
 
Alpha particle [Symbol α (alpha)] A positively charged particle emitted by certain 
radioactive materials. It is made up of two neutrons and two 
protons bound together, hence is identical with the nucleus of a 
helium atom. It is the least penetrating of the three common types 
of radiation (alpha, beta, gamma) emitted by radioactive material, 
being stopped by a sheet of paper. It is not dangerous to plants, 
animals or man unless the alpha-emitting substance has entered the 
body. 
 
Atom A particle of matter indivisible by chemical means. It is the 
fundamental building block of the chemical elements. The 
elements, such as iron, lead, and sulfur, differ from each other 
because they contain different kinds of atoms. There are about six 
sextillion (6 followed by 21 zeros, or 6 x 10
21
) atoms in an 
ordinary drop of water. According to present-day theory, an atom 
contains a dense inner core (the nucleus) and a much less dense 
outer domain consisting of electrons in motion around the nucleus. 
Atoms are electrically neutral.  
 
Atomic bomb A bomb whose energy comes from the fission of heavy elements, 
such as uranium or plutonium.  
 
Atomic cloud The cloud of hot gases, smoke, dust, and other matter that is 
carried aloft after the explosion of a nuclear weapon in the air or 
near the surface. The cloud frequently has a mushroom shape. 
 
Atomic Energy [Abbreviation AEC] The independent civilian agency of the 
federal  
Commission government with statutory responsibility for atomic energy 
matters. Also the body of five persons, appointed by the President, 
to direct the agency. 
 
Background Nuclear (or ionizing)radiations arising from within the body and 
from the 
radiation surroundings to which individuals are always exposed. The main 
sources of the natural background radiation are potassium-40 in the 
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body, potassium-40 and thorium, uranium, and their decay 
products (including radium) present in rocks, and cosmic rays 
 
Beta particle [Symbol β (beta)] An elementary particle emitted from a nucleus 
during radioactive decay, with a single electrical charge and a mass 
equal to 
1
/1837 that of a proton. A negatively charged beta particle is 
identical to an electron. A positively charged beta particle is called 
a positron. Beta radiation may cause skin burns, and beta-emitters 
are harmful if they enter the body. Beta particles are easily stopped 
by a thin sheet of metal, however. 
 
Binding energy The binding energy of a nucleus is the minimum energy required 
to dissociate it into its component neutrons and protons. Neutron or 
proton binding energies are those required to remove a neutron or a 
proton, respectively, from a nucleus. Electron binding energy is 
that required to remove an electron from an atom or a molecule. 
 
Biological dose The radiation dose absorbed in biological material. Measured in 
rems. 
 
Biological half-life The time required for a biological system, such as a man or an 
animal, to eliminate, by natural processes, half the amount of a 
substance (such as a radioactive material) that has entered it.  
 
Blast wave A pulse of air, propagated from an explosion, in which the pressure 
increases sharply at the front of a moving air mass, accompanied 
by strong, transient winds. 
 
Bone seeker A radioisotope that tends to accumulate in the bones when it is 
introduced into the body. An example is strontium-90, which 
behaves chemically like calcium. 
 
Bremsstrahlung Literally “braking radiation.” Radiation covering a range of wave 
lengths (and energies) in the X-ray region resulting from the 
electrical interaction of fast (high-energy) electrons with atomic 
nuclei. Bremsstrahlung are produced by the interaction of beta 
particles with matter. 
 
Chain reaction A reaction that stimulates its own repetition. In a fission chain 
reaction a fissionable nucleus absorbs a neutron and fissions, 
releasing additional neutrons. These in turn can be absorbed by 
other fissionable nuclei, releasing still more neutrons. A fission 
chain reaction is self-sustaining when the number of neutrons 
released in a given time equals or exceeds the number of neutrons 
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lost by absorption in non-fissioning material or by escape from the 
system.  
 
Charged particle An ion; an elementary particle that carries a positive or negative 
electric charge. 
 
Clean bomb One in which measures have been taken to reduce the amount of 
residual radioactivity relative to a “normal” weapon of the same 
energy yield.. 
 
Compton effect Elastic scattering of photons (X rays or gamma rays) by electrons. 
In each such process the electron gains energy and recoils, and the 
photon loses energy. This is one of three ways photons lose energy 
upon interacting with matter, and is the usual method with photons 
of intermediate energy and materials of low atomic number. It is 
named for A. H. Compton, American physicist, who discovered it 
in 1923. 
 
Contamination The deposit of radioactive material on the surfaces of structures, 
areas, objects, or personnel, following a nuclear (or atomic) 
explosion. This material generally consists of fallout in which 
fission products and other weapon debris have become 
incorporated with particles of dirt, etc. Contamination can also 
arise from the radioactivity induced in certain substances by the 
action of neutrons from a nuclear explosion.  
 
Critical assembly An assembly of sufficient fissionable material and moderator to 
sustain a fission chain reaction at a very low power level. This 
permits study of the behavior of the components of the assembly 
for various fissionable materials in different geometrical 
arrangements. 
 
Critical mass The minimum mass of a fissionable material that will just maintain 
a fission chain reaction under precisely specified conditions, such 
as the nature of the material and its purity, the nature and thickness 
of the tamper (or neutron reflector), the density (or compression), 
and the physical shape (or geometry). For an explosion to occur, 
the system must be supercritical, i.e., the mass of material must 
exceed the critical mass under the existing conditions. 
 
Decay, radioactive The spontaneous transformation of one nuclide into a different 
nuclide or into a different energy state of the same nuclide. The 
process results in a decrease, with time, of the number of the 
original radioactive atoms in a sample. It involves the emission 
from the nucleus of alpha particles, beta particles (or electrons), or 
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gamma rays; or the nuclear capture or ejection of orbital electrons; 
or fission. Also called radioactive disintegration. 
 
Deuterium [Symbol 
2
H or D] An isotope of hydrogen whose nucleus contains 
one neutron and one proton and is therefore about twice as heavy 
as the nucleus of normal hydrogen, which is only a single proton. 
Deuterium is often referred to as heavy hydrogen; it occurs in 
nature as 1 atom to 6500 atoms of normal hydrogen. It is 
nonradioactive. 
 
Dirty bomb A fission bomb or any other weapon which would distribute 
relatively large amounts of radioactivity upon explosion, as 
distinguished from a fusion weapon. 
 
Electron [Symbol e
-
] An elementary particle with a unit negative electrical 
charge and a mass 
1
/1837 that of the proton. Electrons surround the 
positively charged nucleus and determine the chemical properties 
of the atom. Positive electrons, or positrons, also exist. 
 
Fallout The process or phenomenon of the fallback to the earth’s surface 
of particles contaminated with radioactive material from the 
radioactive cloud. The term is also applied in a collective sense to 
the contaminated particulate matter itself. The early (or local) 
fallout is defined, somewhat arbitrarily, as those particles which 
reach the earth within 24 hours after a nuclear explosion. The 
delayed (or world-wide) fallout consists of the smaller particles 
which ascend into the upper troposphere and into the stratosphere 
and are carried by winds to all parts of the earth. The delayed 
fallout is brought to earth, mainly by rain or snow, over extended 
periods ranging from months to years. 
 
Fissile material While sometimes used as a synonym for fissionable material, this 
term has also acquired a more restricted meaning, namely, any 
material fissionable by neutrons of all energies, including (and 
especially) thermal (slow) neutrons as well as fast neutrons; for 
example, uranium-235 and plutonium-239. 
 
Fission The splitting of a heavy nucleus into two approximately equal parts 
(which are nuclei of lighter elements), accompanied by the release 
of a relatively large amount of energy and generally one or more 
neutrons. Fission can occur spontaneously, but usually is caused by 
nuclear absorption of gamma rays, neutrons or other particles. 
 
Fission products A general term for the complex mixture of substances produced as 
a result of nuclear fission. A distinction should be made between 
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these and the direct fission products or fission fragments which are 
formed by the actual splitting of the heavy-element nuclei. 
Something like 80 different fission fragments result from roughly 
40 different modes of fission of a given nuclear species, e.g., 
uranium-235 or plutonium-239. The fission fragments, being 
radioactive, immediately begin to decay, forming additional 
(daughter) products, with the result that the complex mixture of 
fission products so formed contains about 200 different isotopes of 
36 elements. 
 
Fusion The process whereby the nuclei of light elements, especially those 
of the isotopes of hydrogen, namely, deuterium and tritium, 
combine to form the nucleus of a heavier element with the release 
of substantial amounts of energy. 
 
Fusion weapon An atomic weapon using the energy of nuclear fusion, such as a 
hydrogen bomb.  
 
Gamma rays [Symbol γ (gamma)] High-energy, short-wavelength 
electromagnetic radiation. Gamma radiation frequently 
accompanies alpha and beta emissions and always accompanies 
fission. Gamma rays are very penetrating and are best stopped or 
shielded against by dense materials, such as lead or depleted 
uranium. Gamma rays are essentially similar to X rays, but are 
usually more energetic, and are nuclear in origin. 
 
Ground zero The point on the surface of land or water vertically below or above 
the center of a burst of a nuclear explosion. For a burst over or 
under water, the term surface zero is preferable. 
 
Gun-type weapon A device in which two or more pieces of fissionable material, each 
less than a critical mass, are brought together very rapidly so as to 
form a supercritical mass which can explode as the result of a 
rapidly expanding fission chain. 
 
Half-life The time in which half the atoms of a particular radioactive 
substance disintegrate to another nuclear form. Measured half-lives 
vary from millionths of a second to billions of years. 
 
Hot Highly radioactive. 
 
Hydrogen bomb A nuclear weapon that derives its energy largely from fusion. 
 
Implosion weapon A device in which a quantity of fissionable material, less than a 
critical mass, has its volume suddenly decreased by compression, 
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so that it becomes supercritical and an explosion can take place. 
The compression is achieved by means of a spherical arrangement 
of specially fabricated shapes of ordinary high explosive which 
produce an inwardly-directed implosion wave, the fissionable 
material being at the center of the sphere. 
 
Induced Radioactivity that is created when substances are bombarded with 
radioactivity  neutrons, as from a nuclear explosion or in a reactor, or with 
charged particles produced by accelerators. 
 
Initial nuclear  Nuclear radiation (essentially neutrons and gamma rays) emitted 
radiation  from the fireball and the cloud column during the first minute after 
a nuclear (or atomic) explosion. The time limit of one minute is 
set, somewhat arbitrarily, as that required for the source of part of 
the radiations (fission products, etc., in the radioactive cloud) to 
attain such a height that only insignificant amounts reach the 
earth’s surface. 
 
Ion An atom or molecule that has lost or gained one or more electrons. 
By this ionization it becomes electrically charged. Examples: an 
alpha particle, which is a helium atom minus two electrons; a 
proton, which is a hydrogen atom minus its electron.  
 
Ionization The process of adding one or more electrons to, or removing one 
or more electrons from, atoms or molecules, thereby creating ions. 
High temperatures, electrical discharges, or nuclear radiations can 
cause ionization. 
 
Ionization The separation of a normally electrically neutral atom or molecule 
into electrically charged components. The term is also employed to 
describe the degree or extent to which this separation occurs. In the 
sense used in this manuscript, ionization refers especially to the 
removal of an electron (negative charge) from the atom or 
molecule, either directly or indirectly, leaving a positively charged 
ion. The separated electron and ion are referred to as an ion pair. 
 
Ionizing radiation Electromagnetic radiation (gamma rays or X rays) or particulate 
radiation (alpha particles, beta particles, neutrons, etc.) capable of 
producing ions, i.e., electrically charged particles, directly or 
indirectly, in its passage through matter. 
 
Isotopes Forms of the same element having identical chemical properties 
but differing in their atomic masses (due to different numbers of 
neutrons in their respective nuclei) and in their nuclear properties, 
e.g., radioactivity, fission, etc. For example, hydrogen has three 
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isotopes, with masses of 1 (hydrogen), 2 (deuterium), and 3 
(tritium) units, respectively. The first two of these are stable 
(nonradioactive), but the third (tritium) is a radioactive isotope. 
Both of the common isotopes of uranium, with masses of 235 and 
238 units, respectively, are radioactive, emitting alpha particles, 
but their half-lives are different. Furthermore, uranium-235 is 
fissionable by neutrons of all energies, but uranium-238 will 
undergo fission only with neutrons of high energy.  
 
Kilo A prefix that multiplies a basic unit by 1000. 
 
Kiloton energy The energy of a nuclear explosion which is equivalent to that of an 
explosion of 1000 tons of TNT. 
 
Megaton energy The energy of a nuclear (or atomic) explosion which is equivalent 
to 1,000,000 tons (or 1,000 kilotons) of TNT, i.e., 10
15
 calories or 
4.2 x 10
22
 ergs. 
 
Neutrino [Symbol ʋ (nu)] An electrically neutral elementary particle with a 
negligible mass. It interacts very weakly with matter and hence is 
difficult to detect. It is produced in many nuclear reactions, for 
example, in beta decay, and has high penetrating power; neutrinos 
from the sun usually pass right through the earth. 
 
Nuclear weapons A collective term for atomic bombs and hydrogen bombs. Any 
weapons based on a nuclear explosive. 
 
Plutonium [Symbol Pu] A heavy, radioactive, man-made, metallic element 
with atomic number 94. Its most important isotope is fissionable 
plutonium-239, produced by neutron irradiation of uranium-238. It 
is used for reactor fuel and in weapons. 
 
Prompt radiation Radiation produced by the primary fission or fusion process, as 
distinguished from the radiation from fission products, their decay 
chains and other later reactions. 
 
Quantum theory The statement according to Max Planck, German physicist, that 
energy is not emitted or absorbed continuously but in units or 
quanta. A corollary of this theory is that the energy of radiation is 
directly proportional to its frequency. 
 
Rad (Acronym for radiation absorbed dose.) The basic unit of absorbed 
dose of ionizing radiation. A dose of one rad means the absorption 
of 100 ergs of radiation energy per gram of absorbing material. 
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Radiation The emission and propagation of energy through matter or space 
by means of electromagnetic disturbances which display both 
wave-like and particle-like behavior; in this context the “particles” 
are known as photons. Also, the energy so propagated. The term 
has been extended to include streams of fast-moving particles 
(alpha and beta particles, free neutrons, cosmic radiation, etc.). 
Nuclear radiation is that emitted from atomic nuclei in various 
nuclear reactions, including alpha, beta and gamma radiation and 
neutrons. 
 
Radiation burn Radiation damage to the skin. Beta burns result from skin contact 
with or exposure to emitters of beta particles. Flash burns result 
from sudden thermal radiation. 
 
Radiation illness An acute organic disorder that follows exposure to relatively 
severe doses of ionizing radiation. It is characterized by nausea, 
vomiting, diarrhea, blood cell changes, and in later stages by 
hemorrhage and loss of hair. 
 
Radioactive cloud A mass of air and vapor in the atmosphere carrying radioactive 
debris from a nuclear explosion. 
 
Radioactive  Deposition of radioactive material in any place where it may harm  
contamination persons, spoil experiments, or make products or equipment 
unsuitable or unsafe for some specific use. The presence of 
unwanted radioactive matter. Also radioactive material found on 
the walls of vessels in used-fuel processing plants, or radioactive 
material that has leaked into a reactor coolant. Often referred to 
only as contamination. 
 
Radioactivity The spontaneous emission of radiation, generally alpha or beta 
particles, often accompanied by gamma rays, from the nuclei of an 
(unstable) isotope. As a result of this emission the radioactive 
isotope is converted (or decays) into the isotope of a different 
(daughter) element which may (or may not) also be radioactive. 
Ultimately, as a result of one or more stages of radioactive decay, a 
stable (nonradioactive) end product is formed. 
 
 
Rem A unit of biological dose of radiation; the name is derived from the 
initial letters of the term “roentgen equivalent man (or mammal).” 
The number of rems of radiation is equal to the number of rads 
absorbed multiplied by the RBE of the given radiation (for a 
specified effect). 
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Roentgen [Abbreviation r] A unit of exposure to ionizing radiation. It is that 
amount of gamma or X rays required to produce ions carrying 1 
electrostatic unit of electrical charge (either positive or negative) in 
1 cubic centimeter of dry air under standard conditions. Named 
after Wilhelm Roentgen, German scientist who discovered X rays 
in 1895. 
 
Spontaneous fission Fission that occurs without an external stimulus. Several heavy 
isotopes decay mainly in this manner; examples: californium-252 
and californium-254. The process occurs occasionally in all 
fissionable materials, including uranium-235. 
 
Stratosphere A relatively stable layer of the atmosphere above the tropopause 
and a height of about 30 miles in which the temperature changes 
very little (in polar and temperate zones) or increases (in the 
tropics) with increasing altitudes. In the stratosphere clouds of 
water never form and there is practically no convection. 
 
Supercritical A term used to describe the state of a given fission system when 
the quantity of a fissionable material is greater than the critical 
mass under the existing conditions. A highly supercritical system is 
essential for the production of energy at a very rapid rate so that an 
explosion may occur. 
 
Subcritical mass An amount of fissionable material insufficient in quantity or of 
improper geometry to sustain a fission chain reaction. 
 
Supercritical mass A mass of fuel whose effective multiplication factor is greater than 
one. 
 
Thermal radiation Electromagnetic radiation emitted from the fireball produced by a 
nuclear explosion. Thirty-five percent of the total energy of a 
nuclear explosion is emitted in the form of thermal radiation, as 
light, ultraviolet and infrared radiation. 
 
Thermonuclear A reaction in which very high temperatures bring about the fusion  
reaction of two light nuclei to form the nucleus of a heavier atom, releasing 
a large amount of energy. In a hydrogen bomb, the high 
temperature to initiate the thermonuclear reaction is produced by a 
preliminary fission reaction. 
 
TNT equivalent A measure of the energy released in the detonation of a nuclear (or 
atomic) weapon, or in the explosion of a given quantity of 
fissionable material, expressed in terms of the weight of TNT 
which would release the same amount of energy when exploded. 
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The TNT equivalent is usually stated in kilotons or megatons. The 
basis of the TNT equivalent is that the explosion of 1 ton of TNT 
releases 10
9
 calories of energy. 
 
Troposphere The region of the atmosphere immediately above the earth’s 
surface and up to the tropopause in which the temperature falls 
fairly regularly with increasing altitude. All weather occurs in the 
troposphere, such as wind and rain. 
 
Uranium [Symbol U] A radioactive element with the atomic number 92 and, 
as found in natural ores, an average atomic weight of 
approximately 238. The two principal natural isotopes are 
uranium-235 (0.7% of natural uranium), which is fissionable, and 
uranium-238 (99.3% of natural uranium) which is fertile. Natural 
uranium also includes a minute amount of uranium-234. Uranium 
is the basic raw material of nuclear energy. 
 
X ray A penetrating form of electromagnetic radiation emitted either 
when the inner orbital electrons of an excited atom return to their 
normal state (these are characteristic X rays), or when a metal 
target is bombarded with high speed electrons (these are 
bremsstrahlung). X rays are always nonnuclear in origin. 
 
Yield The total effective energy released in a nuclear (or atomic) 
explosion. It is usually expressed in terms of the equivalent 
tonnage of TNT required to produce the same energy release in an 
explosion. The total energy yield is manifested as nuclear 
radiation, thermal radiation, and shock (and blast) energy, the 
actual distribution being dependent upon the medium in which the 
explosion occurs (primarily) and also upon the type of weapon and 
the time after detonation. 
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TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 
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Majuro, Marshall Islands 
 
November 22, 1956 
 
AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE REGARDING  
THE USE OF BIKINI ATOLL 
 
 WHEREAS, in order for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to play 
its part in the maintenance of international peace and security it became necessary 
for the United States of America, the administering authority for the said Trust 
Territory, to occupy and use, with the consent of the inhabitants, all of the atoll of 
Bikini located in the Marshall Islands, between 11 degrees 29 minutes North 
latitude to 11 degrees 43 minutes North latitude, and 165 degrees 11 minutes East 
Longitude to 165 degrees 34 minutes East longitude, thus depriving the owners of 
the use of said atoll; 
 
 WHEREAS, an assembled meeting was held on Kili Island on November 
9, 1956, with the majority of the people who possess rights in Bikini Atoll to 
discuss a settlement for the past and future use of Bikini Atoll, and  
 
 WHEREAS, agreement was reached at said meeting with no one present 
dissenting, it is hereby agreed as follows: 
 
1. The Government of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands will grant 
and convey to all of the people who possess land rights in Bikini Atoll, 
that is the commoners, according to the accepted Marshallese custom, full 
use rights in the following islands, islets and land parcels from the public 
domain of the said Trust Territory: 
 
 Kili, also known as Hunter’s Island, located at 5 degrees 38  
 minutes 45 seconds North latitude and 169 degrees 7 minutes East 
longitude; 
 
 Jebet (Devet) located on the eastern side of the Jaluit Atoll at 6 degrees 
7 minutes 46 seconds North latitude and 169 degrees   33 
minutes 43 seconds East longitude; 
 
 Jar (Djar) located on the eastern side of Jaluit Atoll at 6 degrees 7 
minutes 36 seconds north latitude and 169 degrees 33 minutes  46 
seconds East longitude; 
 
 Bokalablab located on the eastern side of Jaluit Atoll at 6 degrees 6 
minutes 50 seconds North latitude and 169 degrees 35 minutes  10 
seconds East Longitude; 
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 and the land area on the southern end of Jabwor  Island located on the 
eastern side of Jaluit Atoll known as Lojokar. All government lands 
south of Lojokar wāto to the end of Lullol wāto. 
 
2. All these lands may be divided among the former Bikini people as they 
shall mutually agree, and the use rights to the land, lagoon, or reefs of the 
above mentioned lands, together with all buildings and trees thereon shall 
be held by them, and their heirs and assigns in accordance with the 
accepted Marshallese customs. 
 
3. The aforesaid use rights in the aforesaid government lands shall continue 
until such time as it may be possible for the people to return to Bikini, 
providing they wish to return to occupy said Atoll. 
 
4. The Government of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and/or 
Government of the United States of America shall possess the full use 
rights to Bikini Atoll until such time as it determines it will no longer be 
necessary to occupy and use the said Atoll. 
 
5. The sum of $325,000 shall be conveyed to those persons, those 
commoners, who possess rights in Bikini Atoll. This money is to be 
administered as follows: (1) $25,000, receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged, to be paid the aforesaid parties at the time of signing this 
agreement and may be divided among those who possess aforesaid rights 
in Bikini Atoll, or otherwise utilized as all parties concerned agree; and (2) 
the remaining $300,000 to be placed in a trust fund  to be established and 
administered by the High Commissioner until such time as said trust fund 
can be administered by a qualified institution. The trust fund shall be 
invested only in United States Government securities and interest accrued 
from said fund will be paid in such manner as may be further agreed upon 
by the alabs and people with vested land rights in Bikini. 
 
6. The people and alabs signing this Agreement in Principle represent that 
they have the full and complete right to represent the interests of any and 
all individuals who by reason of having lived on Bikini or Kili, may now 
or at any future date have a claim against the United States or Trust 
Territory Governments by reason of their use of Bikini Atoll. 
 
7.  Accordingly, the people and alabs signing this agreement agree that any 
future claims by Bikinians based on the use of Bikini by the Governments 
of the United States or the Trust Territory or Atoll to Kili Island shall be 
against them and not against the Government. 
 
This Agreement was made voluntarily and without any compulsion or coercion 
whatsoever. 
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 A copy of the agreement translated into the Marshallese language was provided 
for the Bikinians. 
 
 Three things that emerged during the negotiations or are found in the settlement 
are worthy of note. First, it is clear from the statements and questions asked by the 
Bikinians that they did not feel entirely secure about the proceedings and a sense of 
dependency upon the United States was manifest. The Bikinians let it be known that they 
were placing their future in the hands of the United States, and they wanted to be certain 
that they could depend upon the government in time of need. Secondly, the High 
Commissioner did not rule out the possibility that the Bikinians could someday return to 
Bikini. He stressed that it would be a long time, but the possibility was left open. Thirdly, 
the agreement did not actually bestow a title of ownership of Kili and the Jaluit lands 
upon the Bikinians. In subsequent years, both the administration and the Bikinians have 
referred to the agreement as if it were a transfer of ownership from the Trust Territory to 
the Bikinians. The second point of the agreement, however, clearly indicates that the 
Bikinians have full use rights to Kili and the Jaluit lands until they return to Bikini. In the 
event that that does occur, it is clear that Kili and the Jaluit lands may revert to the Trust 
Territory as public domain. 
